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The issue of low compliance among small and medium enterprises (SMEs) has 
become a serious concern in Nigeria. This is particularly evident when the number of 
SMEs who did not pay tax rose from 22.2% in year 2014 to 65% in year 2015. In 
respond to this issue, this study examined the determinants of tax compliance 
behaviour (TCB) among SMEs in Nigeria.  The study examined the effects of work- 
family financial commitment (WFFC), fuel subsidy removal (FSR), and the role of 
perceived service orientation (PSO) and perceived corruption as potential moderators 
of the relationship between economic factors, psychological factors and TCB. Partial 
Least Squares path modeling was employed to test the study hypotheses. Based on a 
sample of 281 SME's owners/managers, the results provided support for most of the 
hypothesized relationships of the study. In particular, WFFC, FSR and tax 
complexity were significantly and negatively related to TCB. The findings suggest 
that the variables are important in further explaining the puzzle of TCB. The 
probability of detection, incentives and public governance quality (PGQ) were 
significantly and positively related to TCB. However, tax rates and tax knowledge 
were found to be insignificant. Furthermore, the results of the moderating effect 
indicated that six of the 12 hypotheses were significant. Perceived corruption showed 
a significant moderating effect on the relationship between tax rates, the probability 
of detection, incentives, tax knowledge and TCB. In addition, PSO also moderate the 
relationship between incentives, PGQ and TCB. The results indicate that PSO could 
assist in reducing the climate of deterrence between the taxpayers and the relevant 
tax authorities. Thus, relevant tax authorities should integrate these variables into 
their processes in order to enhance the level of tax compliance. An enhanced level of 
tax compliance could lead to the overall improvement in the revenue collection of 
the states and the country at large. 
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Pematuhan cukai yang rendah dalam kalangan perusahaan kecil dan sederhana 
(PKS) merupakan isu yang serius di Nigeria. Ini dibuktikan apabila bilangan PKS 
yang tidak membayar cukai meningkat daripada 22.2% pada tahun 2014 kepada  
65%  pada tahun 2015. Sebagai tindak balas kepada isu ini, kajian ini menyelidik 
faktor penentu gelagat pematuhan cukai dalam kalangan PKS di Nigeria. Selain itu, 
kajian ini meninjau kesan konflik di antara komitmen kewangan kerja dan keluarga, 
pemansuhan subsidi minyak dan peranan tanggapan orientasi perkhidmatan dan 
tanggapan rasuah  faktor perantara ke atas hubungan di antara faktor ekonomi, faktor 
psikologi serta gelagat pematuhan cukai. ‗Partial Least Squares Path Modelling 
(PLS)’ digunakan untuk menguji hipotesis kajian. Berdasarkan sejumlah 281 sampel 
kajian ke atas pemilik/pengurus PKS, keputusan kajian menyokong kebanyakan 
hipotesis dalam kajian. Secara khususnya, konflik di antara komitmen kewangan 
kerja dan keluarga, pemansuhan subsidi minyak dan kerumitan cukai adalah 
berhubung secara signifikan dan negatif dengan gelagat pematuhan cukai. Dapatan 
ini menunjukkan  bahawa pemboleh ubah-pemboleh ubah ini adalah penting di 
dalam menerangkan secara lebih lanjut persoalan gelagat pematuhan cukai. 
Kebarangkalian dikesan, insentif (pendorong positif) dan kualiti pentadbiran awam 
adalah berhubung secara signifikan dan positif dengan gelagat pematuhan cukai. 
Walau bagaimanapun, kadar cukai dan pengetahuan cukai didapati tidak mempunyai 
hubungan yang signifikan dengan gelagat pematuhan cukai. Selain itu, dapatan 
menunjukkan enam daripada 12 hipotesis berkaitan faktor perantara adalah 
signifikan. Tanggapan rasuah menunjukkan kesan perantara yang signifikan di antara 
kadar cukai, kebarangkalian dikesan, insentif (pendorong positif), pengetahuan cukai 
dan gelagat pematuhan cukai. Di samping itu, tanggapan orientasi perkhidmatan juga 
memberikan kesan pengantara ke atas hubungan di antara insentif (pendorong 
positif), kualiti pentadbiran awam dan gelagat pematuhan cukai. Hasil dapatan 
menunjukkan  orientasi perkhidmatan boleh membantu di dalam mengurangkan 
bahang penghalang di antara pembayar cukai dan pihak berkuasa cukai. Oleh itu, 
pihak berkuasa cukai boleh mengambil kira pemboleh ubah-pemboleh ubah ini di 
dalam meningkatkan tahap pematuhan cukai. Peningkatan tahap pematuhan cukai 
boleh mendorong penambahbaikan kutipan hasil bagi setiap negeri mahupun negara 
secara keseluruhan.  
 
Kata kunci: konflik di antara komitmen kewangan kerja dan keluarga, pemansuhan 
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NPC National Population Commission 




NRO Native Revenue Ordinance 
OECD Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development 
PAYE Pay As You Earned 
PC Perceived Corruption 
PD Probability of Detection 
PGQ Public Governance Quality 
PIT Personal Income Tax  
PITA Personal Income Tax Act 
PITAM Personal Income Tax (Amendment) Act 
PLS - SEM Partial Least Squares Structural Equation Modeling 
PPTA Petroleum Profit Tax Act  
PSO Perceived Service Orientation 
RM Ringgits Malaysia 
SBIRS States Board of Internal Revenue Services 
SPSS Statistical Packages for Social Science 
SMEDAN Small and Medium Enterprises Development Agency of Nigeria 
SMEs Small and Medium Enterprises 
TC Tax Complexity 
TCB Tax Compliance Behaviour 
TK Tax Knowledge 
TR Tax Rate 
US United State 
VAT Value Added Tax  









1.1 Background of the Study 
Achieving a high level of tax compliance and maintaining the current compliance 
rates are issues of concern to fiscal policy makers, be they in developed or 
developing countries. This is the case as the principal objective of taxation, 
irrespective of the nature of the economy, is to raise revenue towards the financing of 
public goods and services (Cheunjit, 2014). Although much research has 
concentrated on the tax compliance behaviours of general taxpayers (e.g., Jackson & 
Milliron, 1986; McKerchar, 2007), little is known about the behaviours of businesses 
or Small and Medium Enterprise (SME) taxpayers, even though they are important 
sources of tax revenue to the government. 
 
Therefore, business or SMEs tax compliance is critical to the fiscal viability of any 
government, whether in a developed or developing country (Joulfaian, 2009). Torgler 
(2007) reinforced the above assertion reiterating that tax compliance issues in 
relationship to business or SMEs has generally received very little attention in the 
literature. This is surprising taking into account the economic contribution of SMEs 
in the development of any economy (Charoenrat & Harvie, 2014; Kubickova, 
Votoupalova, & Toulova, 2014). 
 
Presently, SMEs have been given due recognition, especially in the developed 
nations, for playing crucial roles in fostering accelerated economic growth and 




Furthermore, Ihua (2009), Okpara (2009), and Taylor (2013) revealed that SMEs 
made-up the largest proportion of businesses globally. By their very nature, these 
enterprises play a tremendous role in employment generation, as well as immensely 
contributing to the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of many countries.  
 
To affirm the above scenario, Kubickova et al. (2014) further revealed that SMEs 
approximately account for almost 99% of all viable and economic entities in the 
entire European Union. In relationship to Nigeria, the Federal Office of Statistics 
reported that Nigerian SMEs make up 97% of the entire economy (Atawodi & Ojeka, 
2012). Although, smaller in size, they are regarded as the most important enterprises 
in the economy because, when aggregated, the resultant effect of these SMEs 
exceeds that of the larger companies (Adebisi & Gbegi, 2013). Similarly, the 
National Micro, Small and Medium Enterprises Collaborative Survey (NMSMECS) 
(2010) also show that SMEs constitute one, if not the most, important sector of the 
Nigerian economy. They currently represent 96% of the businesses in Nigeria and 
contribute 75% of the national employment. A Small and Medium Enterprises 
Development Agency of Nigeria (SMEDAN) survey in conjunction with the 
National Bureau of Statistics (NBS) showed that the country has more than 17.3 
million SMEs and growth in the sector directly correlates with the growth in the 
economy as a whole (Ndumanya, 2013). Additionally, another report further revealed 
that SMEs constitute more than 90% of the Nigerian businesses, but their 
contribution is only 1% of the GDP (Ghandi & Amissah, 2014). 
 
Over the years, the contribution of SMEs, and prevailing issues of tax compliance 




non-compliance in the country.  Issues of tax compliance have been seen as a global 
phenomenon; for instance, the BBC news magazine (2013) revealed that, in the 
United Kingdom low and even noncompliance is being recorded year in and year 
out. According to the report, Amazon and Google units in the United Kingdom, who 
separately recorded a turnover of 3.35 billion and 395 million UK pounds 
respectively only paid 1.8 million and 6 million pounds as tax, while the Starbucks 
United Kingdom unit recorded a turnover of 400 million but engaged in transfer 
pricing with a sister company in New Zealand. In the same vein, another statistic 
issued by the New Sabah Times (2013) revealed that Inland Revenue Board Malaysia 
was able to solve only 1.9 million tax litigation cases in 2012, which enabled the 
government to recoup RM2.95 million. 
 
In recent times, Nigeria has appeared on the bottom rungs of many global indexes of 
economic and social development. One of the latest indexes, Paying Taxes (2014, 
2015) by the World Bank and PwC, compares tax systems across the world. In 2009, 
2010, 2011, 2012, 2013, 2014 and 2015, Nigeria was ranked 132th, 180th, 138th, 
155th, 170th, 179th, and 181th in collections respectively out of 189 countries. The 
assessment was based on three major indicators, namely, total tax rate; number of 
payments and compliance time, which further revealed that Nigeria‘s tax 
administration was ranked better than only eight countries of the 189 countries 
surveyed at the end of 2015. The report further disclosed that the explanation for 
Nigeria‘s decline in the latest ranking was because the time it takes for most 
businesses to comply with the requirements for tax payment is longer than what is 





Similarly, statistics issued by Nigeria‘s Department of Planning, Reporting and 
Statistics of the Federal Inland Revenue Services (FIRS) revealed that the 
contribution of non-oil tax revenue to the Nigeria economy was on the decrease 
compared to the oil tax revenue as shown in Table 1.1 and depicted in Figures 1.1 
and 1.3. The statistics further revealed that in 2013 the North West geopolitical zone 
achieved the lowest tax collection performance of 72.2% compared to other regions 
with 93.3%; 91.6%; 125%; 81.1% and 83.3% for South West, South East, South 
South, North Central, and North East as presented in Table 1.2. In terms of revenue 
contribution, the North West contributed the lowest percentage of tax revenue to the 
economy as depicted in Figure 1.2. 
Table 1.1 
Nigeria's Total Tax Revenue Collection from 2011 to 2014 (2nd Quarter) 
Year Non-oil tax (N' 
Billion) 
Oil tax (N' 
Billion) 
% of non-oil tax % of oil tax 
2011 
    1st Quarter 297.70 657.40 31.17 68.83 
2nd Quarter 337.10 648.10 34.21 65.79 
3rd Quarter 528.70 888.20 37.31 62.69 
4th Quarter 379.60 891.40 29.87 70.13 
2012 
    1st Quarter 315.30 857.10 26.89 73.11 
2nd Quarter 523.20 743.90 41.29 58.71 
3rd Quarter 567.70 798.30 41.56 58.44 
4th Quarter 385.90 815.80 32.12 67.80 
2013 
    1st Quarter 403.70 802.90 33.46 66.54 
2nd Quarter 643.00 793.40 44.77 55.23 
3rd Quarter 635.20 520.40 54.97 45.03 





    1st Quarter 418.20 638.00 39.60 60.40 
2nd Quarter 815.90 639.20 56.07 43.93 
Source: FIRS (2014). 
Table 1.2 
2013 Tax Collection Performance Based on Geopolitical Zones 
Zones Targeted Revenue    
(N' Billion) 




South West 133.20 124.80 93.30 
South East 14.40 13.20 91.60 
South South 76.80 96.00 125.00 
North Central 45.60 37.00 81.10 
North East 21.60 18.00 83.30 
North West* 21.60 15.60 72.20 
Source: FIRS (2014). 
 
 











Figure 1.3. Contribution of Non-Oil Tax Revenue to Oil Tax Revenue. 
 
Furthermore, Taiwo (2014) also revealed that total tax revenue represents only 4.6% 
of the GDP in Nigeria before rebasing the current GDP. In contrast, the tax revenue 
of a Ghana, a neighbouring country with a lower population and fewer SMEs as well 




further revealed that the situation is reported to be particularly critical, especially in 
the informal sector, the SME's, which should be the engine of the economy. In 
addition, taking a cursory look at the currently revised GDP of Nigeria in 2014, the 
percentage of taxes to GDP is a far cry from what the 12% of GDP that it should be, 
falling below the rule of thumb of 15% the International Monetary Fund has 
recommended (Harmon, 2014). Similarly, a more recent report issued by the Nigeria 
Minister of Finance, revealed that the country‘s GDP has increased from N42.3 
trillion to N80.3 trillion, making the country the largest economy in Africa, as well as 
the 26th largest economy in the world. However, the Minister further reiterated that, 
the tax revenue ratio to the country's GDP has declined from 20% to 12% and now to 
3.85%. Even in war-torn countries, the percentage is 11%, but Nigeria is far from 
reality (NAN, 2014). 
 
Additionally, other statistics issued by the FIRS show that the government lost more 
than N110 million in Jos (Plateau State), which resulted in sealing off a micro- 
finance bank and another 16 SMEs owing to tax-related issues on the 16th 
November, 2014 as reported by the state tax controller (Abimaje, 2014). Also, the 
Executive Chairman of the Kaduna State Board of Internal Revenue Service‘s further 
reported that the government of Kaduna state lost more than N18 billion ($112.5 
million) in 2013 due to unpaid taxes (Tanko, 2014). The singular act resulted in the 
closure of twenty-five private schools, hospitals, eateries, hotels and even a 






Similarly, the Accountant General of the Kaduna State government shows that of the 
six million taxable residents in the state only five hundred thousand complied with 
tax payments (Shekari, 2014). In a related development, the Chairman of the Task 
Force on Revenue Generation in Kano State, Nigeria reported that the Kano State 
Board of Internal Revenue Service's has shuttered more than twenty-nine educational 
institutions as a result of alleged failure to pay taxes to the government (Muhammad, 
2012). This, according to the report, has negatively affected the internally generated 
revenue of the state. 
 
Based on the foregoing, re-examining the present tax compliance of SMEs within the 
prevailing economic condition of Nigeria is expedient. The President of the 
Chartered Institute of Taxation of Nigeria (CITN) recently reported that the level of 
tax compliance in Nigeria is abysmally low, so every effort to gather more taxes and 
increase compliance is a welcome development (Dike, 2014). Hence, the current 
study attempts to fill the current gap by focusing on the determinants of tax 
compliance behaviour among the SMEs, and the moderating role of Perceived 
Service Orientation (PSO) and perceived corruption that could assist in explaining 
the puzzle of tax compliance in relationship to Nigerian SMEs. 
1.2 The Problem Statement 
The low level of tax compliance is one of the major problems facing most policy 
makers in many developing countries. This is because lack of compliance limits the 
ability of government to raise revenues for developmental purposes (Torgler, 2003). 




entities evade their taxes, at the expense of why a remarkable number of people 
willingly comply with their tax obligations (Slemrod, 1992). 
 
In Nigeria, the issue of tax compliance has become a serious concern. Although tax 
audits and investigation departments exist in almost all State Boards of Internal 
Revenue Service (SBIRS) with sufficient mechanisms to address compliance issues, 
low compliance remains a persistent problem among SMEs and other sub sectors 
(Dike, 2014; Taiwo, 2013).  
 
In recent times, Atawodi and Ojeka (2012) reported that tax compliance issues 
remained a difficult task to achieve due to the fact that a good number of SMEs 
carted away a large chunk of unpaid taxes, which might have been invested in 
developing the economy and are lost annually. The Coordinating Minister for the 
Economy and Minister of Finance lamented that more than 65% of the businesses in 
the country have not filed their tax returns for the past two years which has again 
brought to the forefront the issue of low tax compliance in the country (NAN, 2014). 
 
In addition, the Joint Tax Board (JTB) statistically reported that, about 10,006,304 
registered for personal income tax purposes in all the states of the federation 
including the FCT which the SMEs falls under its jurisdiction (Taiwo, 2016). Out of 
this, about 4.6 million or 46% are registered with the Lagos State Internal Revenue 
Service (LIRS) indicating an average of 153,000 or 1.5% per state for others 
(National Bureau of Statistics, 2016). Compared to the labour workforce of 77 
million at the end of 2015 according to the National Bureau of Statistics (NBS), the 




largest employer of labour is not fully compliant in deducting and remitting taxes on 
the salaries of their workers less alone SMEs owners (Taiwo, 2016). This is evident 
in the paltry personal income tax collection nationwide. To buttress further, the NBS 
recently released tax collection data by all 36 states of the federation which totalled 
N683.6 billion out of which Lagos state accounted for N268 bn or 40% of the total 
revenue collected by all the states of the federation in 2015. In fact, Lagos state 
collected more than all the other states in terms of personal income tax combined 
excluding Rivers, Ogun and Delta. 
 
Therefore, the choice of SMEs is motivated by the fact that the contribution of SMEs 
worldwide has been recognized as contributing immensely to the areas of revenue 
and employment generation (Charoenrat & Harvie, 2014; Kubickova et al., 2014). 
Even though the collection and administration of SMEs taxes falls under the 
jurisdiction of Personal Income Tax that cuts across every State in the country. 
However, it is under PIT that compliance issues are on the increase due to the 
presence of this large informal sector (Nzotta, 2007; Slemrod, 2007). 
 
Many theoretical studies are available on the relationship between the factors that 
influenced tax and or a combination of other factors on tax compliance behaviour. 
The economic factors and psychological factors that have received empirical 
attention in relationship to tax compliance behaviour over the years include tax rates 
(Allingham & Sandmo, 1972; Ali, Cecil, & Knoblett, 2001; Mas'ud, Aliyu, & 
Gambo, 2014; Modugu, Eragbhe, & Izedonmi, 2012; Palil, Hamid, & Hanafiah, 
2013), detection probability (Eisenhauer, 2008; Palil & Mustapha, 2011; Stefura, 




incentives including positive inducements (Alm, Jackson, & McKee, 1992b; Feld, 
Frey, & Torgler, 2006; Manaf, 2004),  tax knowledge (Kasipillai & Jabbar, 2003; 
Kirchler, Niemirowski, & Wearing, 2006;  Loo, McKerchar, & Handsford, 2009; 
Palil, 2010; Saad, 2014), public governance quality (PGQ) (Alabede, Ariffin, & 
Kamil, 2011; Everest-Philips & Sandall, 2009; Levi, 1998).  
 
Despite the numerous studies conducted on the factors influencing tax compliance 
behaviour as documented earlier, unfortunately the literature has had varied, mixed 
and weak findings and were thus inconclusive (Eisenhauer, 2008; Slemrod, 
Blumenthal, & Christian, 2001; Young, 1994). In order to improve the existing 
debate, Alm (2013), and Stefura (2011, 2012) suggested the need for studying more 
psychological and other noneconomic factors that may help in explaining the puzzle 
of tax compliance. To buttress this discussion further, Alm (1999) and Jackson and 
Milliron (1986) pointed that tax non-compliance decisions may be influenced by 
other factors not captured in the basic model. Furthermore, Khlif and Achek (2015) 
were of the view that future studies should account for the previous significant 
determinants of tax compliance before exploring new variables. 
 
To heed this call for exploring new variables, Work - Family Financial Commitment 
(WFFC) and Fuel Subsidy Removal (FSR) was selected for this current study 
because they may serve as important determinants of tax compliance behaviour. 
Although the literature has not adequately addressed the relationship between WFFC, 
FSR and tax compliance behaviour (TCB), Work - Family Financial Commitment 
has been found to be an important determinant of job performance, individual 




1992; Frone, Yardley, & Markel, 1997; Kalliath & Kalliath, 2013; Shaffer & Joplin, 
2001; Ahmad, 2008; Patel & Ramgoon, 2006; Rehman & Waheed, 2012; Kalliath, 
Hughes, & Newcombe, 2012; Kossek & Ozeki, 1998). Additionally, FSR has been 
discovered to correlate with other factors, such as cost of production, and growth of 
SMEs (e.g., Kehinde, Kyade, Felix, Musibau, & Ishola, 2012; Odemero, 2013). 
Thus, Nzotta (2007) and Odinkonigbo (2009) supported the inclusion of these 
variables for study, asserting that poverty and other extended family burdens (for 
instance WFFC) might be responsible for the low level of tax compliance in Nigeria. 
 
Furthermore, considering the inconsistencies found in the studies relating to the 
determinants of tax compliance as earlier pointed, Alabede et al. (2011) also 
suggested the need for further exploring the moderating effects of its relationship 
especially in developing countries. Therefore, Perceived Service Orientation (PSO) 
and perceived corruption were selected due to the fact that taxpayers who perceived 
greater service would be more willing to pay their taxes (Gangl, Muehlbacher, de 
Groot, Goslinga, Hofmann, Kogler, Antonides, & Kirchler, 2013). 
 
In addition, service orientation could promote mutual and cordial interactions 
between the taxpayers and the relevant tax authorities, instead of creating a climate 
of deterrence and distrust, which could warrant negative attitudes towards the 
payment of tax (Kirchler, Hoelzl, & Wahl, 2008). Similarly, perceived corruption 
was equally considered because Rahmani and Fallahi (2012) pointed out that, when a 
country is characterized with more democracy and less corruption, the willingness 





Moreover, not much has been written on the issue of tax compliance in the Nigerian 
setting, except for few studies, such as Alabede (2012) and Atawodi and Ojeka 
(2012); however, their studies have been criticized in terms of coverage and ability to 
generalize. 
 
No doubt exists that past studies had given sufficient attention to the factors affecting 
TCB as documented in the literature. Importantly, the present study is an attempt to 
establish a relationship among WFFC, FSR and TCB as well as the moderating role 
of PSO and perceived corruption on the relationship between economic factors (the 
tax rate, the probability of detection, and the tax complexity), and psychological 
factors (the incentive of positive inducement, tax knowledge, and Public Governance 
Quality), and Tax Compliance Behaviour of SMEs owners/managers that previous 
studies have not considered.  In line with the current issues and the suggestions of the 
need for future research in this direction, it is now crystal clear that gaps actually 
exist in the prevailing theories, practical aspects, and empirical findings, concerning 
the recurring issues of tax compliance in Nigeria. Hence, an empirical study is 
needed to fill up these gaps, especially in predicting and explaining the influence of 
WFFC, FSR and the moderating role of PSO and perceived corruption in relationship 
to TCB. 
1.3 Research Questions 
Referring to the discussion on the need for this research to be carried out as stated 
earlier, the following research questions are to be addressed: 
1. Are Work - Family Financial Commitment, Fuel Subsidy Removal, economic 




psychological factors (incentives i.e. positive inducement, tax knowledge and 
public governance quality) related to Tax Compliance Behaviour? 
2. Do Perceived Service Orientation and perceived corruption moderates the 
relationship between economic factors (tax rates, probability of detection and 
tax complexity), psychological factors (incentives i.e. positive inducement, 
tax knowledge and public governance quality) and Tax Compliance 
Behaviour? 
1.4 Research Objectives 
Generally, this study aims at investigating the influence of Work - Family Financial 
Commitment, Fuel Subsidy Removal and the moderating role of Perceived Service 
Orientation and Perceived Corruption on the relationship between Economic Factors 
(tax rates, the probability of detection, and tax complexity), Psychological Factors 
(incentives i.e. positive inducement, tax knowledge, and Public Governance Quality) 
and Tax Compliance Behaviour of SMEs owners/managers. In line with the above 
research questions, the study seeks to accomplish the following specific objectives: 
1. To examine the relationship between Work - Family Financial Commitment, 
Fuel Subsidy Removal, Economic Factors (tax rates, probability of detection 
and tax complexity), Psychological Factors (incentives i.e., positive 
inducement, tax knowledge and public governance quality) and Tax 
Compliance Behavior; and 
2. To determine whether Perceived Service Orientation and Perceived 
Corruption moderates the relationship between Economic Factors (tax rates, 




(incentives i.e., positive inducement, tax knowledge and public governance 
quality) and Tax Compliance Behaviour. 
1.5 Significance of the Study 
This study, which is about investigating the influence of Work - Family Financial 
Commitment, Fuel Subsidy Removal, and the moderating role of Perceived Service 
Orientation and perceived corruption on the relationship between economic factors, 
psychological factors and Tax Compliance Behaviour of SMEs owners/managers, is 
important to theory, methodology and practice. 
1.5.1 Theoretical Significance 
In the literature, three areas of a research contributions have been identified as 
empirical, conceptual, and methodological (Davidsson & Wiklund, 2009). In line 
with this, the present study aims at contributing to the enhancement of knowledge by 
expanding Fischer et al.‘s (1992) tax compliance model with two exogenous 
variables (WFFC and FSR) and two moderating variables (PSO and perceived 
corruption) in relationship to TCB of SMEs owners/managers. Even though, we 
excluded some of the variables (i.e., demographic variables, attitudes and perception, 
noncompliance opportunities) in the original Fischer‘s model due to the fact that; the 
dimensions offered in Fischer et al.‘s model were viewed as not totally suitable for 
this study. Because the variables were documented in the literature by authors (e.g., 
Mustafa, 1997; Tayip, 1998; Manaf, 2004). Additionally, the relationship between 
the excluded variables has been established in the context of Nigerian environment 
(e.g., Alabede, 2012; Atawodi & Ojeka, 2012). Hence, like any other model of tax 




2009; Alabede, 2012), this study added four exogenous constructs to the Fischer‘s 
model. 
 
Furthermore, the inclusion of these new constructs is in line with Alabede et al. 
(2011), Alm, (2013), Alm and Torgler (2006), and Stefura (2011, 2012) who called 
for empirical studies that will incorporate more psychological variables in explaining 
and understanding the puzzle of tax compliance. To the researcher's knowledge, this 
is the first study to use these variables as a combined model. Generally, for the first 
time the current study will add to the existing knowledge by demonstrating the direct 
effects of WFFC, FSR, as well as the moderating effects of PSO and perceived 
corruption. Thus, the proposed theoretical framework for this study may be a useful 
tool for academics and other researchers in understanding these antecedents in the 
future and improve on them. 
 
Moreover, the work family spillover theory has not been extensively examined in 
relationship to tax compliance, particularly in the Nigerian context, considering the 
differences in culture and environmental influences. This study also adds 
theoretically by introducing the work family spillover theory to the area of tax 
compliance and the capable of establishing a relationship between WFFC and TCB. 
 
Finally, this study serves as motivation for other researchers who are interested in the 
field of tax compliance, especially in developing countries in general and Nigeria in 
particular. They might use this current work towards examining and identifying other 




study contributes to academic discourse and literature in the area of taxation and 
accounting.  
1.5.2 Methodological Significance 
In addition to theory, this study intends to contribute in terms of methodology in the 
sense that the researcher recognizes the weaknesses associated with estimation of 
parameters in the literature. 
 
As such, to this researcher‘s knowledge, only a few studies such as Saad (2011) on 
tax compliance duly have utilized PLS-SEM as technique for data analysis. Her 
research is a comparative (between Malaysia and New Zealand) mixed model study, 
which utilizes both survey and interview in achieving the research objectives. 
However, this current study is purely cross-sectional. 
 
In Nigeria, the few studies that were available either used multiple regression, 
ordinary least squares or simple percentages as an analytical technique (e.g., Alabede 
et al., 2011, 2012; Atawodi & Ojeka, 2012; Ibadin & Eiya, 2013). Therefore, to the 
researcher‘s best knowledge, no study has utilized either SmartPLS or PLS-SEM as a 
technique for data analysis in the area of tax compliance in Nigeria. Hence, another 
unique contribution of PLS SEM, over Covariance Based SEM (AMOS) and SPSS is 
in it robustness in the estimation of path coefficient as well as its non-assumptions 
about data distribution. This is due to its predictive accuracy (Bacon, 1999; Hwang et 





In addition, PLS is said to have proven potential to deal with extremely complex 
models with considerably high number of relationships, constructs, or indicators 
(Barclay, Higgings, & Thompson, 1995; Garthwaite, 1994). This study opted to use 
PLS because of its ability to deal with model complexity and due to its predictive 
orientation. As such, Smart PLS software (Ringle et al., 2005) was considered for 
this study as it is said to be one of the most powerful SEM tools available as of now 
compare to others (Chin, 1998).  
 
Another methodological contribution of this study emanates from the measures used 
in measuring the tax compliance construct because previous studies (Alabede et al. 
2011; Kasipillai, Aripin, & Amran, 2003; Chan, Troutman, & O'Bryan, 2000; 
Kirchler & Maciejovsky, 2001; Recker et al., 1994; Saad, 2011) used scenario cases 
to measure tax compliance behaviour. This study applied a 5-point Likert-type scale, 
an interval scale to measure tax compliance behaviour, easily giving room for 
respondents to express their respective judgments as well as enhancing its predictive 
power. The interval scale was employed because; scenario cases are time-consuming, 
which may not give participants enough time to express their opinion (Mietzner & 
Reger, 2005). In the same vein, scenario cases have been reported to yield fruitful 
outcome, only when the study is stem on a more qualitative approach with a strong 
emphasis on the selection of experts, and in practice this task could not be easily 
fulfil as reported by Mietzner and Reger (2005). Whereas this study is of quantitative 
in nature.  Unlike the scenario cases, interval scale has been established to be simple, 





In terms of large sample size, the study used a large sample size which other renown 
scholars were of the view that large sample size can be properly executed without 
violating the assumptions of variance based SEM (Astrachan, Patel, & Wanzenried, 
2014). Even though in their study, they employed a sample size of 480 respondents; 
but the current research finally used a sample of 218, which was far below that of 
Astrachan et al. (2014). Hence added methodologically in the area of large data set, 
which other researchers claimed PLS SEM could not handle effectively.  
1.5.3 Practical Significance 
In addition to theory, this research is also significant in a practical sense. Generally, 
the findings will help the governments of Kaduna and Kano States, and the country 
at large to see the need for instituting a service-oriented mechanism. This mechanism 
will empower and strengthen the public relations arm of the States Board of Internal 
Revenue Service's (SBIRSs) and the Federal Inland Revenue Services (FIRS) for the 
purpose of rendering efficient and effective service delivery in the form of selfless 
services in an effort to meet the expectations of the taxpayers. This singular act will 
enhance the SMEs business operation vis-à-vis the mind-set of the owners for the 
purpose of minimizing the issues of tax compliance and thus enhance revenue 
collection within their jurisdictions. 
 
Specifically, SMEs as an institution will find this study informative due to the fact 
that the findings will help both owners and institutions as a whole understand the 
need for regulating the problems associated with financial obligations emanating 




psychological status of the taxpayers as well as their performance, which may 
invariably affect their compliance behaviours. 
 
Furthermore, the findings also serve as a reference point to the respective SBIRSs, 
FIRS and other regulatory bodies to reconsider their tax policies towards establishing 
an appropriate tax mix that will help in restructuring the tax rate for the purpose of 
mitigating the level of corruption in the tax system as well as complimenting the 
effect of FSR being experienced by SMEs owners/managers in Nigeria and other oil 
producing countries. This is because one policy thrust of every government is to 
ensure the social welfare of its citizens.  
 
Finally, the study has contributed to the institutional, regulatory, and legal 
framework by examining new avenues in tackling other tax related issues at this 
critical period of the country in which 95% of the States find it difficult to pay staff 
salaries due to volatility of crude oil prices in the international market and in 
achieving the country's vision 2020. 
1.6 Scope and Limitations of the Study 
This study investigates the influence of WFFC, FSR, and the moderating role of PSO 
and perceived corruption on the relationship between economic factors (tax rate, the 
probability of detection, and tax complexity), and psychological factors (incentives, 
tax knowledge, and PGQ) on the TCBs of SMEs owners/managers in Kaduna and 
Kano States, North West Nigeria. Importantly, this is a pioneering study that 




motivations or human elements, which may be responsible for low level of tax 
compliance in Nigeria.  
 
However, this study is narrow in scope examining SMEs in Kaduna and Kano States, 
North West geopolitical zone, Nigeria with a total of 472 SMEs (185 in Kaduna, and 
287 in Kano) because the other geopolitical zones of the country, particularly the 
North East geopolitical zone, comprising Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe Yobe, 
Taraba, and some States in the North West comprising Jigawa, Katsina, Kebbi, and 
Sokoto States were not covered by this study due to the activities of the Boko Haram 
insurgency.  
 
Boko Haram, which literary means "Western Education is Forbidden‖ is an Islamic 
extremist sect in Nigeria that has created havoc for human life and economic 
activities across the northern part of the country as well as the Federal Capital 
Territory, Abuja. Its daily violent attacks are mainly on individual businesses, 
individual residential houses, government offices, and places of worship (Gwamna, 
2011). Due to this unfortunate situation in the country, business activities have been 
shut down in most of the affected areas until further notice as the leader of Boko 
Haram has called for more attacks in the country (Omomia, 2015). 
 
The present study could not cover the Southern and North Central geopolitical zones 
of the country because they were inaccessibility due to the Niger Delta Militancy and 
the BIAFRA struggle for self-independence. Because of this turmoil, attacks on 




particularly, the Plateau, Kogi and Benue States limited the scope of this study to 
only two States. 
 
Additionally, these two states are known to have the highest number of SMEs among 
the seven States as well as in the six geopolitical zones of the country (NMSMEs 
Collaborative Survey, 2010; SMEDAN, 2014). Similarly, these are the most 
populated States in the country with an estimated population of more than 16 million 
out of the total estimated Nigerian population of 140 million (National Population 
Commission, 2006). Kaduna and Kano States are located in a geopolitical zone that 
has the highest number of states in Nigeria (FRNC, 1999). In addition, SMEs 
owners/managers were considered as the unit of analysis because the study focused 
on individual behaviour. Because the decision to pay or not to pay taxes is made at 
the individual level, investigating behavioural issues at this level is expedient. The 
study also focused on the 2014 year of assessment. This study did not include any 
analysis for corporate or company income tax. The study only focused on the SMEs 
owners/managers, as their number is huge compared to other taxpayers such as 
corporate organizations. 
 
In predicting the tax compliance behaviour of the SMEs owners/managers, only 
economic factors and psychological factors were taken into account and other 
political or environmental factors were excluded as these were beyond the scope of 
this study. Neither Fischer et al. (1992) nor Alabede (2012) included those factors in 





Finally, the study however narrowed to SMEs in Kaduna and Kano states North 
West, Nigeria. These SMEs were selected because they are duly registered with the 
SMEDAN and the respective SBIRSs. 
1.7 Assumptions of the Study 
This study will be conducted on the bases of the following assumptions: 
1. Small and Medium Enterprises owners/managers are assumed to have 
knowledge of tax regulations in the country. 
2. It is also assumed that SMEs owners/managers will be subject to the 
influence of similar factors as SMEs owners/managers in other countries. 
Although different countries worldwide have different tax policies. 
3. Other factors outside the purview of this study, which may influence tax 
compliance behaviour of SMEs owners/managers in any way, are held 
constant. 
1.8 Outline of the Thesis 
Chapter one focuses on the background of the study in relationship to the needs and 
issues to embark upon the study. 
 
The problem statement is highlighted, followed by the formulation of research 
questions and the objectives the research intends to accomplish. This, in turn, 
provides an avenue for identifying the significance of the study. Within this context, 
the scope and limitations of the study are presented in order to indicate the 






Chapter Two covers the overview of the SMEs income tax system, while Chapter 
Three covers the relevant theories, literature review, and review of tax compliance 
models of other researchers. Chapter Four deals with the research framework that 
arises from the literature, the direct as well as the moderating relationship between 
the key constructs and the hypotheses development. Chapter Five discusses the 
research methodology employed in the current study. The chapter highlighted the 
research paradigm, research design, followed by the population and sampling 
techniques. 
 
Additionally, the chapter further documents the operational definitions and 
measurement of the study variables, the pilot study, followed by the data collection 
methods and procedures, and finally ends with the method of data analysis adopted 
in the study. 
 
Chapter Six presents in detail the descriptive analysis of the respondents, empirical 
results, key findings, and test of the research hypotheses. Finally, Chapter Seven 
emphasizes the discussion of the findings, the limitations of the study, directions for 






OVERVIEW OF NIGERIAN INCOME TAX SYSTEM 
2.1 Introduction 
The chapter covers an understanding of the Nigerian SME income tax system in 
totality. According to the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, the 
country is constitutionally made up of three tiers of government, namely, Federal, 
State, and Local governments. Each of these tiers is given with the outright power of 
raising revenue through taxes within its jurisdiction. The Federal government has the 
power to administer and collect taxes, such as the personal income tax (some 
portion), the company income tax, petroleum profit tax, value added tax, education 
tax, and customs duties among others. While the State government collects 
individual income tax within their territory, and the Local government collects minor 
levies such as market fees, motor park fees, and street naming charges in their 
domain (FRNC, 1999: 86). 
 
The overview of Nigerian SMEs income tax system is presented in this chapter, 
which begins with the background, followed by the history of Nigerian personal 
income tax, tax regulations applicable to SMEs owners in Nigeria, Nigerian SMEs 





2.2  History of Nigerian Personal Income Tax 
In Nigeria, the history of taxation started with the personal income tax in 1904 when 
the British colonial leader called Lord Lugard first introduced the income tax in the 
northern part of Nigeria (Ola, 1999). Similarly, the community tax became 
operational through the Revenue Ordinance (RO) in 1904. However, in 1917, after 
the amalgamation of the Northern and Southern Protectorates in January 1914, the 
Native Revenue Ordinance (NRO) of 1917 replaced the 1904 Revenue Ordinance. 
The provisions of the 1917 Ordinance were amended in 1918 and extended to 
Southern Nigeria, the West and the Mid-West and, subsequently, to Eastern Nigeria, 
in 1928 (Ola, 2004). 
 
The NRO was later incorporated into the Direct Taxation Ordinance (DTO) No. 4 of 
1940, cap 54. In the pre-independence regime, Personal Income Tax (PIT) was 
administered and collected by the Native administrations or Local governments in 
the name of direct taxation. Under the DTO of 1940, the assessment and collection 
of taxes were the sole responsibilities of the Native administrations/authorities 
throughout the country, and the taxes so collected that time were their main sources 
of revenue (Yerokun, 1997). In 1943, another Ordinance known as the Income Tax 
Ordinance (ITO) of 1943 was promulgated for Lagos residents, who had opposed the 
1940 ordinance. Unlike the 1940 ordinance, the 1943 Ordinance was a mixture of 
both the poll tax and an income tax, which were received from the native residents in 
the township of Lagos and non-native residents in Nigeria by the central government 




The Nigerian Income Tax Ordinance (NITO) of 1943 remained in force in the 
Federal Territory of Lagos until late in 1961 when the PIT (Lagos) Act of 1961 was 
enacted by the Federal government. Ola (2004) and Angahar and Alfred (2012) have 
pointed that the root of the present laws on PIT in Nigeria can be traced to the Fiscal 
Commission set up in 1957, which included Sir Jeremy Rainsman as the chairman 
and Professor R.C. Tress as a member among others. The purpose of establishing the 
commission was to examine the jurisdiction and fiscal powers of the various tiers of 
government in Nigeria. At present, the laws that regulate the PIT in Nigeria are as 
follows: 
1. The Income Tax Management Act (ITMA) 1961; 
2. Personal Income Tax Act (PITA) 1979 as amended in 1993; 2004, and 2011; 
3. Tax reforms, and; 
4. Annual pronouncements that have been gazetted. 
 
2.3  Tax Regulation Applicable to SMEs and Owners in Nigeria 
The tax regulation that is applicable to SMEs, sole proprietorship, partnership and 
other related businesses in Nigeria is governed by the Personal Income Tax Act 
(PITA) 1993 as amended in 2004, and 2011 (Angahar & Alfred, 2012). Section 3 of 
the Act specifies, among others, that, tax is payable on: 
1. Gains or profits from any trade, business or vocation for whatever period of 
time such business, trade, profession or vocation may have been carried on or 




2. Any salary, fees, wages, allowances or other gains or profits from an 
employment that are payable in money by the employer to the employee, 
including gratuities, bonuses or premium, compensation, benefits or other 
perquisites allowed, given or granted by any to an employee subject to some 
exceptions; 
3. Profits or gains, including any premiums arising from a right granted to any 
other persons for the use or occupation of any property; 
4. Interests or discounts, and gains; 
5. Any pensions, charge or annuity; and 
6. Any profit or gains not falling within the preceding categories. 
 
Tax regulations applicable to SMEs owners are not much different from those that 
are applicable to people in paid employment or vocations, such as persons employed 
by companies or civil servants in the country (Angahar & Alfred, 2012). In terms of 
corporate taxpayers, the Company Income Tax Act (CITA) governs the applicable 
tax regulations applicable. Other tax regulations such as the Petroleum Profit Tax 
Act (PPTA), Capital Gains Tax (CGT) and Value Added Tax (VAT) are different 
and distinct from the Personal Income Tax Act (PITA), which governs taxation with 






2.4 Nigerian SMEs Income Tax Law 
The Federal Republic of Nigeria Constitution (FRNC) (1999) established the 
authority to impose taxes on individuals, sole proprietorships, and partnerships as 
well as those who run a business have a trade and or a vocation as the case may be. 
The body entrusted with the sole mandate and authority to make laws in relationship 
to taxes in the country is the National Assembly under items 58 and 59 of the 
exclusive legislative list and items 7 and 20 in the concurrent legislative list. State 
government is delegated with the responsibility of collecting and administrating 
certain aspects of taxes, such as personal income taxes under the concurrent 
legislative list as enshrined in the constitution of the country. States Houses of 
Assembly are empowered to make laws in relationship to taxes of individuals, 
businesses, trade and vocation and some specified categories of SMEs within their 
domains. Thus, the law to regulate and impose taxes on SMEs, which falls under the 
PITA in Nigeria, is one enactment of the National Assembly exclusive list. The NRO 
of 1906 was the first law on Personal Income Tax in Nigeria. 
 
Odusola (2006) has noted that the Income Tax Management Act (ITMA) of 1961 
laid the foundation for modern and articulated Personal Income Tax administration 
in the country. After Nigeria gained her independence in 1960, the ITMA of 1961 
was promulgated because of the dire need to have uniform PIT administration in the 
country. According to Lekan and Sunday (2006), the ITMA introduced several 
remarkable changes to the administration of PIT in Nigeria such as income from 




under the Pay As You Earn system (PAYE). However, as Odusola (2006) further 
noted the application of ITMA varied from one part of the country to another, 
thereby dampening the burden of multiple taxes in relationship to personal income. 
 
In 1991, the Federal Government created two important study groups to review 
personal income tax and other taxes in the country. One recommendation of the 
group resulted in the repeal of ITMA 1961 and its replacement by PITA No 104 of 
1993 (PITA). The Personal Income Tax Act (PITA) Cap P8 LFN 1993 as amended 
in 2004 and 2011 was promulgated as a result of the consolidation of PITA 1993 
with various amendments, the PITA Cap P8 LFN 1993 was made up of 13 parts, 109 
sections and 8 schedules. 
 
Furthermore, in 2011, the President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria signed into 
law, the PITA (Amendment) Act (PITAM or ‗the Act‘), 2011. The gazette version of 
the Act was made available to the public in January 2012. The PITAM amended or 
deleted (36) thirty-six sections of the PITA, Cap P8, Laws of the Federation of 
Nigeria, 2004 (PITA). It also made modifications to the First, Third and Sixth 
Schedules to the PITA. Generally, the main objective of PITAM, among other 
things, was to remove the flexibility that employers had under the old PIT regime to 
provide tax efficient compensation to their employees (e.g., through the use of leave 
allowance and housing allowance). Whether the overall impact of the PITAM on 
taxpayers is consistent with the National Tax Policy considering the impact of the 




2.4.1 SMEs Income Taxable in Nigeria 
According to Angahar and Alfred (2012), SMEs income includes income of self-
employed taxpayers, unincorporated persons or body of persons engaged in their 
own businesses either as sole traders or in partnerships. Such persons include 
individual contractors, tradesmen, professionals, consultants, artisans and all other 
entities that are not liable to tax under the Companies Income Tax Act (CITA), but 
under the PITA 1993, as amended in 2004 and 2011. Therefore, PIT could be seen as 
taxes imposed on a person‘s income (Joshua, Ehichioya, & Famous, 2015). That 
means the incomes of such persons accruing to them personally are taxable (Angahar 
& Alfred, 2012). 
2.4.1.1 SMEs Income Tax Assessment and Collection in Nigeria 
According to the Nigerian tax regulations, two types of assessments exist for SMEs, 
owners or the income of individuals from trade or business. The assessments are: 1) 
self-assessment and 2) government assessment. Under Section 44, PITA, 1993, as 
amended in 2004, and 2011, SMEs, owners are free to choose either of the two 
assessment methods to file their tax return (Odusola, 2006). 
 
The law according to the PITA stipulates that every SME owner/manager is 
mandated to file his/her tax returns to the relevant tax authority within 90 days from 
the commencement of every year of assessment which is January every year (PITA, 
1993, as amended 2004 & 2011). Based on the 2011 amendment, the returns are 




all sources and detailed information for allowances, relief, and other deductions as 
the case may be. The option is given to SMEs, owners or individual taxpayers to opt 
for the second option of assessment (Section 43, PITA 1993, as amended 2004, 
2011). 
 
The relevant tax authority normally proceeds with the assessment of the taxpayer 
upon the receipt of the return (Section 54 (2), PITA 1993, as amended 2004, 2011). 
Section 45, PITA 1993, as amended 2004, 2011, gave power to the relevant tax 
authorities to ask for more information and clarification, where information 
contained in the return is unsatisfactory. For SMEs owners who either fail to file a 
return at the correct time or do not file at all, the tax authority uses the Best of its 
Judgment method in determining the assessable income of such owner (Section 54 
(3), PITA 1993, as amended, 2004, 2011). Thus, the law gives power to the relevant 
tax authorities to reassess an SME owner the amount that they ought to have been 
charged if the tax authority discovers that such an individual has not paid a fair 
amount. Section 55 (1), PITA 1993, as amended 2004, 2011 permits this power to be 
exercised within six years from the initial assessment. Upon completion of the 
assessment, notice is normally sent to the owners of SMEs informing them of the 
assessable income, total chargeable income, where to pay the tax, and also the 
owner‘s right to object (Section 57, PITA 1993, as amended 2004, 2011). In an 
instance in which an SME owner does not have any objections to the assessment, he 




On the other hand, an SME owner can object to the assessment in writing to the 
authority within 30 days from notice. Where the relevant tax authorities and the 
taxpayer fails to reach a consensus over the assessment, the SME owner can appeal 
to an independent body of tax experts called the Body of Appeal Commissioners 
within 30 days from the date the tax authority issued to him a notice of refusal to 
amend the assessment based on his objection (Section 58, PITA 2004). If the SME 
owner is dissatisfied with the verdict of the Commissioners, he may appeal the 
decision to the high court (Section 65 (2), PITA 2004). Another appeal may be made 
against the decision of the high court to the court of appeal, then to the Supreme 
Court, which is the apex court in Nigeria (Section 65 (11), PITA 2004). The decision 
of the Supreme Court is final and binding in respect to tax appeals in Nigeria. 
 
In relationship to tax collection, SMEs, owners or individual taxpayers are 
categorized under direct assessment and indirect assessment otherwise known as Pay 
as You Earn (PAYE). Individuals under direct assessment are to pay their taxes not 
under appeal or objection within two months after the notice of assessment has been 
given (Section 68 (1), PITA 1993, amended 2004 & 2011). The collection of tax on 
assessments that are subject to appeal or objection remains in abeyance until the 
objection or appeal is settled and must be paid one month after the appeal is settled 





2.5 Taxing Powers and Authorities in Nigeria 
In Nigeria, the administration of tax is carried out by relevant tax authorities at three 
levels of government, namely, Federal, State and Local levels, within their legally 
defined domains (FRNC, 1999). 
2.5.1 Tax Administration at the Federal Level 
The FIRS is a government organization that is in charge of tax administration at the 
Federal level. The organization came into operation as a board on 1 January 1959, as 
a result of section 3 of the Income Tax Administration Ordinance No 39 of 1953 that 
established its existence. In 1993, the FIRS was established following the 
recommendations of the study group on the Nigerian tax system and administration. 
Fourteen years later in 2007, FIRS was granted administrative autonomy with the 
legal backing of the Federal Inland Revenue Service (Establishment) Act No 13 of 
2007 (FIRSEA).  Among the objectives of the Revenue Service is to control and 
administer the personal income tax of the individuals in the Federal Capital 
Territory, Expatriates, and Personnel of Armed Forces, such as the Army and Police 
as prescribed under section 2 of PITA, 1993 as amended in 2004 and 2011. 
However, the FIRS is also in charge of the administration and collection of the 
following taxes in Nigeria: 
1. Petroleum profit tax; 
2. Personal income tax (some part); 
3. Company income tax; 




5. Capital gains tax in respect of companies; and 
6. Value added tax, and other revenues of the Federal government. 
2.5.2 Tax Administration at the State Level 
The State Board of Internal Revenue Service's (SBIRS), with the support of the Joint 
Tax Board (JTB), has the legitimate power and responsibility of administrating tax at 
the State level. 
2.5.2.1 State Board of Internal Revenue  
The State Board of Internal Revenue Service's (SBIR) is responsible for the 
administration of tax at the State level.  Section 87 (1) of the Personal Income Tax 
Act LFN 1993, as amended in 2004, and 2011 establishes the SBIRS as the 
operational arm for the administration of taxes at the State level. The State Boards of 
Internal Revenue Service (SBIRS) are the operational arms of the States as enshrined 
in the constitution of the country. Normally, the SBIRS is made up of a team, headed 
by the Executive Chairman of the State Board of Internal Revenue Services, who is 
appointed by the governor for tenure of five years subject to renewal, and six other 
members representing various interests and other institutional groups. 
 
The sole aim of SBIRS is to ensure the adequate and effective collection of all taxes 
and penalties due to the state government. In addition, the board does everything 
necessary for the purpose of assessment and collection of tax and accounts for all 




finance. Furthermore, the SBIRS makes recommendations to the Joint Tax Board 
(JTB) in respect to tax treaties, tax policy, and other control mechanisms, which 
affect the policy formulation of the SBIRS. 
2.5.3 Joint Tax Board 
The Joint Tax Board (JTB) is the board that unifies the States and Federal 
Government on issues relating to taxation. Section 27 of ITMA, now under section 
86 of PITA, establishes the existence of JTB. The Board comprises the Executive 
Chairman of FIRS, who serves as the Chairman and a member each from the 36 
SBIRS of the Federation. The Federal Civil Service Commission always appoints the 
Secretary of the JTB.  
 
The Board advises the Federal Government on the taxation arrangements with any 
other country as well as the rates for capital allowance and other taxation matters 
that are in effect throughout Nigeria.  The Board also has powers and duties 
conferred on it by express provisions of the PITA and any other power and duties 
arising under PITA 1993 as amended in 2004 and 2011, which may be agreed by the 
government of each State to be exercised by the Board. Furthermore, the Board also 
promotes uniformity both in the application of a PITA and the incidence of taxation 




2.5.4 Tax Administration at the Local Level 
The responsibility of tax administration at this level is the Local government revenue 
committee. Being the third level of government in Nigeria, the Local government 
committee is set up under the authority of section 90 of PITA 1993 as amended. This 
committee comprises a treasurer as the head and chairman of the committee, plus 
three elected Local government councillors with two other persons with vast 
experience in revenue matters to be appointed by the honourable Chairman of the 
respective Local government as members. 
 
The constituted committee is totally autonomous of the Local government treasury 
and is responsible for the day-to-day administration of the Treasury Department. 
However, the Treasury Department serves as the nerve centre and operational arm of 
the Local government revenue committee. The responsibility of the committee, 
among any other things, is assessing and collecting all taxes, fines and rates under 
the jurisdiction of the Local government and to account for all amounts collected 
from time to time to the Local government. 
 
2.6 Summary 
This chapter presented an overview of Nigerian SMEs income tax system. Nigeria is 
a federation comprising three tiers of government, namely, Federal, State, and Local 
governments. Powers and responsibilities are assigned to each tier of government as 
established in the Nigerian Constitution. The personal income tax is one of the oldest 




The personal income tax is currently administered under the provisions of the 
Personal Income Tax Act, Cap P8 LFN  1993, as amended in 2004 and 2011 through 
the Federal Inland Revenue Services at the Federal level, State Board of Internal 
Revenue Service at the State level and Local Government Revenue Committee at the 








3.1 Introduction  
This chapter first provides an overview of the contextual terms used in the study; it 
then explores the relevant theories and reviews the extant literature in connection 
with the research. In achieving that, the chapter starts by defining the term SME in a 
broader context and then narrows the definition down to the contextual environment 
in which the study was conducted. In addition, the chapter further explores the 
concept of tax compliance and noncompliance. Furthermore, relevant theories of tax 
compliance and how they are applied in the context of this research was also 
discussed. It then culminates by focusing on the theory underpinning the study, in 
turn, exploring other supporting theories. Then literature reviews and tax compliance 
models that various researchers explicated were also considered and finally the 
chapter ends with a summary. 
 
3.2 Concept of Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) 
The concept of SMEs encompasses a varied range of definitions. Different 
individuals, institutions, organizations and countries employed their guidelines for 
defining a SME. Some definitions were often based on the number of people, 
turnover or assets. SMEs are clearly and adequately distinguishable in many 
countries be they developed or developing. As a result, a single definition of SMEs 




differentiated in terms of their level of capitalization, sales, ownership structure, 
assets and employment. 
 
In that regard, any definition of SMEs that uses measures of profitability, turnover, 
and number of employees, if applied to a specific sector could result in all firms 
being grouped as small. However, the same definition when applied to a different 
sector could lead to an entirely different outcome. Based on the foregoing, 
researchers and international bodies or organizations have always attempted to 
provide a yardstick for defining SMEs. No such definitions have been accepted 
universally due to differences between countries, and the nature of SMEs across the 
world. 
 
Consequently, Ayyagari, Beck and Demirguc-Kunt (2005) reported that SMEs are 
seen to be those enterprises or businesses that are set up with the following 
characteristics: a maximum of 300 employees, $15 million in annual revenue, and 
$15 million in assets. Therefore, an SME owner is normally seen as a person who 
establishes and manages a business for the purpose of furthering personal goals 
(Carland, Hoy, Boulton, & Carland, 1983). As such, the owners perceive the 
business as an extension of their identity and are intricately bound with family needs 






The World Bank Definition of a SME 
Firm size Employees Assets ($' 000) Annual sales ($'000) 
Micro Less than 10 Less than $100 Less than $100 
Small Less than 50 Less than $3,000 Less than $3,000 
Medium Less than 300 Less than $15,000 Less than $15,000 
Source: Ayyagari, Beck, and Demirguc-Kunt (2005). 
 
In Malaysia, the definition of SME is based on two criteria, namely, the number of 
people the business employs and the revenue it makes. In 2013, the Prime Minister, 
Datuk Seri Najib Abdul Razak announced a new definition of SMEs, which took 
effect from 1 January 2014. According to the Malaysia SME Corp (2013), SMEs in 
the manufacturing sector were to be defined as enterprises whose annual turnover is 
less than RM50 million with fewer than 200 employees from the earlier definition, 
up from the previous definition of less than RM25 million in revenue and fewer than 
150 workers. Services and other sector SMEs were defined as enterprises with 
turnover not exceeding RM20 million and the number of full-time workers not 
exceeding 75 employees. The above definition is represented in Table 3.2. 
Table 3.2 
SME Definitions by the Malaysian Government with Effect from 1 January 2014 
Category Small Medium 
Manufacturing 
 
Sales turnover of RM300, 000 to 
less than RM15 million OR full-
time employees from 5 to less 
than 75. 
 
Sales turnover from RM15 million to not 
exceeding RM50 million OR full-time 




Table 3.2 (continued) 
Category Small Medium 
Services & other 
Sectors 
Sales turnover of RM300, 000 to 
less than RM3 million OR full-
time employees from 5 to less 
than 30. 
Sales turnover from RM3 million to not 
exceeding RM20 million OR full-time 
employees from 30 to not exceed 75. 
 
Source: Malaysia SMEs Corp (2013). 
 
However, with respect to the Nigerian environment, Sule (1986) observed the 
following characteristics as part of the definition of SMEs: taxpayers‘ tended to be 
few, taxpayers of the business were also the managers, transactions were based on 
cash payments and hardly any bank payments, the businesses normally had a 
dynamic lifespan, and the places of business for SMEs were normally fixed but 
volatile and reacted to changes/demands. 
 
Similarly, the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) (2010) defined a SME as an enterprise 
whose asset base ranged between N5 million to N500 million and a staff strength 
between 11 to 300 workers. The NMSMEC Survey (2010) recently defined MSMEs 
on the bases of dual criteria, employment and assets (excluding land and buildings) 





SMEs Categorisation by the Nigerian Government 
S/N Size Category Employment Assets (N = Million) 
Excl. Land & 
Buildings 
1 Micro Enterprise Less than 10 Less than 5 
2 Small Enterprise 10 to 49 5 to Less than 50 
3 Medium Enterprise 50 to 199 50 to Less than 500 
Source: NMSMECS (2010). 
 
Due to inconsistencies in definitions, researchers have adopted definitions for SMEs 
that are more appropriate to their particular jurisdictions. To this end, SMEs within 
the context of this study are defined as any business enterprises having between 10 
and less than 199 full-time workers, and total assets between N5 million and less 
than N500 million (Excluding Land and Buildings) adopted from the NMSMEs 
Collaborative Survey (2010). This definition is more encompassing, and much 
larger, and also applicable to the context in which the study is being conducted. 
 
3.3 Conceptualizing Tax Compliance 
One critical tool for revenue collection of any responsible government is attaining an 
optimal level of tax compliance of taxpayers. James and Alley (2004) pointed out 
that tax compliance is one fundamental issue confronting many relevant authorities 
across the world. Hence, a Herculean task exists to persuade taxpayers to comply 
with the requirements even though tax laws are always dynamic. 
 
Therefore, the definition of tax compliance in its simpler form is usually narrow in 




Unlike other concepts, the meaning of tax compliance can be viewed as a 
phenomenon that changes over time. Accordingly, James and Alley (2004) 
documented the categorization of tax compliance into two approaches, namely, the 
traditional narrow law enforcement, to the wider economic perspectives and through 
a more comprehensive approach relating to taxpayer decisions to conform to the 
wider objectives of the society as reflected in the tax policy. These approaches are 
captured in Table 3.4. 
Table 3.4 
Approaches to Tax Compliance 
Tax Compliance First Approach Second Approach 
Concepts Tax gap 100% 
compliance less actual 
revenue 
 
Voluntary, willingness to act in accordance 








Exemplified by Trade off: 
1. Expected benefit of 
evading. 
2. Risk of detection 
and application of 
penalties. 
3. Maximise personal 
income and wealth 
 
Individuals are not simply independent, 
selfish utility maximiser's. They interact 
according to differing attitudes, beliefs, 
norms and roles. Success depends on 
cooperation 
Issues of Efficiency in resource 
allocation 




Table 3.4 (continued) 
Tax Compliance First Approach Second Approach 
Taxpayers are seen as Selfish calculator of 
pecuniary 
gains and losses 
 
Good citizen 
Can be termed the Economic approach Behavioral approach 
Source: James & Alley (2004). 
 
Tax compliance has been defined in so many ways. For instance, Song and 
Yarbrough (1978), in a simple term, defined tax compliance as the taxpayers‘ ability 
and willingness to comply with the relevant tax laws and regulations, which are 
determined by ethics, legal environment and other factors at a given time and place. 
 
Over the years, tax authorities and multinational organizations have suggested a 
similar appropriate definition for tax compliance. Hence, the IRBM (2009) and 
Australian Tax Office (ATO) (2009) both defined tax compliance as taxpayers‘ 
ability and willingness to obey the tax laws, declare their actual income annually and 
pay the correct amount of taxes on the due date. Moreover, the Organization for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) (2001) outlined two 
categorizations for defining tax compliance: 1) technical compliance and 2) 
administrative compliance. 
 
According to the OECD, technical compliance has to do with the technical 
requirements of tax laws in the computation of tax liability, whereas administrative 
compliance always aligns with the combination of reporting compliance, procedural 




complying with the rules relating to lodging and the payment of tax. Compliance is 
enforced on taxpayers who did not pay taxes by mechanisms such as threat and the 
application of audit and penalties (OECD, 2001). 
 
Roth, Scholz, and Dry-Witte (1989) defined tax compliance as the ability to comply 
with reporting requirements, which invariably means that the entity files all required 
tax returns at the proper time, and the returns accurately report tax liability in 
accordance with the internal revenue code, regulations and court decisions applicable 
at the time the returns are filed. James and Alley (2002) offered an alternative to this 
definition, defining tax compliance as the ability of taxable entities to respond in 
relationship to the spirit as well as to the letter of relevant tax laws without the 
administration or application of enforcement. They considered tax compliance in 
terms of the tax gap, the difference between the true entity's income tax liability and 
that which is finally collected by either voluntary payment or enforcement.  
 
However, several studies have viewed tax compliance from other different 
dimensions. For instance, McBarnet (2003) said that tax compliance can be 
structured into three dimensions: 1) committed compliance: which has to do with the 
taxpayers‘ willingness and ability to pay his/her taxes without grudges; 2) 
capitulative compliance: willingly giving in and paying taxes; and 3) creative 
compliance: engagement to reduce taxes by taking advantage of possibilities to 
redefine income and deduct expenditures within the bracket of tax laws. Hence, tax 




declare the correct income, claim the correct deductions, relief and rebates and pay 
all taxes on time (Palil & Mustapha, 2011). Recently, Geibart (2014) conceived of 
tax compliance as a means of navigating a maze of rules, regulations, exceptions and 
exemptions, which can leave a tax agent confused, disorientated and often lost when 
reaching a frustrating dead end. 
 
It is noticeable from the definitions proffered by different authors that some 
standards keywords have accompanied their assumptions, such as willingness, 
ability, obey, the act of filing tax returns, declaring the correct amount, reporting all 
income, correct amount of tax, and timeliness. To this researcher‘s knowledge none 
have borrowed the term "appropriate quotas". However, without the proper 
identification of the appropriate quotas in paying taxes, noncompliance can result 
even though the taxpayer has made his best efforts to comply. 
 
In the context of this study, tax compliance is defined as the ability and willingness 
of a taxpayer to obey tax laws, declare his actual income and pay the correct amount 
of taxes on the due date using the appropriate quotas and taxpaying jurisdiction. 
Commonly, in the literature the terms noncompliance, compliance and evasion are 
often used interchangeably to describe either the intentional or the unintentional 





3.4 Exploring Tax Noncompliance 
Tax noncompliance in simple terms is the opposite of tax compliance; any violation 
in tax compliance may entirely result in tax noncompliance. As a complex 
phenomenon, tax noncompliance could be addressed from different perspectives. A 
remarkable amount of literature shows that no universal definition of tax 
noncompliance exists. 
 
Kasipillai and Jabar (2003) studied the influence of taxpayers' attitudes and 
behaviour in Malaysia. In their study, they structured tax noncompliance into 
different categories, which, according to the authors included, but were not limited 
to, the inability either to submit a tax return within a specified period or non-
submission, understatement of income, overstatement of deductions, and the failure 
to pay the assessed taxes at the appropriate time. Stemming from the submission, the 
authors described how tax noncompliance could only be perpetrated without fully 
defining the concept in its entirety and therefore not encompassing. 
 
In addition, Jackson and Milliron (1986) and Kesselman (1994) defined tax 
noncompliance as the failure of taxpayers to remit an actual amount of tax as a result 
of the difficulties in tax administration or regulations. Though a little bit 
encompassing, their definitions lay emphasis on the difficulties in tax administration. 
However, such a limited definition cannot be ultimately regarded as the only 





In the same vein, Kinsey (1984) also defined noncompliance with tax laws as the 
failure of a taxpayer to meet his tax obligations either intentional or unintentional. 
Similarly, Kirchler (2007) regarded the taxpayer's inability or failure to report actual 
income, claim deductions, and rebates and remit the exact amount of tax revenue as 
the main cause of tax noncompliance. In the same line of argument, Saad (2012) also 
defined tax noncompliance as the unwillingness to act in relationship to the tax law 
and administration applicable at a particular point in time. Even though Kinsey, 
Kirchler (1984) and Saad (2012) defined the term in their respective studies, their 
definitions might have been far more interesting for comparison if the actual reasons 
for noncompliance were stated in their definitions. 
 
To explicate the problem, Palil and Mustapha (2011) studied the likely factors 
affecting tax compliance behaviour via a Self-Assessment System. In their study, the 
authors viewed tax noncompliance as the inability of the taxpayer to be in agreement 
with the tax regulations, to report amount of income incorrectly, to claim incorrect 
deductions, relief and rebates to pay the incorrect amount of tax beyond the required 
time frame. 
 
Similarly, Tan and Sawyer (2003) also conceived of tax noncompliance as a process 
by which taxpayers wrongly arrived at the appropriate income due to the inaccurate 
reporting of income and expenses, or failing to abide by the established norms in 
filing or not filing their returns within a specified period of time in accordance with 




viewed tax noncompliance in a broader term, even though their study focused on the 
processes by which the act can be perpetrated. However, their definition is more 
encompassing compared to other definitions reviewed in this study as such can be 
extended beyond the jurisdiction in which they developed their study. 
 
Fischer et al. (1992) and Chau and Leung (2009) separately pointed to several 
probable reasons for tax noncompliance including peer influence, income levels, 
weak enforcement of the tax system, and complex tax system. Moreover, James and 
Alley (2004) further perceived tax noncompliance in relationship to the tax gap, 
which measured and compared the differences between the tax that was supposed to 
have been collected and that which have been actually collected if there were total 
compliance. 
 
Thus, tax noncompliance may be grouped into avoidance and evasion according to 
James and Alley (2004). By contrasting the two words, the authors clearly 
demonstrated that one act is legal (avoidance) and the other is illegal (evasion). From 
the legal point of view, evasion differs from avoidance in the sense that evasion is 
unlawful and hence punishable. As far as economic realities are concerned, however, 
evasion and avoidance are mostly used interchangeably without a clear-cut 






Moreover, Hasan, Hoi, Wu, and Zhang (2014) formulated formidable distinguishing 
characteristics of tax evasion that included: intentional act, illegal act, inability to 
comply with the laid down laws and regulations, some ingredients of concealment, 
recklessness, disregard for the tax system, and falsification of records. James and 
Alley (2004) studied tax compliance, self-assessment and tax administration. In their 
study, they further outlined the tax noncompliance problem as totally an evasion 
issue, which, according to the authors, is yet to adequately address the full nature of 
the situation. The authors consider tax evasion as a direct form of non-compliance.  
 
3.5  Underpinning Theory 
In the context of this study, the main theory underpinning this research is the 
economic deterrence theory as discussed below. 
3.5.1 Economic Deterrence Theory 
The economic theory of tax compliance is said to have originated from the work of 
Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and Srinivasan (1973), which were based on 
economic of crime models. The theory posits that the behaviour of taxpayers is 
influenced by factors such as the tax rate in ascertaining the rewards of evasion or 
penalties of noncompliance, the probability of detection and penalties for the crime 
or fraud which help in determining the costs (Allingham & Sandmo 1972; Becker, 
1968). This actually means that, if the probability of detection is likely or certain and 





Meanwhile, in the presence of low audit probabilities and low penalties, the expected 
outcome of returns in relationship to evasion or noncompliance will definitely go 
high all things being equal (Fjeldstad, Sjursen, & Ali, 2013). The theory gives room 
for substantial noncompliance as predicted by the above variables. However, the 
theory has suffered much criticism for emphasizing entirely on economic variables 
or factors as well as the coercive aspects of compliance at the expense of other 
factors (Sandmo, 2005). 
 
The theory seeks to examine the deterrence effect that various levels of punishment 
have on people's decisions either to comply with the law or not to comply. Jackson 
and Milliron (1986) were of the view that much tax compliance research has 
emphasised this particular theory, especially with reference to the relative deterrence 
effect of different categories of sanctions. Grasmick and Scott (1982) outlined three 
strategies of social control in the form of threatened punishment that might mitigate 
illegal behaviour. The strategies or mechanisms are: 1) legal sanctions (state 
imposed punishment), 2) social stigma (peer imposed punishment), and 3) feelings 
of guilt (self-imposed punishment). In a nutshell, this theory posits that people or 
individuals who are in a position to eliminate feelings of guilt before engaging in the 
acts of noncompliance are more likely to engage in such acts. 
 
McKerchar and Evans (2009) outlined key issues relevance in supporting deterrence 
strategies for addressing noncompliance. For instance, the fear of getting caught has 




(Fjeldstad et al., 2013). Furthermore, the theory was developed based on the 
economics-of-crime model, in order to optimize government and private policies in 
curtailing the unwanted behaviour because threats of punishment were seen to 
encourage lawful behaviour (Becker, 1968). Basically, Alm, Jackson, and McKee 
(1992) pointed out that the economic deterrence approach assumed taxpayers would 
engage in tax compliance decisions as a result of the fear of the possibility of being 
caught and penalized. 
 
In short, a large body of theoretical and empirical evidence in the literature supports 
the view that higher audit probabilities and penalties encouraged compliance and 
higher tax rates discouraged compliance. For instance, Allingham and Sandmo 
(1972) opined that the only way to ensure people pay their taxes was using a 
deterrence policy such as the use of threat of punishment, which involved the 
probability of audit, the severity of the penalty and an increase in the tax rate. 
However, most studies on the influence of audit probabilities on tax compliance 
were in accordance with the theory. Even though the fiscal psychological approach 
had been introduced earlier, this approach only began to draw researchers‘ attention 
in the 1990s. 
 
However, this theory has been criticized on the basis of not considering the 
importance of human element (Cullis & Lewis, 1997). Therefore, Alm, Sanchez, and 
De-Juan (1995) argued that, in explaining tax compliance, other factors should be 




beyond the ordinary standard economics of crime approach, so as to incorporate 
theories of behaviour and other social sciences. Supporting the above assertions, the 
framework of this study account for other noneconomic factors as Stefura (2011, 
2012) suggested. Rather than relying heavily on the narrow economic approach to 
encourage tax compliance, exploring other approaches to understand noneconomic 
factors that might influences taxpayers‘ behaviours is better (James, Murphy, & 
Reinhart, 2005). 
 
For instance, a fiscal psychological approach or a political legitimacy approach will 
be more appropriate for exploring the willingness and ability of taxpayers to comply 
with tax laws. In short, the deterrence theory does not explain the reasons why many 
people will comply with tax laws because this theory has only emphasised the 
economic factors at the expense of noneconomic factors that influence tax 
compliance. The next section will discuss in full the psychological theories 
underpinning the current study. 
 
3.6 Other Supporting Theories  
In relationship to tax compliance behaviour, this section discusses theoretical 
concepts related to this study. As one of the most diverse and multidisciplinary types 
of study, theories of tax compliance cut across many disciplines. Based on the 
literature, many factors have been found that might influence tax compliance; thus, 
the use of one theory might be unable to relate all the variables. For example, Alm 




sociology and anthropology could also be of assistance in explaining other variables 
that might influence taxpayers‘ compliance behaviour. Hence, theories supporting 
the economic deterrence theory are discussed in the next subsection. 
 
3.7 Psychological Theories 
In the past, the extant literature on tax compliance research mainly emphasized a 
single theory, which offered only restricted and biased research and analysis of the 
tax compliance problem (McKerchar, 2001), with the exception of a few researchers 
who linked these theories in order to have an articulated and comprehensive view of 
taxpayers‘ compliance behaviours. Hasseldine and Bebbington (1991) and 
Schmolders (1959) suggested that a proper blend of both the economic and 
behavioural approaches, which is referred to as the fiscal psychological approach, is 
required in order to have a wider understanding of the prevailing issues surrounding 
tax compliance. Schmolders (1959) was the first author who introduced the 
phenomenon of ―fiscal psychology‖, a term that stresses the deficiency in 
stimulating taxpayers to pay taxes as a result of non-reciprocity from the government 
to the taxpayers in the form of either monetary or public goods. 
 
Fjeldstad et al. (2013) and Moore (2004) in a separate but related study revealed that 
the reciprocity benefit of tax payment was documented to be a major concern of 
taxpayers, which can take the form of either public goods or services. Furthermore, 
Alm, Jackson, and McKee (1992b) were of the view that the availability of public 




Individuals are subjected to paying taxes as a result of the goods provided by the 
government, bearing in mind that their monetary payments will be used to finance 
the goods and services (Fjeldstad & Semboja, 2001). Drawing from the above 
findings, the deduction can be made that the behaviour of taxpayers is always 
affected either negatively or positively based on the symbiotic relationship that exists 
between that behaviour and the government as a result of the tax payments and the 
rewards derived from such acts. 
 
The presence of positive benefits such as incentives has the ability to increase the 
probability that taxpayers will voluntarily comply without any coercion (Fjeldstad et 
al., 2013). However, assessing the actual value of what they received from the 
government in return for taxes paid as claimed by the above authors is difficult for 
taxpayers. As such, Richupan (1987) argued that assessment is made on the basis of 
general impressions and attitudes concerning their own and others contractual 
relationships with the government. 
 
Most behaviour of taxpayers is influenced by the attitudes of government in one way 
or another, which can be attributed to the provision of quality of goods in 
relationship to their contractual relationship. Hence, if the tax system is perceived to 
be unfair, taxpayers may resort to evasion in order to reconsider their terms of trade 





Therefore, psychological theory stresses the importance of positive policies 
developed by a government in order to improve the cooperation between taxpayers 
and government. Thus, for instance, using reduced tax rates, as an incentive to 
induce the positive behaviour of taxpayers during the process of tax compliance 
decision-making because tax enforcement is seen as problematic in the fiscal 
psychological approach and can be improved with the cooperation of taxpayers with 
government or tax authority. 
 
In addition, research has also indicated that numerous factors influence tax 
compliance, such as: personal factors (e.g., attitudes, experiences, morale and 
financial circumstances), demographic factors (e.g., age, gender and level of 
education), and other aspects of the tax system, which include (tax rate, penalties of 
detection, probabilities of audit, enforcement strategies, tax complexities and 
compliance cost) (McKerchar & Evans, 2009). Even with so many attempts in the 
literature to examine these factors, the complexities of tax compliance behaviour of 
taxpayers remain unclear (Alm et al., 1992). 
 
As Andreoni, Erard, and Feinstein (1998) suggested, incorporating and exploring the 
influence of psychological and sociological factors on tax compliance behaviour into 
a formidable tax compliance model, particularly from the economic approach, is 
critical. In line with this call for research, Hasseldine and Li (1999) suggested that 




international borders in order to provide more information to policy makers and 
enhance the understanding of taxpayers‘ compliance.  
 
The conceptual approach of tax evasion has been expanded in the past years to 
incorporate compliance and noncompliance with the adoption of several 
methodologies in order to provide an in-depth understanding of the factors that 
influenced tax compliance behaviour (McKerchar, 2001).  Integrating the economic 
and noneconomic factors in a study might offer the most promising route for solving 
the puzzle of tax compliance. Thus, the following theories fall under the group of 
psychological theories, therefore serving as supporting theories. 
3.7.1 Work - Family Spillover Theory 
In the parlance of work - family spillover theory, Staines (1980) stated that either the 
family or work system may have or possess a spillover effect or an influence on the 
other. Similarly, the theory further proposes that satisfaction or dissatisfaction in one 
area of life extends to other domains. Thus, financial commitment of the family may 
affect individual business obligations such as tax payments and vice versa (George 
& Brief, 1990). Therefore, excess work may affect the family, and an excess in 
family life may affect work (Kelly & Voydanoff, 1985). Similarly, Belsky, Lang, 
and Rovine (1985) pointed that the experiences gained from the family domain may 
have a resultant effect on the work domain. Therefore, dual representation in two 





Additionally, the work - family spillover theory also has a lineage with the role 
theory, which proposes that employees or workers would find it difficult to handle or 
fulfil each role successfully, if they engage in two or multiple roles collectively. 
This, in turn, may invariably lead to inter-role problems (Kahn, Wolfe, Quinn, Snoek 
& Rosenthal, 1964). Therefore, Jackson and Schuler (1985) and Katz and Kahn 
(1987) reiterated further that work - family financial commitment would produce a 
negative effect when employees find it difficult to successfully complete each of 
their diverse roles as a result of limited resources. Because of this difficulty, role 
conflict may be associated with the difficulty encountered by employees in handling 
more sets of pressures as well as multiple roles occurring simultaneously (Katz & 
Kahn, 1978; Kahn et al., 1964). Logically, the spillover effect may affect either the 
work or family domain either negatively or positively. 
 
The spillover effect pattern shifts attention from the effects of social institutions 
upon each other to the effects of family members on each other, thereby ignoring the 
social and political consequences of the context in which family and work are 
located. Xu (2009) studied the work-family linkage and work-family financial 
condition model. The study discovered that spillover could be either positive or 
negative. Positive spillover has to do with the satisfaction and achievement in one 
domain, which may bring along satisfaction and achievement in another domain. 
This includes, for instance, a peaceful family or less family pressure or problems that 
will invariably not cause a burden to SME owners or individuals in paying their 




On the other hand, negative spillover refers to the fact that difficulties and 
depression (for instance, more pressure and family commitment for an individual 
and organizational obligations such as tax compliance) in one area of life may result 
to the same emotion in another. Based on the foregoing, the deduction can be made 
that the more the family financial commitment in terms of meeting the financial 
needs of the family and other allied demands, the great the impending impact on the 
compliance behaviour of individuals, especially with regard to tax payments and 
other organizational commitments. When the work - family financial commitment is 
tense or high, it may have a negative effect on the compliance behaviour of the 
taxpayer and vice versa. In general, the work family spillover theory is, therefore, 
capable of establishing the relationship between work - family financial commitment 
and tax compliance behaviour.  
3.7.2 Social Exchange Theory 
As the name implies, social exchange theory provides an insight into the perceptions 
of a system by an individual. Homans introduced the theory in 1958, and Blau 
(1964) further developed the theory. Homans concentrated more on the psychology 
of instrumental behaviour while Blau emphasised technical analysis. Homans (1974) 
defined social exchange as a kind of voluntary interactions between individuals that 
are motivated by expected returns from such actions. Blau differentiates social 
exchanges from economic exchanges by simply arguing that economic exchanges 




obligations and are more flexible. Hence, tax compliance can be seen as a social 
exchange between the government and the taxpayers.  
 
Furthermore, social exchange theory suggests that individuals evaluate inputs and 
outputs that comprise exchange. Social exchange theory reiterates that three 
important factors shape an individual‘s happiness with a social exchange: 1) the 
inputs he contributes (tax payment or amount of taxes), 2) the outputs he receives 
(benefits in terms of social and infrastructural facilities), and 3) his perception of 
how likely it would be for him to obtain a more favourable exchange relationship 
(Aronson, Wilson, & Akert, 2010). Hence, an individual may continue to contribute 
to the social exchange if he or she perceives few alternative options and even if 
he/she is not absolutely satisfied with the inputs provided and outputs received. 
Social exchange theory agrees that perceptions of fairness (for instance in 
relationship to the spending the revenue derived from fuel subsidy removal) can 
significantly influence the decisions of an individual (DeConinck, 2010; Masterson, 
Lewis, Goldman, & Taylor, 2000). 
 
Similarly, Homans (1974) premised the theory of social exchange on the following 
points. The success assumption states that for all actions taken by individuals, the 
more often a particular action of an individual is rewarded with benefits, the more 
likely the individual is to undertake that action. In application of taxation and in 
relationship to the removal of the fuel subsidy, as taxpayers receive more benefits 




provision of infrastructural facilities including electricity, good road networks, and 
access to a regular supply of water, among others, the more they will be willing to 
comply with their tax obligations. Thus, if the money or funds derived from the fuel 
subsidy removal are channelled into worthwhile ventures such as the provision of 
infrastructural facilities, the more willing SMEs owners/managers will be to comply 
with their tax obligations. Conversely, if the money or funds derived from the fuel 
subsidy removal are not channelled into something worthwhile, the less willing 
SMEs owners/managers will be to comply with their tax obligations. Homan (1974) 
posited that, if in the past, the occurrence of a particular stimulus has benefited an 
individual‘s action and the more similar the present stimuli are to the past ones, the 
more likely that individual will be to undertake appropriate actions.  
 
In the context of this current study, if the removal of the fuel subsidy has not 
provided added benefits, taxpayers would be less likely to comply with tax 
obligations. Conversely, if the removal of the fuel subsidy has produced remarkable 
improvements in the provision of goods and services, control of corruption, and 
proper handling of security, this would go a long way in enhancing the compliance 
behavior of taxpayers. 
 
Finally, in relationship to taxation, if the benefits taxpayers have received from the 
government are valuable in quality, then they would be more willing to comply. 
Wallace and Wolf (1999) suggested that people will consistently repeat an action 




rewards and act in accordance with the values given to the action. The social 
exchange theory has received much attention and is well established theoretically in 
the literature.  
3.7.3 Social Influence Theory  
The theory of social influence has a lineage with Bandura‘s (1977) theory of social 
learning that was premised on the influence of the environment. The theory of social 
influence states that behaviour is one of the most important ingredients in the 
environment and that others in the environment can influence behaviour either 
intentionally or unintentionally. The theory further posits that individuals learn from 
each other as well as through observations, imitation, and orientations. Therefore, the 
theory explains human behavior in relationship to the continuous exchange 
interaction between cognitive and behavioral environmental influences. Bandura 
(1977) documented that people learn not only from the behavior of others through 
observing them, but are influenced by the outcomes of their own personal behaviors.  
 
In relationship to tax compliance behaviour and, in the context of this study, social 
influence theory identifies the opinions of peers and the extent of social influence an 
individual encounters in socialization, for instance, tax knowledge through service 
orientation, as important variables in determining compliance (Sutinen & Kuperan, 
1999). Furthermore, Crisp and Turner (2007) conceived that social influence is 
concerned with how our thoughts, feelings and behaviour change in the midst of 




conformity, compliance and obedience. The authors further posited that compliance 
may be influenced by the persuasive ways individuals employ in seeking consent as 
well as the power that individuals are perceived to have at their disposal. Power in 
the context of this study is regarded as the ability to exert influence by an individual 
or institution through service orientation. 
 
French and Raven (1959) outlined five bases of social power, which Raven (1965 & 
1993) later expanded to six. The six bases of social power are: 1) reward power, 2) 
coercive power, 3) informative power (for instance service orientation), 4) expert 
power (for instance ability to influence), 5) legitimate power and 6) referent power. 
Reward power, according to the literature, has to do with the provision of incentives 
for compliance. For instance, Manaf (2004) found that incentives in the form of 
positive inducement have significant impacts on the compliance attitudes of land 
taxpayers in Malaysia.  
 
Coercive power, which is the second basis, involves the use of threats of punishment 
to encourage compliance. In connection with taxation, the probability of detection 
serves as coercive power. 
 
The third power is information power, which subjects individuals to compliance 
through the availability of thorough and frequent information. In the context of this 
study, service orientations and tax knowledge available to the taxpayers may go a 




Expert power is the fourth base; this has to do with the absolute ability or capacity of 
experts together with their knowledge to motivate compliance. The relevant tax 
authority may provide services in the form of orientations that will help in 
addressing an individual tax problem, which may motivate the individual to comply 
with tax obligations. 
 
As Gangl et al. (2013) pointed out; taxpayers who perceive a greater service 
orientation will be more willing to pay their taxes. Hence, legitimate power is based 
on authority and the recognition bestowed to the body to which compliance is to be 
made.  For instance, the legitimacy of the tax authority may exert an influence for 
compliance.  
 
Referent power is the sixth base, and the power is derived from the reference group, 
that is, the groups that are significant for an individual‘s behaviour and attitudes. In 
practical terms, social influence in taxation may not be easily achieved due to 
different needs or requirements of taxpayers. For instance, an influential SME 
owner/manager will probably receive more attention from the relevant tax authorities 
compared to a less influential SME owner/manager despite their contributions.  
3.7.4 Equity Theory  
According to McKerchar and Evans (2009), equity theory states that individuals will 
be in the position to comply with certain rules or standards, only if such rules are 




has been highlighted in the social and psychological model as one of the most 
important theories in the area of tax compliance (Fjeldstad et al., 2013). This theory 
may explain that, when the tax system is complex, taxpayers may question its 
fairness. Therefore, the more complex the tax system is, the more taxpayers perceive 
inequity in the system. Thus, based on the theoretical insights, tax complexity may 
induce a level of negativity on tax compliance behaviour.  
 
3.8  Reviews of Past Studies on the Factors Influencing Tax Compliance and 
Noncompliance 
Tax compliance has been widely recognized in the fields of accounting, auditing, 
economics, political economy, sociology, law, and psychology. Therefore, it is of 
interest to know that compliance is a major problem confronting all countries and all 
revenue authorities. Hence, more tax compliance and less tax avoidance or tax 
evasion could be influenced by WFFC, FSR and other factors such as economic (tax 
rate, the probability of detection, and tax complexity), and psychological factors 
(incentives including positive inducements, tax knowledge, and PGQ), and the 
moderating role of PSO and perceived corruption. Because of this, tax compliance 






3.8.1 Studies on Work - Family Financial Commitment (WFFC) 
Work - family financial commitment is an issue of general concern to individuals, 
families, and organizations as it relates directly to families and the workplace. 
Greenhaus and Beutell (1985) viewed WFFC as a form or type of inter-role conflict 
in which one's role conflicts make it difficult either to have valuable time with the 
family or when commitment in the family makes it difficult to be fully engaged at 
work or to meet individual organizational responsibilities and obligations. 
Additionally, Howard (2008) as put forth by (Boyar, Maertz, Pearson, & Keough, 
2003; Greenhaus & Beutell, 1985), in separate but related studies, conceptualized the 
work-family financial condition to be an inter-role issue whereby both work and 
family issues exert pressures on an individual as such creating more financial 
commitment where compliance with some set of pressures (i.e., meeting the needs of 
immediate and extended family) increases the difficulty of complying with the other 
set of pressures (i.e., tax payments and compliance with other obligations to 
individuals or to an organization). 
 
Frone, Russell, and Cooper (1992) also conceived of WFFC as comprising two 
reciprocal processes in which work could interfere with family (i.e., work-to-family 
financial commitment) or family could interfere with work (i.e., family-to-work 
financial commitment). The nature of the relationship between the two sources of 
roles highlights the fact that unmet demands in one role will eventually lead to 
unmet demands in the other role. Because of such financial commitment, taxpayers 




addition, researchers have shown that more financial commitment originating in one 
environment can actually affect the same and other domain outcomes such as tax 
payment obligations. 
 
Fu and Shaffer (2001) studied the tug of work and family with an emphasis on direct 
and indirect domain-specific determinants of WFFC. They discovered that WFFC 
could be a bi-directional construct. For instance, work interference with the family 
environment (WIF) and the family in turns interferes with work (FIW). Each type or 
form of work-family financial commitment has its own unique environmental-
specific antecedents. The specific antecedents of work interference with family 
financial commitment (WIFF) lie in the work environment, whereas the domain 
specific antecedents of the family interference with work financial commitment 
(FIFF) lie within the family environment. These all have significant effects on the 
taxpayer or owner of an SME or organization. Because the degree to which role 
responsibilities from the work environment and family domains are incompatible, 
the demands of either role may affect the performance of the other role (Katz & 
Kahn, 1978). 
 
However, various researchers have investigated the relationship between WFFC and 
other variables. Akinboye (2003), Akinjide (2006), and Popoola (2008) affirmed that 
a significant relationship exists between WFFC and managerial efficiency of the 
managers, for instance, compliance to all organizational obligations, which may 




efficiency in managing organizational resources for results could be better 
guaranteed when WFFC and motivation are jointly combined in the work setting by 
managers. 
 
Adams, King, and King (1996), Grandey and Cropanzano (1999), and Netemeyer, 
Boles, and McMurrien (1996) posit that WFFC can affect work outcomes for 
individual obligations such as tax payments and family-to-work financial 
commitment can affect family outcomes. 
 
Hence, Grandey, and Cropanzano (1999) were of the view that work-to-family 
financial commitment was positively related to job distress (such as psychological 
issues that can result in health-related problems, and, in turn, may lead to low 
commitment by an individual exhibited in tax payments and turnover intentions, 
whereas the family-to- work financial condition was positively associated with 
family distress. Thus, the resultant evidence for same domain versus opposite 
domain effects of inter-roles studies is inconclusive. 
 
Although this researcher has yet to discover any published studies related to WFFC 
and tax compliance behaviour, some research has tied WFFC to individual 
organizational commitment or job performance in general. For example, Aryee 
(1992) and Frone, Yardley, and Markel (1997) examined the relationship between 
WFFC and job performance. The findings revealed a significant negative 




WFFC on job performance in Indonesia. The study, which examined 334 bank 
employees, revealed a negative significant relationship between WFFC and job 
performance. In the same vein, Kalliath and Kalliath (2013) and Shaffer and Joplin 
(2001) also found that family interference with work demands was associated with 
decreased job performance. Logically, the role conflict of employees in the work 
domain is seen as destructive, thereby creating job dissatisfaction in them. 
Greenhaus, Collins, Singh, and Parasuraman (1997) and Netemeyer et al. (1996) 
found no relationship between WFFC and job performance. 
 
However, Kossek and Ozeki (1999) found that the presence of high work-life 
financial condition can lead to low individual and organizational commitment, for 
instance in the commitment of the organization to tax payment over the long term. 
Similarly, Shimazu, Bakker, Demerouti, and Peters (2010) deduced that extreme 
demands of job and home commitments could lead to an increased chance of adverse 
spillover effects between work and non-work domains. Consequently, a constant 
occurrence of this effect could possibly lead to psychological and/or physical health 
issues from unmanageable job and home demands. The resultant effect of this 
psychological stress may further increase when multiple roles exists between work 
and family as a result of job and home obligations.  
 
The implication may be that, if WFFC increases, the chances of tax compliance 
issues will be increased in due course. For instance, Wickens (1996) found that stress 




associated, for example, with meeting financial obligations of family burdens, 
burdening already limited cognitive resources, which, in turn, may affect the tax 
payment and compliance behaviour of the taxpayer, and therefore interfere with the 
attention to detail of individuals or employers and information even when carrying 
out very routine tasks. These routine tasks can be in the form of tax payment. 
Moreover, Hobfoll (1989) opined that individuals are motivated to retain and protect 
their valued resources such as esteem, performance, and wellbeing. Hence, in a 
situation of high WFFC, attention to organizational obligation such as tax 
compliance and the perceived ability to devote discretionary energy to tax payments 
and other organizational obligations may not be a conscious priority. Therefore, this 
may result in a decrease in on-task activities such as tax payments and an increase in 
off-task activities such as a lack of complete task focus because of worries about 
family members. As such, studies have suggested that WFFC does affect different 
factors. 
 
To this end, some studies have shown that WFFC is more associated with work, 
including job satisfaction and burnout (Bacharach, Bamberger, & Conley, 1991; 
Kossek & Ozeki, 1998), while others are more associated with measures of 
psychological stress (Frone et al., 1992; Klitzman, House, Israel, & Mero, 1990). For 
this reason, this current study is focusing on analysing the relationship of WFFC 





Given the limited number of studies in this direction, this current study extends this 
research to the influence of WFFC on tax compliance behaviour, which to the 
researcher's knowledge has yet to be established in the literature. The inclusion of 
this variable is necessitated as a result Stefura‘s (2011, 2012) suggestion of the need 
to incorporate more psychological and other noneconomic factors to gain a more 
insightful knowledge of the puzzle of tax compliance. On the basis of the above 
discussion and logic, WFFC and tax compliance behavior are expected to exhibit a 
reasonable level of correlation. 
3.8.2 Studies on Fuel Subsidy Removal (FSR) 
A subsidy may refer to the assistance provided by others, including, for instance, 
individuals or non-governmental institutions (Stephen, 2012). Majekodunmi (2013), 
who examines the political influence of fuel subsidy removal in Nigeria, sees a 
subsidy as a means of benefit given by the government to either individuals or 
businesses in terms of cash and tax reduction or by reducing the cost of goods. 
Lawal (2014) defined subsidy as a form of assistance the government normally pays 
to the entire economic sector or producers of goods and services to offset part of 
their production costs. He further noted that a fuel subsidy may be in the form of: a 
tax allowance, duty rebate, tax holiday, tax moratorium, tax exemptions, grant, or 
soft loan that is designed to maintain; desired prices of essential products, incomes 
of producers of critical or strategic products or employment levels or induce 




at play in the fuel subsidy is therefore both necessary and expedient (Ikpeze, Soludo, 
& Elekwa, 2004). 
 
Nwafor, Ogujiuba, and Asogwa (2006) and Iyobhebhe (2011), in separate but related 
studies, reported that FSR can be seen as a form of price manipulation whereby the 
government fixes the pump price of fuel for sale to consumers and pays the retailer 
the difference between the actual market price and the regulated or official price per 
litre. Plante (2014), who studied the long-run macroeconomic impacts of fuel 
subsidies, found that the basic features of all subsidies are targeted towards reducing 
the market price of an item below its cost of production. Ering and Akpan (2012) 
were of the view that, although Nigeria has derived its wealth largely from oil and 
gas, which contributed 99% of government revenue, the country was unable to use 
the oil wealth to significantly reduce poverty, or provide basic social and economic 
services to her citizens. 
 
Fuel subsidy removal may be perceived as a price intervention policy wherein 
assistance that is supposed to be granted in the form of finance for the purpose of 
enhancing public welfare is withdrawn by the government (Odemero, 2013). Oseni 
(2013) also pointed out that subsidy removal without adequately tackling the security 
problems in Nigeria and decaying infrastructural facilities was like treating boils and 
leaving cancers and cardiac issues unattended. Based on the various evidence 
available, Majekodunmi (2013) was of the view that removal of fuel subsidies could 




are currently experiencing. These hardships include: hikes in transport fares, rising 
prices of food and services, closure of local industries due to the high costs of 
production making it difficult for the industries to pay its taxes, job losses and 
unemployment, deepening of the poverty level and a poor standard of living. She 
further claimed that the businesses would face daunting challenges including tax 
obligations and other commitments to stay in business. Onyeizugbe and Onwuka 
(2012) found that a remarkable number of industries were closing down because of 
their inability to cope with the business challenges.  
 
As evidenced in Nigeria, the effect of fuel subsidy removal by the president and his 
economic advisers on the infrastructural development of the country has not been 
clear (Ering & Akpan, 2012). Empirically, Kehinde et al. (2012) found that FSR 
would have both negative and positive effects on the agricultural sector. Such 
negative effects have brought about an increase in the cost of agricultural produce, as 
a result of the higher costs of agricultural inputs and transportation, which, of course, 
may affect SMEs owners. 
 
The removal of the fuel subsidy has been seen as being in the long-term best 
interests of transforming the economy through diversification by using the proceeds 
to invest in other sectors such as agriculture. Nonetheless, Stephen (2012) also found 
FSR to be associated with the following consequences: inflation, untold hardships 
and an unprecedented crime upsurge that could make the lives of the ordinary people 




caused the subsidy to increase significantly over recent years, damaging the 
country‘s fiscal health. 
 
In another related study, Odemero (2013) studied the effects of FSR on profitability 
in frozen fish marketing; the findings revealed that FSR is assumed to translate into a 
general increase in the cost of business operations including production and 
compliance costs through tax payments. This has led to increased marketing costs, 
leading to a sudden drop in profitability. Hence, the removal of the fuel subsidy has 
affected the welfare of both fish marketers and fish consumers. Coady and 
Newhouse (2006) and Bacon and Kojima (2006) argued that fuel subsidies had been 
a very inefficient policy tool for poverty reduction because the better-off households 
had usually disproportionately benefited most from petroleum subsidies, thus 
undermining social equity. They further noticed that fuel subsidy removal has led to 
a persistent scarcity of fuel, resulting in long queues, wasted man-hours in queues, 
fuel adulteration resulting in fire incidences and the consequent loss of lives, loss of 
production facilities, and loss of production arising from increased cost of 
infrastructural facilities. Also, Shenoy (2009) pointed out that fuel subsidy removal 
had provided ample opportunity for rampant corruption. 
 
Moreover, the Central Institute for Economic Management Vietnam (2013) 
conceived that an increase in fuel prices could have multiple effects on firms 
including low production and lower profits, which, in turn, would lead to low tax 




effects. First, it will directly affect firms or SMEs input prices including the cost of 
raw materials. Second, an increase in energy prices could lead to a rise in the prices 
of other inputs that may further increase pressure on tax obligations on a firm or 
SME. 
 
Similarly, Taiwo (2012) also reported that FSR could result in higher costs for 
companies and individuals. This, he pointed out, would lower profits for companies 
and mean less disposable income for individuals. Also, companies and individuals 
will consume less and therefore pay less VAT (Taiwo, 2012). He added that, if the 
savings from subsidy removal were not adequately utilized to develop infrastructural 
facilities, and create employment, then the lower consumption by individuals would 
mean less income for businesses with attendant effects on productivity, profitability 
and income taxes. Individuals and households would experience a reduction in their 
disposable income, which in turn would result in a drop in savings and funds 
available for lending to businesses. The resulting consequence could lead to higher 
costs of funds for businesses and lower taxable profit for CIT purposes. Also firms 
may cut down on jobs, which will further result in a reduction in the collection of 
personal income tax. Under extreme pressures on disposable income and 
profitability, tax avoidance and evasion would likely intensify resulting in a further 






Conversely, Burniaux & Chateau (2011) believe that FSR would bring both 
economic and environmental benefits. In their study, they demonstrated that welfare 
gains associated with subsidy removal were accompanied, in most cases, by a more 
efficient allocation of resources across sectors. In Indonesia, this view seems to be 
plausible as subsidy removal reduced real output by 2% in the short-term (Clement, 
Jung, & Gupta, 2007). However, these research findings are in contrast with those of 
Hope and Singh (1995) who indicated that a reduction of fuel subsidy stimulates 
higher growth. Breisinger, Thomas, and Thurlow (2010) suggested that any 
exogenous shock would impose direct and indirect effects. Even though several 
studies have been conducted on FSR, a dearth of empirical evidence exists linking 
FSR and tax compliance behaviour in the literature. 
 
These reasons together with Stefura‘s (2011, 2012) suggestions necessitated the need 
for the inclusion of this variable in relationship to tax compliance. 
3.8.3 Studies on Tax Rates 
Tax rates are normally seen as the actual rate of taxes that taxpayers are expected to 
remit to the relevant tax authorities. It is not surprising that taxpayer behaviour is 
influenced either positively or negatively by either increasing or decreasing the tax 
rate. Clotfelter (1983) investigated the relationship between tax evasion and the tax 
rate. The study cautioned that the reduction of the tax rate would not serve as the 
only effective mechanism in discouraging tax evasion. His results showed that tax 




secondary data of individuals; therefore, the results may not be a true reflection of 
the behaviour of taxpayers. The debate surrounding these findings is that taxpayers 
are always sensitive to their income. When the relevant tax authorities or the 
government is untrustworthy, some taxpayers may refrain from tax payments, 
especially when the penalty for avoidance is not stiff. 
 
Palil et al. (2013) studied the tax compliance behaviour with emphasis on economic 
factors in Malaysia. The study, which relied heavily on a survey, discovered that the 
tax compliance behaviour of Malaysian taxpayers was negatively influenced by the 
tax rates. The import of their findings revealed that higher tax rates have the 
potential to increase tax evasion. Though a large sample size was used, the study had 
a limited scope because it focused on country specifics related to Malaysia, which 
cannot be generalized to other developed or emerging countries. 
 
Recently, Mas'ud et al. (2014) employed simple regression to investigate the 
influence of tax rate on tax compliance in Africa for the period between 2012 and 
2013. The results indicated a significant negative effect of tax rates on tax 
compliance. Though all 61 African countries were used, however, the study also had 
limited scope because only two years were covered. In addition, their findings have 
limited validity in other sectors such as SMEs sectors and other sets of taxpayers, 






Hence, the imposition of high tax rates in relationship to SMEs owners/managers 
may not necessarily increase government revenues through tax collections; rather it 
may lead to the extinction of some businesses or even cause some SMEs to become 
informal (Rebecca & Benjamin, 2009). Although higher tax rates and weak tax 
administration in developing countries may cause low tax compliance, little is 
known of this relationship in the context of Nigerian SME taxpayers.  However, it 
does seem likely that more businesses are opting out from the formal sector due to 
high tax rates. More evidence has also revealed that a higher tax rate increases tax 
evasion and reduces tax compliance (Ali et al., 2001; Torgler, 2007). 
 
Several studies have examined how tax rates influence tax compliance in the 
negative direction. Yitzhaki (1974) found that as a penalty rate was imposed for tax 
evasion, tax evasion was reduced. Feinstein (1991) applied an econometric analysis 
of income tax evasion and its detection in 1991. The study relied heavily on IRS data 
from 1982 to 1985. The results indicated that a positive relationship existed between 
tax rates and tax reporting compliance. However, the secondary data utilised in the 
study and the incorporation of dummy variables in the model might have tilted the 
outcome of the findings. Alm, Sanchez, and De Juan (1995) studied the effect of the 
tax rate on tax compliance in Spain. The study found that a higher tax rate resulted in 
a decrease in tax evasion and a proportional increase in the compliance level. Other 
regions or developing countries were not included in the study, which might have 





The actual impact of tax rates on compliance remains vague, unclear and debatable 
(Kirchler, 2007). Though most of the literature has revealed that tax rates are 
positively correlated with tax evasion as well as negatively related with tax 
compliance behaviour, other studies discovered either a positive impact or no 
relationship between tax rates and tax compliance.  Recently, Modugu et al. (2012) 
conducted a study in Nigeria. They discovered that the tax rate failed to show either 
a positive or negative relationship with tax compliance.  
 
Because of these conflicting findings, Freire-Serén and Panadés (2013) pointed out 
that more must be explored, especially in the relationship between tax evasion and 
tax rate. The numerous conflicting findings make the cause-and-effect relationship 
between tax rates and tax compliance more ambiguous and fascinating. Do higher 
tax rates result in a higher tax compliance level? Or, do lower tax rates result in a 
higher tax compliance level? These are substantive questions that need to be 
answered.  
3.8.4 Studies on Probability of Detection 
The probability of detection is seen as the likelihood that the relevant tax authorities 
will uncover an individual‘s noncompliance and seek to remedy the evasion (Chau & 
Leung, 2009). Therefore, the influence of the probability of detection on taxpayer's 
compliance has received considerable attention in recent years by researchers in 
developed and developing countries. For example, Bordignon (1993) examined the 




for taxpayers‘ avoidance or evasion was the non-zero probability of being detected 
because such taxpayers tend to avoid or evade their tax liabilities. 
 
Palil and Mustapha (2011) investigated the determinants of tax behavior in Malaysia, 
using multiple regressions. The authors, who surveyed 1,073 individual taxpayers, 
found that if taxpayers believed that they would not be caught due to lack of 
investigations, they resorted to more complex tax evasion tactics and less traceable 
documentations in order to pay less tax. However, the probability of detection may 
encourage some taxpayers to declare their true income, which of course will 
invariably increase compliance. This study is encompassing, but failed to consider 
taxpayers such as SME owners/managers. In 1978, Mason and Calvin, as cited in 
Kirchler (2007) conducted a survey, which revealed that taxpayers who evaded taxes 
always perceived the chances of being caught or detected to be lower than the 
taxpayers who were found to be honest. 
 
Indeed, Alm, Martinez-Vasquez, and Schneider (2004) considered the probability of 
being detected to have a significant dual deterrent effect on the taxpayers. These 
were the direct deterrent effects of taxpayers actually being audited, and the indirect 
deterrent effect on taxpayers of not actually being audited. As a result, as the 
probability of detection become higher, this may or may not encourage tax 
compliance. According to Allingham and Sandmo (1972), an increase in the 
probability of detection is associated with an increase in reported income. In the 




correlated with tax compliance in the jurisdiction of her study. Her findings revealed 
that perceived chances of being detected were positively correlated with the amount 
of reported income, that is, as the perceived chances of being detected grew higher, 
the degree of compliance became higher too. 
 
Similarly, Riahi-Belkaouni (2004) and Richardson (2008), in separate but related 
studies, opined that the probability of detection was a significant factor in reporting 
behaviour. Taxpayers were more honest in declaring their income due to the 
expectation that they would be audited during that particular year. In the same 
regard, Bergman‘s (1998) studied the tax compliance behaviour in Australia, it was 
concluded that the probability of taxpayers being detected played a substantial role 
in improving compliance behaviour. As pointed out earlier, a lack of audits and 
investigations by relevant tax authorities in the 1980s had driven taxpayers to behave 
more recklessly in Australia. In addition, Spicer and Lundstedt (1976) as cited in 
Spicer and Becker (1980) claimed that the tendency towards tax evasion is always 
reduced by increasing the probability of detection. 
 
The probability of detection is seen as being controlled by the revenue service, 
whose obligatory mandate and objectives are geared towards revenue maximization. 
As a result, a kind of symbiotic or mutual relationship exists between the revenue 
service and taxpayers; that is, the revenue service reacts to the declarations of 





In the United States, Eisenhauer (2008) conducted a study to examine the 
determinants of tax compliance. The result revealed that self-employed individuals 
or SME owners have a higher opportunity to evade taxes than do other groups due to 
low probability of audits. The study further revealed that as tax evasion increased in 
the United States, tax audits have become a significant measure in curbing or 
decreasing tax noncompliance. Lewis, Carrera, Cullis, and Jones (2009) did a 
comparative study between the United Kingdom and Italy, and their findings showed 
that most participants declared more of their income as the probability of detection 
increased. As Hindriks and Myles (2006) pointed out, if the probability of detection 
is too small compared to the sanction rate, then the evasion will increase 
accordingly. On the other hand, Yaniv (2009) argued that a rise in enforcement by 
raising the probability of detection would subsequently have a deterrent effect on 
evasion. The general belief is that an increase in the probability of detection will 
have a resultant effect in decreasing tax evasion (Alm et al., 1992; Cummings, 
Martinez-Vazquez, McKee, & Torgler, 2009; Dubin & Wilde, 1988; Franzoni, 1999; 
Franzoni, 2000; Hindriks & Myles, 2006; Stefura, 2012). The rate of compliance 
will increase if a taxpayer or a SME owner perceives the probability of being 
detected to be high, which may result in a true declaration of their actual income.  
 
However, other studies found mixed results. Andreoni, Erard, and Feinstein (1998) 
conceived that prior audit experiences and a continuous relationship or contact with 
the tax authority increased compliance among taxpayers. This finding was consistent 




could be either positive or negative between the detection probability and taxpayers‘ 
compliance. Conversely, Young (1994) found the probability of being detected was 
negatively correlated with compliance behaviour. 
 
In sum, the literature shows that different in the probability of detection levels or 
magnitudes provide different degrees of compliance. For instance, Bergman (1998) 
and Eisenhauer (2008) found that a higher probability of being detected potentially 
increased compliance. However, other authors found contradictory results due to the 
circumstances and the context in which the study was conducted (Slemrod et al., 
2001; Young, 1994). Because of these mixed results, the variable will be subjected 
to further re-examination in this study to see how the nature of the relationship will 
be portrayed.  
3.8.5 Studies on Tax Complexity 
As tax regulations and other provisions become more complex over time, that 
complexity has become a significant factor related to tax evasion (Jackson & 
Milliron, 1986; Richardson & Sawyer, 2001). Before considering whether to 
comply, one fundamental element that taxpayers are confronted with is the tax 
system. Because of this, the structures of the tax system and its laws always have 
capabilities of hindering the willingness of the taxpayer to comply.  
 
The complexity of a tax system takes different forms, including computational 




complexity or a low level of readability (Carnes & Cuccia, 1996; Cox & Eger, 2006; 
Pau, Sawyer, & Maples, 2007; Richardson & Sawyer, 1998; Saw & Sawyer, 2010). 
Thus, complexity arises when the equity of the entire tax system is being considered 
with the aim of reducing inconsistencies of a tax system (McKercher, Ingraham, & 
Karlinsky, 2005). 
 
However, prior research on the relationship between tax complexity and tax 
compliance has been varied. McKerchar (2003) suggested that increasing complexity 
causes both monetary and non-monetary costs of compliance to increase, thereby 
causing a negative impact on taxpayers' perceptions of fairness, and, as a result, 
negatively impacts their respective commitments to compliance. 
 
Similarly, Forest and Sheffrin (2002) conducted a research that laid emphasis on a 
broader population of taxpayers based on the impact of complexity on compliance 
behaviour. The result revealed that an increased perception of fairness on the part of 
the taxpayers led to improved compliance, whereas complexity did not necessarily 
influence perceptions of fairness and compliance. McKerchar et al. (2005) opined 
that in either United States or Australia the extent to which small business taxpayers 
are committed to compliance is unclear and ambiguous. In this comparison of 
Australian and United States practitioners, the findings revealed that the major 
causes of complexity were the result of the frequency of changes, the volume of 





Kirchler, Niemirowski, and Wearing (2006) conceived that an inverse relationship 
exists between complexity and perceptions of fairness. Reflecting on earlier findings 
that perceived tax fairness would stimulate taxpayers‘ compliance, tax complexity 
will negatively affect the tax compliance.  As Kirchler et al. (2006) in Saad (2009) 
opined complexity in the relevant tax law would lead to a negative perception of the 
tax system and, in turn, encourage an unwillingness to comply with the tax law. 
 
In order to gain further insight into the phenomenon of tax complexity, Strader and 
Fogliasso (1989) undertook a comparative study of tax complexity in seven 
countries. Their findings revealed that Japan, the United Kingdom, France, Italy and 
the United States were associated with a highly complex tax system. Sweden and the 
Netherlands had a moderately complex tax system. In New Zealand, for instance, the 
country witnessed many tax reforms dating as far back as the 1980s to reduce the 
magnitude of the complexity of the tax system (Hasseldine & Bebbington, 1991). 
 
Mustafa (1997) studied the perception of taxpayers toward the introduction of a self-
assessment system in Malaysia. The finding suggested the presence of tax 
complexity, particularly in the area of record keeping, as a result of so many details 
in the tax law and ambiguity. His findings were partly consistent with the six 
potential causes of complexity labelled as: 1) ambiguity, 2) calculations, 3) changes, 
4) details, 5) forms and 6) record keeping, as identified by Long and Swingen 
(1987). Such complexity was also present in Australia, which forces taxpayers to 




Others have examined how readable tax legislation is for taxpayers. Tan and Tower 
(1992) applied the Flesch Reading Ease Index to measure the readability level of tax 
legislation, Tax Information Bulletins (TIBs) and Tax Return Guides in New 
Zealand. The Flesch Reading Ease Index has a range of 0 to 100, which calculates a 
range from the most cumbersome to least difficult. Their results indicated that 
simplification was not in progress at that time, except for the Tax Return Guides. 
Based on the above findings, Tan and Tower (1992) recognized the importance of 
employing shorter and more appropriate sentences in the style of writing so as to 
improve the readability of tax legislation, which might invariably reduce the 
complexity of the tax law. Pau et al. (2007) found significant improvements of the 
tax simplicity using the Flesch Reading Ease Index, Flesch-Kincaid Grade Level 
Index, average sentence length and percentage of passive sentences. Their study 
found that the written Income Tax Act 2004 in New Zealand had improve in 
readability. Sawyer (2007) agreed that simplification has improved to a reasonable 
extent, but that the persistence changes in the legislation has delayed the rewrite of 
the program and the benefits contained therein.  
 
In sum, the above studies about New Zealand found significant success for the 
review project undertaken by the New Zealand government in its tax simplicity goals 
in the context of improved readability. As a result of the rewrite project, the results 
of Saw and Sawyer (2010) also indicated that a remarkable percentage of people 
with an education level range from 11 to 13 years were able to understand the 2007 




Nonetheless, Saad (2014) provided contrary evidence in relationship to the 
complexity of the income tax system in New Zealand. The study found that most of 
the taxpayers interviewed believed that the income tax system was generally too 
complex and technical for them to comprehend. Thus, these more recent findings 
seem to disprove what Saw and Sawyer claimed in 2010. Some of this may be due to 
differences in the metrics used. Saad (2014) measured complexity in terms of 
taxpayer‘s views of their actual experience in dealing with the income tax system, 
while Saw and Sawyer (2010) measured the phenomenon of complexity in 
relationship to the difficulty in reading and comprehending the various tax 
legislation and other tax regulations. 
 
Richardson (2006) conducted a study of 45 countries, and the results revealed that, 
complexity was one of the most significant determinants of noncompliance, aside 
from education, income source, fairness and tax morale. The findings were 
consistent with those of Cox and Eger (2006) who focused on the State Road Funds 
in the state of Kentucky in the United States. The authors posited that procedural tax 
complexity contributes to an increase in tax noncompliance. In Australia, McKerchar 
(2005) noted that tax agents were unhappy with the increasing complexity of the tax 
law. The results further suggested that tax agents needed a simpler tax law, in 
relationship to less regulatory material and ad-hoc changes. 
 
Gambo, Mas'ud, Nasidi, and Oyewole (2014) studied the influence of tax complexity 




Pearson correlation and regression methods as techniques of data analysis, the 
authors found tax complexity to significantly influence tax compliance negatively. 
Though the findings covered a remarkable number of African countries, however, 
they relied solely on secondary data, which failed to recognize the effect of 
individual country specifics that might have affected the entire findings. Moreover, 
Kirchler et al. (2006) also documented that taxpayers were more likely to comply 
when the tax law was perceived as less complex. However, Yankelovich and White 
(1984) found that no relationship existed between tax complexity and tax compliance 
of the taxpayers, even though Saad (2014) had outlined the possibility of 
investigating tax complexity as an important determinant of tax compliance. 
 
Based on the mixed findings, suggestions for future research in this area, and most 
importantly, the fact that studies on tax complexity were mainly related to 
compliance costs not tax compliance in particular (Forest & Sheffrin, 2002; Guyton, 
Hare, Stavrianos, & Toder, 2003) further studies are needed. Additionally, most 
studies were conducted in either developed countries or in the Asian axis and not in 
the context of Nigeria. Therefore, further examination is needed. 
3.8.6 Studies on Incentives (Positive Inducement) 
Several studies that do concentrate on tax incentives of small firms mostly laid 
extensive emphasis on margin (Goolsbee, 1998; Cullen & Gordon, 2007; Gordon & 
Mackie-Mason, 1994). Moreover, several researchers have pointed the need for a 




incentives. Such incentives could be in the form of positive inducements to comply 
with the relevant tax laws or negative inducements such as penalties or sanctions 
where the probability of noncompliance is assumed to exist (Slemrod, 1992; Smith, 
1992). Richardson and Sawyer (2001) recognised the effectiveness of positive 
reinforcements in encouraging compliance behaviour as evidence in other 
disciplines. 
 
Various authors have studied positive inducements. Torgler (2002) recognized the 
importance of positive inducements in the area of tax compliance studies. Based on 
the importance to which the subject matter possessed in the area of taxation, the 
author suggested the need to recognize a number of different forms in which positive 
inducements could surface. Prominent researchers in this area have suggested many 
measures, among them is Alm et al. (1992a) suggested the use of monetary rewards 
for absolute compliance. They pointed out that rewards should be in the form of cash 
payments or discounts on tax. 
 
Consistent with Alm et al. (1992b), Smith and Stalans (1991) were of the view that 
other monetary rewards in the form of monetary incentives for timely filing, as well 
as the issuance of lottery tickets to taxpayers who complies with tax laws and 
regulations. They further explained the circumstances surrounding the effectiveness 
of such incentives to be essentially that of operant conditioning. Much evidence in 
the literature also portrays the extent to which monetary incentives have impacted 




compared how positive inducements could encourage compliance behaviour and 
found that monetary rewards and lottery tickets were the most effective avenues of 
improving compliance. 
 
Other measures were also examined as well. For example, Jackson (1986) outlined 
the need for a parsimonious means of improving the behaviours of taxpayers 
including the prompt issuance of tax refunds. Jackson (1986) and Smith (1992) 
suggested measures such as polite and helpful service by relevant tax authority staff. 
Others suggested measures such as an expression of thanks for compliant behaviour 
(Smith & Stalans, 1991).  
 
In relationship to the standard economic theory, rewards are expected to change or 
alter the relative prices, such that paying taxes would be seen as more attractive 
compared to evading taxes (Feld et al., 2006). To further support the above 
assertions, Harju and Kosenen (2012) reported that provision of better tax incentives 
would help in boosting the economic activities of entrepreneurs. 
 
Trivedi, Shehata and Mestelman (2004) studied attitudes and incentives, and tax 
compliance. The study, which utilised data from the Canada Revenue Agency, found 
that, if taxpayers focused only on incentives by playing an ―audit lottery‖, increasing 
penalties and audit rates should go a long way in improving compliance. Thus, in 
relationship to the above findings, the deduction can be made that incentives, in most 




claimed that positive incentives are important instruments to enhance tax 
compliance. Supporting the above assertions, Alm et al. (1992b) further reiterated 
that rewards have a tendency to increase compliance, especially in altering the rate at 
which extreme behaviours may possibly shift individuals from a very low to a very 
high compliance rate. 
 
Based on the above arguments, most findings are geared towards one direction; 
however, the variable incentive (positive inducement) seems to have been accorded 
little attention in the context of taxation, let alone tax compliance behaviour. To the 
best of this researcher‘s knowledge, apart from Manaf‘s (2004) work, no literature in 
other developing countries emphasizes incentives (positive inducement) and tax 
compliance behaviour. Therefore, this variable was included in this present study for 
further re-examination in the context of a developing country, Nigeria.  
3.8.7 Studies on Tax Knowledge 
According to Kasippilai (2000), tax knowledge is one of the most important 
ingredients in achieving voluntary compliance. Such knowledge is also one of the 
vital tools in determining an accurate tax liability (Palil, 2005). Hofmann, Hoelzl, 
and Kirchler (2008) studied the knowledge and evaluation of taxation, norms, 
fairness, and motivation to cooperate with the state and its institutions. Their study 
identified knowledge of taxation as one of the most essential factors influencing tax 
compliance. Though the study extensively reviewed the perceptions of the taxpayers, 




Loo et al. (2009) reported similar results, that tax knowledge under the regime of 
self-assessment was one of the most influential factors in determining compliance 
behavior of taxpayers. 
 
In separate but related studies, Kasipillai and Jabbar (2003) and Kirchler et al. (2006) 
discovered a high correlation between compliance rates and the possession of tax 
knowledge. Based on the foregoing, even though, tax knowledge was discovered to 
enhance tax compliance; the absence of tax knowledge may result in either 
intentional or unintentional noncompliance behaviour among taxpayers. 
 
The influence of tax knowledge on tax compliance behavior has been well 
established and proven in various researches (Ahmad, Hanefah, & Noor, 2007; 
Eriksen & Fallen, 1996; Palil, 2010; Palil & Mustapha, 2011; Saad, 2014). 
Christensen, Weihrich, and Gerbing (1994) were of the view that both understanding 
and acceptance of the tax law complexity can only be enhanced when the knowledge 
of the taxpayers has increased. In order to fully understand the subject of discussion, 
Harris (1989) categorised tax knowledge into two aspects, namely, 1) knowledge 
through common or formal education received as a matter of training, and 2) 
knowledge specifically directed at possible opportunities to evade tax. 
 
Moreover, Eriksen and Fallan (1996) concluded that the level of knowledge received 
by taxpayers is an important factor that has contributed to the general understanding 




laws and regulations of taxation. In their study, they found that, when the knowledge 
of the taxpayers increased, taxpayers considered their own tax evasion as being more 
serious, which invariably might increase their compliance levels. 
 
Additionally, general tax knowledge has been shown to have very close relationship 
with the ability of taxpayers to understand the laws and regulations of taxation, and 
their ability to comply with them (Singh, 2003). Ahmad et al. (2007) pointed out that 
a significant difference exists between taxpayers who have tax knowledge and an 
understanding of compliance and those who do not have tax knowledge and an 
understanding of compliance. Thus, insufficient knowledge possessed by the 
taxpayers may have a resulting effect on the interpretation and understanding of the 
tax law. 
 
Given evidence that tax knowledge affects the knowledge of taxpayers, some authors 
such as Eriksen and Fallan (1996), Harris (1989), and Singh (2003) have attempted 
to examine whether the enhancement of tax knowledge would increase tax 
compliance. Eriksen and Fallan (1996) and Lewis (1982) examined whether a 
connection existed between attitudes towards taxation and specific tax knowledge, in 
part because these tax attitudes might enhance the tendency towards tax evasion or 
tax compliance. Lewis (1982) attempted to determine whether a connection was 
present between specific tax knowledge and attitudes during the completion of a tax 
return. His aim was to study any changes in the attitudes towards taxation that 




impact on tax compliance. Lewis argued that insufficient knowledge about tax 
regulations could lead to negative economic effects. 
 
In Malaysia, Palil, and Mustapha (2011) also identified the determinants of tax 
compliance through a survey of 1,073 respondents. Their study revealed a significant 
relationship between tax knowledge and tax compliance irrespective of the variation 
among the respondents. Though a large sample size was used, the study was limited 
because it did not consider the variations among the respondents. Their findings 
aligned with those of Fischer et al. (1992) who found a positive relationship between 
tax knowledge and compliance. This meant that as people become more informed or 
knowledgeable about the tax system, their attitudes and perceptions might also 
change either positively or negatively. 
 
The following studies also established a positive relationship between tax knowledge 
and tax evasion (Dubin & Wilde, 1988; McGee, Basic & Tyler, 2009; Ritsema, 
Thomas & Ferrier, 2003). One consideration is that as people become more familiar 
with the tax system, they might seek to find weaknesses in the tax system and avoid 
paying taxes. However, most findings are mixed with regards to whether tax 
knowledge affects tax compliance either negatively or positively. As Devos (2008) 
has pointed out, the conflicting results may be due to the inability to ascertain what 





In the literature, the findings have shown mixed and inconsistent effects of tax 
knowledge on the compliance levels of taxpayers. While some studies found tax 
knowledge to positively influence tax compliance, others found a negative 
correlation between the variables. As a result, this current research is designed to 
further investigate their relationship in the context of a developing country.  
3.8.8 Studies on Public Governance Quality (PGQ) 
According to Huther & Shah (1999), PGQ is a multi-faceted concept that 
encompasses all aspects of exercising authority through formal and informal 
institutions in the management of the available resources of a state for the benefit of 
the masses. For example, Rotberg (2005) sees PGQ as the provision of efficient 
necessary quality political goods by the government to the taxpayers. Thus, the more 
government provides public services according to the preferences of taxpayers based 
on exchange for an adequate tax price, the more taxpayers are willing to comply 
(Alm et al., 1992b). Critically speaking, public governance is an issue of utmost 
importance to developed and developing countries.  
 
International organizations have sought to define the construct. For example, the 
World Bank (2006) viewed PGQ as a process in which leaders are chosen, 
regimented, and replaced with the capacity of the government of a specific country 
in order to judiciously manage the resources of their respective country so as to 
further implement appropriate policies for the benefit of all. Similarly, Besancon 




available to the masses irrespective of class. Further buttressing the above assertions, 
Besancon (2003) claimed that, when a country provides its citizens with a high 
quality of predefined political goods, such a nation is assumed to have a sound 
quality public governance. 
 
Alabede et al. (2011) studied the moderating effect of financial condition and risk 
preference on the relationship between public governance quality and tax 
compliance behaviour in Nigeria. The study was based on a survey of income tax 
payers and employed a hierarchical regression model. The authors discovered that a 
significant improvement in the quality of public governance had gone a long way in 
reawakening the culture of tax compliance among individual taxpayers. However, 
the findings might have been far more interesting, if the scope of the study was not 
limited to only taxpayers of the FCT Abuja. 
 
Similarly, Levi (1988) revealed the presence of a vertical contract influencing tax 
compliance. The findings showed that the contract that exists between the taxpayers 
and the government was vertical in nature, which was termed as a quid pro quo for 
taxation. A vertical contract was established based on the fact that whether taxpayers 
receive public goods in exchange for the monetary value being paid as taxes is a 
bone of contention. Lassen (2003) shed further light on the meaning of quid pro quo 
in relationship to taxation, which was considered, according to his study, as whether 
the political goods provided by the government were adequately sufficient in 




The argument has been made that, if taxpayers perceive the rate of transformation 
from tax to political goods as low, then the taxpayers always feel cheated, such that 
the government fails in its obligatory duty to sustain its end of the agreement. This 
failure would consequently have a negative impact on tax compliance (Levi, 1998). 
Furthermore, Lassen (2003) posited that, if the political goods mixture issued by a 
responsible government was found to be distinct and uniquely different from the 
preferences of taxpayers, then the attractiveness of the vertical contract between the 
two parties would start to diminish. This diminution could, in turn, lead to lower tax 
compliance, which aligns the earlier thoughts of Alm et al. (1992b). In examining 
the relationship between PGQ and compliance behaviour, Akpo (2009) found that 
the term ―good governance‖ refers to the ability of government to provide quality 
public goods to the citizens, but, in an instance in which the government failed in its 
duty to provide such an exchange, the result might, in turn, negatively affect the 
morale of citizens in paying their taxes. 
 
Further emphasizing the above line of argument, Everest-Philips and Sandall (2009) 
pointed out that a linkage between PGQ and taxation exists, such that quality 
governance is seen as a product of a good tax system, which would produce a better 
tax system, and further promote good governance. Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, 
(2007) said that PGQ included the following indicators: political stability, 
government effectiveness in the provision of quality of public goods, adherence to 
the rule of law, control of corruption and participation in governance through 




number of people always made their decisions to comply in accordance with the 
level of public services the government supplied. Alm et al. (1992a) also found that 
the average rate of compliance was always higher when public goods were provided. 
Their findings were consistent with that of Alm and Gomez (2008). 
 
In a related direction, Torgler (2003) was of the view that the more taxpayers engage 
in the political decision-making process through democratic means, the more the 
relationship of taxpayers and government is built on the basis of trust. As a result, 
this relationship will have a substantial influence on the ability and willingness of 
people to pay their taxes. 
 
Joshua and Jinjarik (2005) theorized that the efficiency of tax collection is normally 
affected by polarization and political instability in a country, which invariably would 
reduce the efficiency of tax collection and thereby lower the compliance level. This 
was established by Alm and Torgler (2006) who studied the tax morale of United 
States, Austria and Switzerland. Their study found that the United States was 
associated with higher tax morale compared to Austria and Switzerland. Damania, 
Fredriksson, and Mani (2004) opined that a higher degree of compliance with 
regulation is achieved when the political situation of a country is normal. The above 
finding was consistent with those Tedds‘ (2007) reported. Torgler and Schneider 
(2009) also noted that a lack of efficient and effective administration of the rule of 
law might undermine the willingness of citizens to pay taxes. In support of Torgler 




established rule of law has better compliance than a country without an efficient rule 
of law. 
 
In relationship to the above discussion, study of the relationship between PGQ and 
tax compliance is scanty, especially in developing countries, and most importantly, 
the literature only focuses on the direct relationship between these variables. This is 
true even though Alabede et al. (2011) suggested the need for examining further the 
indirect effects of PGQ in relationship to tax compliance behaviour in developing 
countries in order to validate their findings. In light of the above, such an 
examination is an excellent avenue by which to further explore its relationship with 
SME owners/managers, which for now has received little attention. 
  
3.9 The Resultant Influence of the Predictors on Tax Compliance 
The essence of this section is to recapitulate the key factors that have been identified 
as influencing the tax compliance behaviour of SME owners/managers. No doubt, 
many studies have examined the various factors that are capable of influencing tax 
compliance behaviour. Nonetheless, within the context of this study, WFFC, FSR, as 
well as economic and psychological factors that were identified and considered as 
the most important factors that may significantly and positively influence tax 
compliance behaviour of SMEs owners/managers, keeping other factors constant, are 





Thus, the consideration of these factors in this current study was based on the 
suggestions made by past studies and, coupled with the fact that these variables 
would assist in addressing the research issues highlighted in Chapter One, is also in 
line with the research setting and environment in, Nigeria (Sekaran, Robert, & Brain, 
2001). 
 
To start with, the influence of WFFC and FSR has not, in any way, been established 
in relationship to tax compliance behaviour. Though some studies have linked 
WFFC with other constructs, such as job performance, organizational commitment, 
individual obligation, and psychological stress (Aryee, 1992; Frone et al., 1997; 
Kalliath & Kalliath, 2013; Kossek & Ozeki, 1999; Wickens, 1996). Similarly, FSR 
on its own has not received the much-needed attention in the literature, especially in 
relationship to tax compliance behavior, even though, FRS was found to be 
associated with the cost of production, the cost of transportation, the agricultural 
sector, and growth (Kehinde et al., 2012; Odemero, 2013). At present, scanty 
empirical research relates WFFC, FSR and tax compliance behaviours in the 
literature. Thus, the inclusion of these variables is in line with the call of Alm (2013) 
and Stefura (2011, 2012) to study more psychological and other noneconomic 
factors to gain an insight into the puzzle of tax compliance. 
 
Furthermore, the significant role of either economic or psychological factors on tax 
compliance behaviour has long been established in the literature. For instance, 




Nichita, Batrancea (2012), Mas'ud et al. (2014), Palil et al. (2013), Pau et al. (2007), 
Saad (2014), Sawyer (2007), and Stefura (2012) argued that these factors in one way 
or the other significantly affect tax compliance behaviour, while others failed to 
establish any relationship. However, Akpo, (2009), Alm (1999), Alm and Torgler 
(2006), and Jackson and Milliron (1986) further argued that other factors not 
considered in any of the previous studies, which by no means exhaustive, might 
influence tax noncompliance decisions  
 
Several researchers have argued that no one set of factor(s) could predict a good 
relationship with tax compliance behaviour. Thus, the economic environment or 
situation tends to dictate which set of particular factor(s) could have the potential for 
predicting a taxpayer‘s behaviour. Hence, the consideration of WFFC, FSR, tax 
rates, the probability of detection, tax complexity, incentives (positive inducements), 
tax knowledge, and PGQ are variables that could significantly affect the tax 
compliance behaviour of SME owners/managers in the context of the Nigerian 
environment.  
 
Furthermore, Allingham and Sandmo (1972), Alm (2013), Batrancea et al. (2012), 
Palil et al. (2013), and Stefura (2012) asserted that economic factors such as the tax 
rate or the probability of detection predict and significantly affect the tax compliance 
behaviour of taxpayers. Thus, these demonstrate how important economic factors are 
to the prediction of tax compliance of SME owners/managers. Nonetheless, the 




environment in Nigeria required that the impact of economic factors must be 
checked. Hence, the inclusion of economic factors as independent variables in this 
study. 
 
In addition, authors have equally documented evidence of the significant role of 
psychological factors such as positive inducements, tax knowledge, and PGQ on tax 
compliance behaviour. For instance, Alm et al. (1992a), Manaf (2004), and Manaf, 
Hasseldine, and Hodges (2005), in related but separate studies, argued that positive 
incentives have been recognized as one of the most important instruments for 
enhancing tax compliance behaviour, although little attention seems to have been 
paid to them in the literature. Authors such as Alabede et al. (2011), Maseko (2014), 
Bătrâncea et al. (2012), Palil et al. (2013, Palil and Mustapha (2011), Richardson 
(2006), and Saad (2014) also documented a significant influence of PGQ and tax 
knowledge on tax compliance behaviour, though contradictory findings are present 
in the literature. The inconsistency in the findings further prompted the need to re-
examine the variables in relationship to a different geographical settings and 
taxpayers. Therefore, the consideration of these factors in this study is appropriately 





3.10 The Resultant Effect of the Moderating Variables 
3.10.1 Studies on Perceived Service Orientation (PSO): The Moderating 
Variable 
Hogan, Hogan, and Busch (1984) conceived of service orientation as an attitude of 
being helpful, thoughtful, considerate and cooperative. The term service orientation 
was used in the area of personality traits (Solnet & Jay, 2008). Although the term has 
evolved over time, service orientation is now known as one dimension of strategic 
management (Schneider & White, 2004). For example, Solent and Jay (2008) 
divided the meaning of service orientation into two: 1) a perception of employees in 
relationship to practice, policies and procedures in an organization, and 2) a meaning 
focused on a dimension of an organization's overall strategy and culture. Though 
service orientation has been given due attention in the area of tax administration 
(OECD, 2010), studies on its actual effects are rare (Gangl et al., 2013). The OECD 
(2010) mainly focused on the usage rates of services on cost efficiency (Bird, 2004; 
Pieterson, 2009), while Smith and Stalans (1991) and Stalans and Lind (1997) 
emphasised satisfaction with services rendered. 
 
Accordingly, Heintzman and Marson (2005) studied the interaction between people, 
service and trust with an emphasis on public sector service chain. They pointed out 
that PSO has a possibility not only for facilitating cooperation with citizens, but can 
also be an avenue for increasing the level of trust and confidence in government. As 
such Alm and Torgler (2011) and Kirchler et al. (2008), in related but separate 




treated with the utmost respect, as well as being providing with all the needed 
services, in order to facilitate mutual participation, instead of creating a climate of 
deterrence and distrust that could warrant negative attitudes towards tax payment. 
 
However, very few studies actually have looked at the interaction of this construct in 
relationship to the compliance behaviour of taxpayers. These included Cherry, Jones, 
and McKee (2010), while Gangl et al. (2013) carried out a more recent study on the 
perceived service orientation of tax authorities and tax compliance, with the aim of 
discovering how the relevant tax authorities could render a helping hand. They 
discovered PSO to significantly influence the tax compliance behaviour of private 
Dutch taxpayers. Though a large sample size was used, a market research agency 
collected the data on behalf of the NTCA because of which, some have questioned 
the authenticity and reliability of the data. Additionally, Alm and Torgler (2011), 
who conducted a multifaceted approach, found that service orientation was 
recognized as one of the important approaches in regulation, which should be equal 
to enforcement and trust in addressing tax noncompliance. Kirchler et al. (2006) 
found that the perceived support of the advice of the relevant tax officers was 
correlated with high self-reported compliance. 
 
Moreover, the results of empirical research on the effects of economic factors on tax 
compliance behaviour remains mixed, including studies for instance tax rate (e.g., 
Allingham & Sandmo, 1972; Alm et al., 1992; Barbuta-Misu, 2011; Chau & Leung, 




Feinstein, 1991; Pommerehne & Weck‐Hannemann, 1996; Porcano 1988), 
probability of detection (Allingham & Sandmo, 1972; Alm et al., 2004; Cummings 
et al., 2009; Kirchler, 2007; Palil & Mustapha, 2011; Slemrod et al., 2001; Stefura, 
2012), tax complexity (Forest & Sheffrin, 2002; McKerchar, 2003; & Saad, 2014; 
Sawyer, 2007), psychological factors, for instance, incentives (Feld et al., 2006; 
Manaf, 2004; Trivedi et al., 2004), tax knowledge (Kasipillai & Jabbar, 2003; 
Kirchler et al., 2006; Palil & Mustapha, 2011; Saad, 2014), and PGQ (Alabede et al., 
2011; Torgler & Schneider, 2009). 
 
Neither individual nor firm compliance can be entirely explained by the influence of 
economic factors, even with the likelihood of low probabilities of detection because 
organisations and individuals still choose to comply based on non-economically base 
rationales. For example, Cuccia (1994) discussed the effects of noneconomic factors 
of compliance, and other contextual features. He noted that they often may moderate 
the influence of economic models. It is therefore pertinent to consider PSO and its 
potential moderating effect in this current study. In some measure, this is due to the 
mixed findings concerning the relationship between and among some factors and tax 
compliance, most especially the economic factors (Dubin et al., 1987; Dubin & 
Wilde, 1988). In addition, Alm, Kirchler, and Muehlbacker (2012) posited that an 
emphasis should be directed towards the relevant tax authorities, as a result of their 





Similarly, Slemrod (2009), Torgler (2003), and Torgler and Schaffner (2007), in 
separate but related studies, empirically discovered that most countries cannot fully 
explain their actual compliance levels by taking into consideration the basic theory 
of tax compliance. The literature has suggested that certain variables may moderate 
this relationship (Alabede et al., 2011; Kirchler et al., 2007; Baron & Kenny, 1986). 
Baron and Kenny further revealed that, when a weak or inconsistent relationship 
exists between predictors and criterion variables, then a moderator is necessary. 
Hence, the use of PSO as a moderator in this current study is justified. Given the 
above trend in the literature, some important variables such as service orientation, 
which heretofore not been considered as a moderator in the literature, could 
moderate the relationship between economic factors, psychological factors, and the 
tax compliance behaviour of SMEs owners /managers. 
 
Examining the moderating effect of PSO, which may either strengthen or weaken the 
relationship between economic factors, psychological factors, and tax compliance 
behaviour of SMEs owners/managers, is necessary. The essence of this examination 
is to establish an indirect relationship that will strengthen the relationship between 
these individual factors and tax compliance behaviour in order to make their 
relationship more directional. 
 
In this case, the expectation is that service orientation would have a significant and 
positive effect on the relationship between the various factors highlighted above in 




tax compliance behaviour will be more effective and significant. With the presence 
of service orientation, the assumption is that the relationship between individual 
factors and tax compliance would become stronger and more effective. Hence, 
service orientation will play a crucial role in the effectiveness of economic factors, 
psychological factors and tax compliance behaviour, which to this researcher‘s 
knowledge, has not been studied. Thus, this current study intends to bridge the 
existing gap in the extant literature. 
 
3.10.2 Studies on Perceived Corruption: The Moderating Variable 
Several definitions exist for the concept of corruption. Habib and Zurawicki (2002) 
and LaPalombara (1994) defined corruption as an abuse of public power for private 
benefit. Corruption persists in countries in which law enforcement agencies are seen 
to be untruthful coupled with excessive power in administrative apparatuses 
(Braguinsky, 1996; Habib & Zurawicki, 2002). While Gilman (1989) defined 
corruption as ―bribery or dishonest dealings‖, what may not be viewed as corruption 
by one person may be absolutely classified as corruption by another. 
 
Theoretically, Tanzi (1998) classified corruption into two different types: 1) small 
corruption and 2) grand corruption.  The author viewed small corruption as that 
which had to do with the corruption of tax inspectors or tax officials, bureaucrats and 
policemen. Grand corruption, according to the author was linked to the attitude of 





Several studies that have been conducted in developing countries have shown that 
half or more of the tax revenues that were supposed to be collected cannot be traced 
by the government as a result of corruption and tax noncompliance (e.g., Krugman, 
Alm, Collins, & Remolina, 1992; Richupan, 1984). Aligning with the above authors, 
Coolidge (2012) pointed out that tax evasion and corruption seemed to be common 
issues in most developing countries. Some countries revealed more evidence of the 
problem than others, while in other countries tax officials seemly possess an 
excellent reputation for competence, helpfulness and integrity than other government 
officials. 
 
Nonetheless, few limited studies have clearly outlined the problem of tax compliance 
in relationship to the effects of perceived corruption. Torgler (2003) studied people‘s 
perceptions of the likely reasons for not paying taxes. The results revealed that 
corruption was among the top three reasons coupled with people, lack of honesty and 
high rates of taxes that result in noncompliance. Nawaz (2010) also found that 
corruption within a tax administration had insidious and destructive effects on tax 
morale and compliance of taxpayers. In short, studies conducted in most developing 
countries found that half or more of the taxes targeted remain untraced by the 
government treasuries as a result of corruption and tax evasion (e.g., Alm, Bahl, & 
Murray, 1991; Krugman et al., 1992). 
 
In addition, Fjeldstad and Tungodden (2003) analyzed the effect of corruption on 




power of corrupt tax officers. The authors discovered that, in contrast to the belief 
that strengthening the bargaining power of corrupt tax officers could reduce tax 
noncompliance and increase tax revenues, corruption were perceived to attract more 
tax noncompliance. Thereby, tax revenues would be reduced in the long run, 
although they could lead to more tax revenues in the short run. In the same vein, Fan 
(2006) analysed the resultant effect of corruption in a kleptocracy. In a kleptocracy, 
the ruler often uses anti-corruption measures such as wage incentives and monitoring 
in order to discourage corrupt officials from rent-seeking for themselves. As a result, 
the leader sets an inefficiently high tax rate in order to discourage the officials from 
demanding bribes, which in turn improved tax compliance and more revenue. 
Similarly, Rahmani and Fallahi (2012) studied the effects of corruption and 
democracy in the formation of tax compliance. The authors discovered corruption to 
be one of the most significant factors influencing the willingness and ability of the 
people to pay taxes. They further inferred that more democracy and less corruption 
increased tax compliance and the willingness to pay taxes. 
 
However, like PSO, perceived corruption is also an indispensable construct that may 
shape taxpayers' behaviour. Previous studies correlated the direct influenced of 
either economic factors or psychological factors on tax compliance behaviour (e.g., 
Allingham & Sandmo, 1972; Becker, 1968; Fischer et al., 1992; Alm, 2013; 
Batrancea et al., 2012; Manaf et al., 2005; Mustafa, 1997; Nur-tegin, 2008; Palil et 





Nonetheless, because of the inconsistent findings in the respective studies and 
coupled with the empirical evidence indicating the actual compliance levels in most 
countries, the basic theory of tax compliance is not very explanatory (Feld & Frey, 
2003; Slemrod 2009; Torgler 2003; Torgler & Schaffner, 2007). Thus, the literature 
often suggests that certain variables may moderate the relationship (Alabede et al., 
2011; Kirchler et al., 2008). Alabede et al. (2011) and Kirchler et al. (2008) strongly 
support this argument stating that, when the relationship between the dependent and 
independent variables is inconsistent or unexpectedly weak, then moderators should 
be introduced. The inconsistent findings may also indicate that previous studies have 
not given the needed attention to important variables such as perceived corruption. 
 
Because of this, examining the role of perceived corruption as a moderator in 
influencing the relationship between economic and psychological factors of tax and 
tax compliance is necessary. Therefore, this current study argues that it is not only 
pertinent to consider the direct relationship between economic factors and 
psychological factors on tax compliance behaviour but also that connecting these 
factors with the perceived corruption would help strengthen tax compliance 
behaviour. To this researcher's knowledge, no study has looked at the moderating 
role of this variable in relationship to these factors and the tax compliance behaviour 
of SMEs owners/managers. Hence, the assumption in this study is that perceived 
corruption would play a vital role in strengthening or weakening the relationship 





3.11 Adopted Models of the Study 
This current study derives its model from the Fischer et al.‘s (1992) model, and 
supported by Alabede et al. (2012) tax compliance model. The discussion of the 
models appears below. 
3.11.1  Fischer’s Model  
Fischer et al. (1992) conducted the first comprehensive review to expand and 
categorize Jackson and Milliron‘s fourteen key factors of tax compliance into four 
formidable groups, which later became known as the Fischer's model of tax 
compliance (Fischer et al., 1992). Their study was built on the foundation of Jackson 
and Milliron (1986) who introduced fourteen key factors of tax compliance. 
According to the authors, the fourteen key factors of tax compliance were: age, 
education, gender, compliant peer, ethics, fairness, occupation, withheld income 
source, income level, IRS contact, sanction, complexity, tax rate, and probability of 
detection. As such Fischer's model is one of the most comprehensive model, 
incorporating the economic, sociological and psychological factors of tax 
compliance behaviour and has enjoyed wide acceptance in the area of tax 
compliance research. 
 
The model is structured as the following: 1) demographic constructs, comprising 
age, gender, and education; 2) the tax system structure, comprising tax rate, penalty 
rate, probability of detection, tax authority contact, and complexity of the tax system; 




level, and occupation; and 4) the attitude and the perception construct comprising 
ethics, fairness, and peer influence. In Fischer's model, the variables under the 
constructs of the tax system structure, attitude and perception, and noncompliance 
opportunity are the direct factors that influence tax compliance, while demographic 
variables comprise antecedent variables connecting noncompliance opportunity as 
well as attitude and perception. While the coverage of this model is argued to be 
more encompassing compared to others, it is limited in some aspects. 
 
Nonetheless, the model indicates the importance of noneconomic factors in 
relationship to tax compliance, about which the current study is concerned. The 
model also offers a framework linking most of the important variables to tax 
compliance, with an emphasis on the compliance behaviour of taxpayers. The 
framework could not be adopted totally, but some aspects of economic and 
psychological factors were adapted and incorporated into this study‘s framework. 
 
The dimensions offered in Fischer et al.‘s model are viewed as not totally suitable 
for the development of this research framework, due to the fact that factors such as 
demographic variables, attitudes and perception, noncompliance opportunities will 
not be considered in this study. The reason was because these factors have been 
extensively studied in the literature and the relationship between these factors has 
been established in the context of Nigerian environment (e.g., Alabede, 2012; 
Atawodi & Ojeka, 2012; Aronmwan, Imobhio & Izedonmi, 2015; Modugu & 




studied the salaried income earners of the Federal Capital Territory Abuja. Their 
study only concentrated in one state and does not looked at the compliance 
behaviour of SMEs owners/managers, as such lack in scope to make a reasonable 
generalisation. Likewise, Atawodi and Ojeka (2012) who actually studied the tax 
compliance behaviour of SMEs taxpayers, their study only covered one local 
government area (Zaria) in Kaduna State Nigeria, hence the study is limited in scope 
and the findings of a single local government cannot help in revealing the puzzle 
surrounding tax compliance behaviour of SMEs taxpayers in Nigeria. 
 
However, the model provided some variables that will be used and that were adopted 
and incorporated into the proposed new framework. These variables include: tax 
rate, the probability of detection, and tax complexity. Hence, like any other model of 
tax compliance (for instance, Manaf, 2004; Mustafa, 1997; Tayib, 1998; Chau & 
Leung, 2009; Alabede, 2012), Fischer‘s model also did not incorporate many other 
factors of tax compliance behavior. Despite its shortcomings, the model serves as the 
basis for this study, but was expanded with two exogenous constructs (WFFC and 
FSR), and two moderating constructs (PSO and perceived corruption). Therefore, 
Fischer et al.‘s (1992) was adapted as the basis for the foundation of this study as 


















Source: Adapted from C.M. Fischer (1992), Perceived detection probability and taxpayer 
compliance: A conceptual and empirical examination (p. 33), Ann Arbour: UMI. 
 
Figure 3. 1. Fischer’s Model of Tax Compliance Behaviour. 
3.11.2 Personal Income Based Tax Compliance Model 
Supporting the model of this study, Alabede (2012) conducted one of the most recent 
studies on the tax compliance behaviour of personal income taxpayers in the FCT 
Abuja, Nigeria. The researchers also made use of the Fischer et al.‘s (1992) model as 
a reference point for their model. The study introduced the three new variables of 
PGQ, risk preference, and personal financial condition as independent and 
moderating variables to the tax compliance model based on the objectives of their 
research. This model provided a variable that was used in the current study. The 
variable was PGQ, and the authors suggested a further re-examination in order to 
reconfirm their previous findings. The Alabede et al. model was adapted in this 
study, because is the first model to be deployed in the Nigerian environment, which 
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the current study was built upon in other to unveil other factors capable of 
influencing the tax compliance behaviour of the taxpayers. This was necessitated 
because even in other countries, in Malaysia for instance, Manaf (2004) made 
reference and adapted some of the variables that were earlier studied by Mustafa 
(1997) being the pioneering tax compliance study even though she made reference to 
Fischer‘s et al. (1992) model. As such this current study follow suit. Hence, like 
other models of tax compliance, the Alabede's model also did not incorporate many 















Source: Adapted from Alabede (2012), An investigation of factors influencing taxpayers’ 
compliance behavior: Evidence from Nigeria (Unpublished PhD Thesis), Sintok: Universiti Utara 
Malaysia. 
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3.12 Other Research Models 
Researchers have made reasonable contributions to tax compliance literature, which 
led to the development of different models in relationship to tax compliance. Some 
of these models include Allingham and Sandmo‘s A-S model, Wiegel, Hessing, and 
Elffers‘s social, psychological model, and Lewis‘s revised model. Within the scope 
of this study that emphasizes the effect of WFFC, FSR, and the importance of PSO, 
and perceived corruption on the tax compliance behaviour of SME 
owners/managers, the following models were reviewed. 
3.12.1 Financial Self Interest Model 
The Financial Self-interest Model of Allingham and Sandmo (1972), which is also 
known as the A-S model, was derived from Becker's (1968) economic of crime 
approach seminar work. The model was developed on the premise of deterrence 
theory. Within the framework of the model; tax rate, the probability of detection and 
the penalty structure are factors of monetary compliance costs influencing taxpayers‘ 
behaviour in complying with tax obligations. 
 
Fischer et al. (1992) had opined that most empirical studies of taxpayers have shown 
that numerous factors that may influence tax compliance behaviour, which the 
financial self-interest model, failed to take into consideration. They further revealed 
that the relationships among the factors were vague as depicted in the model. The 




influence compliance behaviour of taxpayers. Therefore, the coverage of this model 
is argued to be limited. 
 
However, the model indicates the importance of economic factors, which the current 
study used as control variables. The model offers a framework linking economic 
factors to tax compliance. The framework could not be totally adopted because it 
only focuses on economic factors, thereby undermining the importance of 
psychological, sociological, and political factors. The financial self-interest model is 






Source: Adapted from C.M. Fischer (1992), Perceived detection probability and taxpayer 
compliance: A conceptual and empirical examination (p. 23), Ann Arbor: UMI. 
 
Figure 3.3. Financial Self Interest Model. 
3.12.2 Social and Psychological Model 
Due to the deficiency of the financial self-interest model, and in an effort to 
incorporate all other factors in the tax compliance model, Weigel, Hessing and Elffer 
(1978) developed tax compliance models incorporating both social and 
psychological factors. As pointed out by the authors, the inclusion of these factors 










Thus, they developed the tax compliance model, which incorporates social and 
psychological factors. The model undermines the importance of economic factors. 
Therefore, the dimension offered is viewed as not totally suitable for the 
development of the research framework of this study. 
 
The framework could not be adopted in this current study because of its 
shortcomings in articulating some elements of economic factors. Weigel et al.‘s 










Source: Weigel, Hessing and Elffers (1978). Adapted from Perception of taxation, A 
comparative study of different population in South Africa. University of Pretoria. 
 
Figure 3.4. Wiegel’s Social and Psychological Model. 
 
Social Conditions 
1. Sustainable instigation: Financial strains, Social norms 
2. Situational Constraints: Noncompliance opportunity, Legal 




1. Personal instigation: Personal strains, Personal orientation 
2. Personal Constraints: Perceived risk of punishment, Intolerance 





3.12.3 Lewi’s Revised Model of Tax Compliance 
From all indications, Lewi‘s model is an upgraded version of Weigel et al.‘s (1978) 
model. The model was structured with two parallel lines taken into consideration, the 
economic, social and psychological factors of tax compliance. As depicted in the 
model, each of the parallel lines has four dialogue squares. 
 
The first parallel structure comprises economic and political factors (tax structure 
and fiscal policy of the government, tax enforcement structure and policy (tax audit, 
tax penalty), assumptions about taxpayers‘ behaviour (risk averse) and taxpayer 
compliance or noncompliance, which is the dependent variable). 
 
The second parallel structure focuses on the social and psychological variables. It 
contains the taxpayer‘s attitude and perception (attitudes towards the tax system, 
government, perceptions about fiscal accountability and the tax system (Fischer, 
1993), perceived tax enforcement and opportunity and taxpayer‘s demographic 
variables (age, gender, education, and occupation). Perceived tax enforcement and 
taxpayer‘s attitude were perceived as influencing each other, while other factors and 
demographic variables were perceived as interacting with each other. In the model, 
arrows also link the tax enforcement structure to tax attitudes and perceived tax 
enforcement, revealing that the actual result influences the attitudes and perception 
of the taxpayers (Fischer, 1993). As reported in Oberholzer (2007), the contribution 
of Lewi‘s model is that it includes variables on government fiscal policy, tax 




Nonetheless, Lewi‘s model is not broad enough to capture many other variables. The 













Source: Adapted from C.M. Fischer (1993), Perceived detection probability and taxpayer 
compliance: A conceptual and empirical examination (p. 29). Ann Arbor: UMI. 
 




3.13 Expanded Model of Tax Compliance 
In order to contribute to the existing knowledge, bearing in mind Fischer's et al.‘s 
(1992) model, researchers have added one or more variables to the tax compliance 
model to fulfil their research objectives. Some of the expanded models are discussed 
below. 
Tax enforcement structure & 
Policies 
Perceived tax enforcement & 
opportunity 
Fiscal policy, tax structure & 
Constitutional structure 
Tax Compliance (Tax evasion) 
Assumption about taxpayers‘ 
behaviour 
Tax compliance (Tax evasion) 
Demographic characteristics of the 
taxpayer 
Attitude & perception of fiscal 




3.13.1 Knowledge Based Model 
Mustafa (1997) evaluated taxpayers‘ perceptions of the tax administration system 
under the self-assessment system with respect to tax law fairness and complexity in 
Malaysia. His study used Fischer‘s model as a basis, but added only knowledge and 
understanding of the tax system as a new variable. Mustafa claimed that the correct 
knowledge and understanding of the tax system was one of the fundamental 
ingredients in enhancing taxpayers‘ compliance behaviour (Mustafa, 1997). 
 
The model provided a variable that has been used in the current study. The variable 
is knowledge and understanding. The variable is further modified to tax knowledge 
in order to suit the current study. Mustafa's study only used a single itemized 
statement in measuring tax knowledge and understanding of the taxpayers, which 








Source: Adapted from M.H. Mustafa (1997), An evaluation of the Malaysian tax administrative 
system & taxpayer's perceptions towards assessment system, tax law, fairness, and tax law complexity 
(Unpublished PhD Dissertation), Sintok: Universiti Utara Malaysia. 
 




Understanding Tax system structure 
Noncompliance opportunity 





3.13.2 Local Based Model of Tax Compliance 
Tayib (1998) developed a locally based model of tax compliance. His study focuses 
on the assessment of tax collection in Malaysia. Tayib also adapted and expanded 
part of the Fischer's (1992) model by incorporating three variables, i.e., quality of 
service provided by the local government, financial information disclosure, and tax 
collection performance as the independents and dependent variables respectively. 
These variables, according to Tayib, depend solely or directly on tax compliance 
behaviour. The author based his argument on the premise that the quality of public 
service provided by the local government may have a direct influence on taxpayers‘ 
compliance behaviour. As a result, the study failed to use an appropriate quality 












Source: Adapted from M.B. Tayib (1998), The determinants of assessment tax collection: 
The Malaysian local authority experience (p. 108), Cardiff, University of Glamorgan. 
 
Figure 3.7. Tayib’s Local Tax Based Model of Compliance Behavior. 
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3.13.3 Land Based Tax Compliance Model 
Manaf (2004) conducted a study of land tax administration and compliance attitudes 
in Malaysia. The study, which was also based on Fischer's model, also extends the 
work of Mustafa (1997). In relationship to the needs and the objectives of her study, 
incentives and land type were incorporated into the model as new variables. In 
addition, the study also added race to the demographic construct in order to capture 
the resultant effect of culture on the behaviour of land taxpayers. The model 
provided a variable that will be used in the current study by adapting and 
incorporating it into the proposed model. The variable is incentives (positive 
inducement); it is fully adopted without any modifications in order to suit the current 








Source: Adapted from N.A. Manaf (2004), Land tax administration and compliance attitude in 
Malaysia. (Unpublished doctoral thesis), Nottingham: University of Nottingham. 
 
Figure 3.8. Manaf’s Land Based Tax Model. 
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3.13.4 Culture Based Tax Compliance Model 
Chau and Leung (2009) also expanded Fischer's model as the basis for developing 
their framework. The study added culture as a new variable, which was based on a 
modification of Fischer's model. Chau and Leung (2009) argued that tax compliance 
behaviour might be influenced by environmental factors such as culture. Chau and 









Source: Adopted from C. Chau & P. Lenug (2009), A critical review of Fischer's tax 
compliance model: A research synthesis, Journal of Accounting & Taxation, 1(2), 34-40. 
 
Figure 3.9. Chan and Leung’s Culture Based Model of Tax Compliance. 
3.13.5 Fairness Perception Based Tax Compliance Model 
Saad (2011) also expanded the tax compliance model by focusing on the fairness 
perception, which served as a moderating factor between tax knowledge, tax 
complexity and tax compliance behaviour. The model attempted to confirm the 
various dimensions of fairness that are important to taxpayers‘ judgments. It is the 
first model to combine all the dimension of fairness (Saad, 2011). The fairness 








































Source: N. Sa‘ad (2011), Fairness perceptions and compliance behavior: Taxpayers' 
judgment in self-assessment environments (Unpublished PHD thesis), Christchurch, New 
Zealand. University of Canterbury. 
 
Figure 3.10. Saad’s Fairness Perception Tax Model. 
 
3.14 Summary of Tax Compliance Models 
























Summary of Tax Compliance Models 
Researcher(s) Model Variable(s) 
Becker (1968) Financial self-interest model Tax rate, detection probability, penalty rate 








& Elffer (1978) 
Social and Psychological 
model 
Social conditions 
Financial strain, Social norms, 
Opportunity, Legal control, Social norm 
 
Psychological condition  
Personal strains, Personal  
orientation, Perceived opportunity,  
Perceived risk of punishment,  
Intolerance of tax evasion 
 
Fischer, Wartick, 
& Mark (1992) 
Expanded model Demographic factors 
Gender, age, & education 
 
Noncompliance opportunities 
Income source, income level, & 
occupation 
 
Attitudes and Perception 
Ethic & perceived fairness of tax system, 
peer influence 
 
Tax system structure 
Complexity of tax system, IRS contact, tax 
rate, Detection probability, & penalty 
 
Tayib (1998) Expanded model  
(Local taxation based) 
Noncompliance opportunity, 
Attitude & perception, 
Tax system structure, 
Quality of service, 
Financial information 





Table 3.5 (continued) 
Researcher(s) Model Variable(s) 
Manaf (2004) Expanded model (Land 
taxation based) 
Demographic factors (Race), 
Attitude & perception, 




Chau & Leung 
(2009) 
Expanded model (Culture) Demographic factors, 
Noncompliance opportunities, 
Attitude & perception, 
Tax system structure, 
Culture 
 
Saad (2011) Expanded model (Fairness 
compliance tax model) 











(Personal income based tax 
model) 
Risk preference, 
Personal financial condition, 
Perceived tax service, 
Public governance quality, 
Ethnic diversity: 
(Race, Religion) 
Tax knowledge, Moral reasoning, 
Noncompliance opportunity: 
Occupation, 
Source of income, 
Income level 
Attitude towards tax evasion, 
Tax system structure 
 
Mustafa (1997) Expanded model 
(Knowledge Based Tax 
Model) 
Demographic variables, Knowledge and 
understanding, Non-compliance 
opportunity, Attitude and perception, Tax 
system structure 
Source: Compiled by the author (2014). 
 
3.15 Summary 
This chapter presented relevant theories and literature in relationship to the study. It 




developed to developing countries, which were further narrowed down to the 
Nigerian scenario. Furthermore, the study also explored the concept of tax 
compliance and noncompliance of taxpayer from various perspectives. In addition, 
the underpinning theory and other theories supported by the study were also 
discussed. The review conducted in these theories revealed that no single theory has 
the capability to explain the factors that affect tax compliance behavior of SME 
owners/managers. Researchers employed theories from different disciplines such as 
psychology, sociology, anthropology and other fields in order to achieve their 
research objectives in relationship to tax compliance research. 
 
Consequently, a review of past studies on the factors influencing tax compliance 
behaviour of SMEs owners/managers was provided. In reviewing the factors 
influencing tax compliance and noncompliance, attention was particularly focused 
on WFFC, FSR, PSO and perceived corruption. Earlier studies have identified that 
economic and psychological factors are significant in explaining taxpayer 
compliance behaviour.  
 
Similarly, in order to gain an in-depth understanding into the phenomenon of tax 
compliance studies, previous research was examined. The models of several 
researchers were reviewed with an emphasis on Fischer‘s model, which provided a 
basis for the theoretical model of this study. The proposed model of this study was 
developed based on the expanded model of Fischer et al. (1992) and supported with 




discussed in the next chapter so as to identify the factors that will relate to tax 
compliance behaviour of SME owners/managers. As revealed from the review of the 
past models, a single model does not have the capability to incorporate all the factors 
that may influence tax compliance. Based on these limitations, the need for an 
expansion of the model to incorporate new factors is recommended in the future. The 





RESEARCH FRAMEWORK AND HYPOTHESES 
DEVELOPMENT 
4.1 Introduction  
The previous chapter dealt with the related literature, tax compliance theories and a 
review of other researcher's tax compliance models. This chapter focuses on the 
detailed development and presentation of the research framework. This discussion is 
followed by the development of the research hypotheses. The chapter ends with a 
summary.  
 
4.2 The Research Theoretical Framework 
In this study, the framework comprises Work - Family Financial Commitment, Fuel 
Subsidy Removal, tax rates, the probability of detection, tax complexity, incentives 
(positive inducements), tax knowledge, Public Governance Quality, Perceived 
Service Orientation, perceived corruption, and tax compliance behaviour that were 
sourced from the literature.  
 
To meet the contextual needs of Nigeria and other developing countries, the tax 
compliance model was expanded with Work - Family Financial Commitment and 
Fuel Subsidy Removal as independent variables, while Perceived Service 
Orientation and perceived corruption were incorporated into the model as 




Stefura, 2011, 2012). That is because WFFC may influence the perceptions of 
taxpayers in relationship to their respective compliance behaviours.  
 
Nzotta (2007) and Odinkonigbo (2009) affirmed that poverty and extended family 
burdens including, for instance, financial commitment, may be one of the causes of 
the low level of tax compliance in Nigeria. This burden may result in many conflicts 
that might affect the ability of individuals to fulfil their business obligations, such as 
tax payments. Wickens (1996) also said that stress, which manifests itself in 
attention tunnelling and other WFFC issues, might create additional demands with 
respect to financial obligations to meet family pressure, which, in turn, may affect 
the tax payment and compliance behaviour of taxpayers. 
 
The Work Family Spillover Theory (WFST) states that either family or work 
systems might produce spillover effects or influences on each other (Staines, 1980). 
The theory further proposes that satisfaction or dissatisfaction in one area of life 
might extend to the other domain in that financial commitment in the family might 
affect individual financial business obligations such as tax payments or that 
individual business obligations might affect the family (George & Brief, 1990). 
Therefore, excess work may have an effect on the family (Kelly & Voydanoff, 
1985).  
 
Furthermore, FSR may also influence the perceptions of the Nigerian taxpayers in 




be transmitted through higher costs, for instance, the costs of production, raw 
materials, overheads, and transportation cost, which may affect taxpayers‘ 
compliance behaviour and companies as well as individuals. Because the 
transportation system in Nigeria is in a sorry state, private transport owners are free 
to fix whatever price they so wish to the general public. By its very nature and 
because the hardship experienced by fuel subsidy removal is mostly attributed to the 
masses, the result may be a compounding effect that may be ultimately shifted to the 
SME owners. This is due to the fact that owners rely on the commercial 
transportation system to transport their raw materials and to dispatch their finished 
products to wholesalers and retailers. 
 
Odemero (2013) also affirmed that FSR was assumed to translate to a general 
increase in the cost of business operations including overhead costs, production costs 
and costs of compliance, which may, in turn, affect tax compliance behaviour. The 
cost of business operations is a key factor that consumes business resources, 
especially when the business is in its early stage of development. To that end, 
taxpayers‘ vis-á-vis SME owners will always be subjected to many pressures in 
order to balance expenditures on raw materials, rentage, and staff salaries mainly 
because the prices of every aspect of their business were affected by the resultant 
effect of fuel subsidy withdrawal. 
 
The social exchange theory supports these assertions, stating, that a relationship is 




survive, it must be beneficial to all parties (Blau, 1964). Fundamentally, the revenue 
derived from the fuel subsidy removal was supposed to be used to finance 
infrastructural facilities, which by extension might encourage taxpayer to keep the 
covenant of reciprocity. Conversely, in a situation in which such a contract is void, a 
taxpayer might not be encouraged to abide by the covenant of reciprocity, adversely 
influencing his/her compliance behaviour. On the basis of the above analogy and 
logic, WFFC, FSR and tax compliance behaviour are expected to show some 
reasonable level of correlation. 
 
In addition, the direct relationship between tax rates, the probability of detection, tax 
complexity, incentives, tax knowledge, PGQ, and tax compliance behaviour have 
been established in the literature (e.g., Alabede et al., 2012; Fischer, 1993; Gangl et 
al., 2013; Manaf, 2004; Mustafa, 1997; Richardson, 2006; Saad, 2014; Tayib, 1998), 
even though some of these variables were borrowed from the Fischer et al.‘s (1992) 
and Alabede‘s (2012) model which served as a basis for the model in this current 
study. Higher tax rates may have negative connotations on the tax compliance 
behaviours of taxpayers. Aligning with Economic Deterrence Theory (EDT), an 
increase in tax rates will have corresponding negative effects on compliance levels 
(Allingham & Sandmo, 1972). 
 
Furthermore, several tax compliance studies (for instance, Mustafa, 1997; Tayip, 
1998, Manaf, 2004, and Alabede et al., 2012) have resorted to relying on using 




has been found hugely successful in describing and predicting behavior of taxpayers 
in different contextual setup.  Therefore, the authors suggested that the model is in 
principle, open to the inclusion of additional predictors if it can be shown that they 
capture a significant proportion of the variance in the compliance behavior of the 
taxpayers after the theory‗s current variables have been taken into account. In the 
theoretical framework as depicted in (Figure 4.1) of this study, underpinned with the 
theory of EDT, the tax rates and probability of detection are proposed to influence 
the behavior of the taxpayers.  
 
Similarly, equity theory has been used to explain the complexity of the tax system by 
some researchers (Fjeldstad, Schulz-Herzenberg, & Sjursen, 2012). Equity theory 
suggests that individuals will be in a position to comply with certain rules or 
standards, only if they perceive such rules to be impartial (McKerchar & Evans, 
2009). Hence, the more complex the tax system is, the more inequity the taxpayers 
perceive in the system. Furthermore, social exchange theory has been identified as 
being suitable in aligning the relationships among incentives, PGQ and the 
compliance behaviour of the taxpayers (Alabede et al., 2011; Manaf, 2004).  
 
Therefore, according to Blau (1964) social exchange theory suggests that people are 
always psychologically indebted and hence compelled to return the material or other 
benefits they have received from the person who helped them. According to 
Kelmans (1958), the social influence theory states that behaviour is one of the most 




otherwise. When incentives and public goods and services are provided to the 
taxpayers, they will, in turn, reciprocate the gesture in the form of tax payments. In 
short, all these constructs were further tested in the context of the developing country 
of Nigeria for the purpose of validating the new model. 
 
The effects of PSO and perceived corruption as they moderate the compliance 
behaviour of taxpayers are also of the utmost significance. This is interesting given 
Nigeria's quality of service delivery and service orientation in the country's public 
settings as well as tax offices, which fall below the reported minimum acceptable 
standard (Ewepu, 2010; Thomson, 2004). For example, Gangl et al. (2013) reiterated 
that taxpayers who perceived service orientation to be greater would be more willing 
to pay their taxes. They further affirmed that service orientation was seen as one of 
the fundamental elements of building trust as well as of strengthening and enhancing 
the compliance behaviour of the taxpayers. Service orientation can be in the form of 
educating taxpayers, the provision of service either in the form of phone advice, the 
simplification of the tax law and procedure and other ancillary services, especially 
for taxpayers who are willing to pay their taxes, but have challenges with the 
provisions of the law (Alm & Torgler, 2011).  
 
Social influence theory supports the above discussion and states that individuals 
learn from each other as well as through observation, imitation, and orientations, and 
explains human behaviour in relationship to the continuous exchange interaction 




(2005) were of the view that social influence could be aligned to conformity, 
compliance and obedience, which, according to the authors, could be influenced by 
the persuasive ways individuals use in seeking consent and the power that 
individuals perceived to have at their disposal. The ability to exert influence by an 
individual or authority is regarded as power in relationship to this study.  
 
However, Madueke (2008) reported that the inadequate control mechanism with 
regards to corruption and the rule of law poses a general problem in Nigeria. 
Similarly, Nzotta (1995) also affirmed that corruption is manifest throughout the 
legal system of the country, such that conviction of tax offenders has become very 
difficult despite the appropriate mechanisms put in place by the government to curb 
the extremely high cases of tax evasion and avoidance. A low level of compliance 
still persists in the respective states (Shekari, 2014; Tanko, 2014). On the other hand, 
Rahmani and Fallahi (2012) have inferred that more democracy and less corruption 
would increase both tax compliance and the willingness to pay taxes. This assertion 
is supported by the social exchange theory. 
 
The theory states that, relationship is absolutely built on the basis of trust, and, for it 
to continue or survive, the relationship must be beneficial to all parties. Therefore, if 
the taxpayers perceive the government as being corrupt and that even the least 
amount of tax paid is not judiciously utilized in the form of service provision, 





In general, this research model adapted the well-established Fischer‘s et al., (1992) 
model, even though not all the variables in the model were adopted. Nonetheless, the 
model indicates the importance of noneconomic factors in relationship to tax 
compliance, about which the current study is concerned. The model also offers a 
framework linking most of the important variables to tax compliance, with an 
emphasis on the compliance behaviour of taxpayers. The framework could not be 
adopted totally, but some aspects of economic and psychological factors were 
adapted and incorporated into this study‘s framework. 
 
The dimensions offered in Fischer et al.‘s model were viewed as not totally suitable 
for the development of this research framework, due to the fact that factors such as 
demographic variables, attitudes and perception, noncompliance opportunities will 
not be considered in this study. The reason was because these factors have been 
extensively studied in the literature and the relationship between these factors has 
been established in the context of Nigerian environment (e.g., Alabede, 2012; 
Aronmwan, Imobhio & Izedonmi, 2015; Atawodi & Ojeka, 2012, Modugu & 
Anyaduba, 2014; Oladipupo & Obazee, 2016). However, in the Fischer‘s model the 
researchers adopted and incorporated some constructs into the proposed new 
framework. These variables include: tax rates, the probability of detection, and tax 
complexity. Hence, like any other model of tax compliance (for instance, Manaf, 
2004; Mustafa, 1997; Tayib, 1998; Chau & Leung, 2009; Alabede, 2012), Fischer‘s 
model also did not incorporate many other factors of tax compliance behaviour. 




understanding of tax compliance behavior (Hasseldine & Bebbington, 1991). A 
study designed on a blend of both approaches seems most appropriate as a single 
approach is not likely to be totally effective in explaining the compliance behaviour 
of taxpayers. In addition, examining taxpayer behaviour is complex and challenging 
as the relevant literature emanates from a variety of disciplines including economics, 
psychology, and sociology (McKerchar, Hodgson & Datt, 2008). However, despite 
some limitations of the Fischer‘s model, it served as the basis for this study, but was 
expanded with two exogenous constructs (WFFC and FSR), and two moderating 
constructs (PSO and perceived corruption). Therefore, Fischer et al.‘s (1992) was 
adapted as the basis for the foundation of this study. Hence, the model of this study 
is shown in Figure 4.1. 
 
As shown in Figure 4.1, a critical review of the relevant variables in connection with 
the research questions and research objectives would provide possible insights for 
developing the framework of this study. Therefore, establishing the relationship that 
exists among these variables is necessary. As shown in Figure 4.1, the framework 
identifies eleven constructs in the research model and establishes the relationships 































Figure 4.1. Proposed Research Framework. 
 
The framework has further indicated that tax compliance behaviour is the 
endogenous construct, whereas WFFC, FSR, tax rates, the probability of detection, 
tax complexity, incentives (positive inducement), tax knowledge, and PGQ are the 
exogenous constructs. This study is primarily concerned with the direct relationship 
(WFFC and FSR) and the indirect relationship (the moderating role of PSO and 
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perceived corruption), which will be tested in the current framework. Even though 
the direct relationships related to tax rate, the probability of detection, tax 
complexity, incentives, tax knowledge, and the PGQ have been tested before now, 
but they were subjected to further tests based on the suggestion of Khlif and Achek 
(2015) for the need of accounting for previous significant determinants before 
exploring new ones‘ in order to further re-establish their relationships in another 
environment and in relationship to SMEs. 
 
Moreover, the framework also shows two lines of relationships among the variables. 
First, it establishes direct relationships between the exogenous variables of WFC, 
FSR and the endogenous variable, tax compliance behaviour. Second, the indirect 
relationship between the exogenous variables (tax rate, the probability of detection, 
tax complexity, incentives (positive inducement), tax knowledge, and PGQ), and the 
endogenous variable (tax compliance behaviour) in the presence of PSO and 
perceived corruption is also shown in the framework. These variables served as 
potential moderators in this study. Therefore, the influence of WFFC and FSR on tax 
compliance behaviour is to be examined. For instance, if the influence of either 
WFFC or FSR leads to an increase in tax compliance behaviour, then they will be 
considered to have a positive influence, and, if the influence of WFFC or FSR leads 






On this note, SME owners/managers must show some lower or higher level of 
WFFC or FSR in order to affect the tax compliance behaviour either positively or 
negatively. Moreover, the presence of PSO and perceived corruption has been 
outlined as another avenue for moderators. A moderator is normally perceived as an 
exogenous variable that can influence the strength and/or the direction of the 
relationship between another exogenous variable and the endogenous variable 
(Wilken, Jacob, & Prime, 2013). A moderator is further seen as a variable that alters 
the association between the exogenous and endogenous variable (Sekaran & Bougie, 
2010). Hence, a moderating variable may: 1) change the strength of a relationship 
and/or 2) change the form of the relationship. Therefore, the inclusion of PSO and 
perceived corruption as moderators in the research framework is assumed to have the 
ability to improve or predict the relationship between economic factors and 
psychological factors on tax compliance behaviour of SME owners/managers. 
 
Within the purview of this study, the expectation is that WFFC, and FSR would 
negatively and significantly affect tax compliance behaviour. A possibility also 
exists that the two exogenous variables would influence tax compliance behaviour 
positively. For instance, in countries in which the WFFC is very low (i.e., the family 
obligations are very low) and where the resources derived from the FSR are further 
re-invested in the critical areas, this will go a long way in aiding SME owners to 
boost their businesses which, in turn, may influence their tax compliance behaviour 






Moreover, the presence of PSO and perceived corruption is posted to affect the 
strength of the relationship either positively or negatively with respect to economic 
factors, psychological factors and tax compliance behaviour. For instance, if proper 
services in the form of orientation are not adequately provided by the relevant tax 
authorities, likelihood exists of a very low compliance. If on the other hand, the 
services in the form of orientation are timely and adequately provided by the relevant 
tax authorities, such an SME owner/manager is bound to achieve high performance, 
which invariably will lead to a high compliance level. 
 
In the same vein, the presence of perceived corruption in the relationship between 
these factors and tax compliance reveals that corruption influences tax compliance 
and thus affects the compliance behaviour of an SME owner/manager either in a 
positive or negative manner as the case may be. Thus, the higher the corruption 
perceived by the taxpayers, the lower the compliance, and the lower the corruption 
perceived by the taxpayers, the higher the compliance. 
 
Thus, the framework suggested the need for incorporating WFFC, FSR and the 
moderating role of PSO and perceived corruption based on the above argument as 
WFFC, FSR, PSO and perceived corruption are capable of influencing the tax 
compliance behaviour of SME owners/managers. Meanwhile, in the context of this 
study, the expectation is that all these factors will influence tax compliance 




affect tax compliance. In countries with weak regulatory authorities, high rates of 
nepotism and poverty, low levels of technical knowledge and professional 
incompetency, bribery, and environmental issues such as political instability may 
hinder the tax compliance performance of SMEs. In contrast, if the environment is 
favourable, the policies that will aid or improve business activities of SMEs are 
provided by the relevant tax authorities or the government, SMEs perform very well, 
and, by extension, compliance may be increased. 
 
These relationships will be examined in the presence of PSO and perceived 
corruption as the moderating effect. Hence, this suggests the direct significant effect 
of WFFC and FSR, as well as the moderating role of PSO and perceived corruption 
in the relationship between economic factors, psychological factors, and tax 
compliance behaviour. As such, the relationship between these factors and tax 
compliance behaviour will either be strengthened or weakened by these moderators. 
Thus, PSO and perceived corruption may moderate the resultant effects of the 
relationship between economic factors, psychological factors, and tax compliance 
behaviour. The inclusion of service-oriented programs and the restructuring the tax 
system in an effort to reduce the magnitude of corruption would be a welcome 
development, so as to improve the level of tax compliance. In a nutshell, consistent 
with the work family spillover theory, social exchange theory, economic deterrence 
theory, social influence theory, and equity theory, the current model of tax 






4.3 Hypotheses Development 
With the help of literature and other theoretical justifications, the hypotheses for this 
study were formulated for empirical testing and validation. This study has eleven 
major variables, namely, WFFC, FSR, tax rate, the probability of detection, tax 
complexity, incentives (positive inducement), tax knowledge, PGQ, as exogenous 
variables and PSO and perceived corruption as the moderating variables, and tax 
compliance behaviour as the endogenous variable. 
 
Testing the proposed model in the real world is essential. In establishing this 
objective, eight direct and twelve sub-hypotheses (moderating) were developed, 
making a total of twenty hypotheses to assess the validity of the model and the 
strength of the proposed relationships. 
4.3.1 The Relationship between WFFC and Tax Compliance 
Theoretically, satisfaction or dissatisfaction in one domain of the work-family life 
balance may extend to other domains. That is, financial commitment in the family 
may affect individual business obligations such as tax payments and business-related 
problems might impact family life. Individuals with more family commitment would 
be considered as having more work-to-family financial obligations than those with 
little or no family pressures. In this regard, a larger family burden in terms of 
meeting the needs of the immediate or extended family would affect a person‘s 




or not to comply. Hence, in a situation in which the WFFC is perceived to be high, 
attention to organizational obligations, for instance tax compliance and the perceived 
ability to devote discretionary energy to tax payment and other organizational 
obligations may not be a conscious priority. On the basis of the above argument and 
drawing from the work family spillover theory, the following hypothesis is 
formulated: 
H1:  There is a significant relationship between WFFC and tax compliance 
behaviour. 
4.3.2 The Relationship between FSR and Tax Compliance 
According to Blau (1964), social exchange theory suggests that individuals in any 
commitment always direct their reciprocation or symbiotic efforts directly to the 
sources of any rewards they receive. For instance, if taxpayers perceive that the 
government is being fair by re - investing the proceeds derived from the FSR, their 
behaviour towards tax compliance may change positively. On the contrary, if the 
taxpayers perceive that the government is not being fair and not reinvesting the 
proceeds derived from the FSR, the level of compliance may be affected negatively. 
Therefore, SMEs taxpayers who experience more hardship in terms of trying to run 
their respective businesses may perceive the government as being responsible for 
causing the misery. As a consequence, their compliance behaviour may be affected 
negatively. This line of argument is consistent with the tenets of social exchange 
theory and its relationship with FSR and tax compliance behaviour. Hence, the 




H2: There is a significant relationship between the fuel subsidy removal and tax 
compliance behaviour. 
4.3.3 The Relationship between Tax Rates and Tax Compliance in the Presence 
of PSO and Perceived Corruption 
Previous studies on the relationship between tax rates and tax compliance show that 
an increase in the tax rates influences tax compliance. Some studies have shown that 
an increase in tax rates increased tax compliance (Allingham & Sandmo, 1972; Alm, 
Mcclelland, & Schulze, 1992; 1995; Hai & See, 2011; Yitzhaki, 1974). These studies 
suggested that a resultant increase in tax rates leads to a positive effect on tax 
compliance, such that an increase in tax rate makes taxpayers more truthful in 
declaring their income. Conversely, Clotfelter (1983), Pommerehne and 
Weck‐Hannemann, (1996), Porcano (1988), and Slemrod (1985) claimed that 
increasing the tax rate led to a decrease in the level of compliance. Consistent with 
this, Chau and Leung (2009), and Mas'ud et al. (2014) also revealed a negative 
relationship between tax rates and tax compliance. More evidence has also revealed 
that a high tax rate was positively related to tax evasion as well as negatively related 
to tax compliance (Ali et al., 2001; Christian & Gupta, 1993, Freire-Seren & 
Panades, 2013; Modugu et al., 2012; Richardson, 2006). Thus, while much literature 
has shown that a higher tax rate was positively related to tax compliance while 





Perceived service orientation and perceived corruption may moderate the 
relationship between tax rates and tax compliance behaviour. As stated in Gangl et 
al. (2013), taxpayers who perceive a greater service orientation will be more willing 
to pay their taxes. Similarly, Kirchler et al. (2008) discovered that the possible way 
relevant tax authorities could enhance compliance was by providing the required 
services so as to promote mutual and cordial participation, instead of creating a 
climate of deterrence and distrust which could warrant negative attitudes towards tax 
payment. The important part of these arguments is that, if both tax authorities and 
taxpayers see themselves as partners in progress, this shared viewpoint will go a long 
way in strengthening the relationship between the two parties. 
 
Similarly, the effects of corruption were emphasized in relationship to monitoring 
measures such as wage incentives and an inefficiently set high tax rate designed to 
discourage the relevant tax officials from demanding bribes, which, in turn, 
improved tax compliance and increased revenue. Hence, PSO and perceived 
corruption could moderate these relationships. Though previous studies have tested 
the direct relationship existing between tax rates and the compliance behaviour of 
taxpayers, to this researcher's knowledge such a moderating relationship has yet to 
be investigated. 
 
Thus, drawing from the economic deterrence theory, social influence theory and 
social exchange theory, the moderating effect of PSO and perceived corruption are 




H3:  There is a significant relationship between tax rates and tax compliance 
behaviour. 
H3a: Perceived service orientation will moderate the relationship between tax 
rates and tax compliance behaviour. 
H3b:  Perceived corruption will moderate the relationship between tax rates and 
 tax compliance behaviour. 
4.3.4 The Relationship between the Probability of Detection and Tax              
Compliance in the Presence of PSO and Perceived Corruption 
Several researchers have examined the chances of being detected from various 
perspectives. Carnes and Englebrecht (1995) emphasized perceived detection risk, 
while the proponents of Allingham and Sandmo‘s model (1972) as well as the 
proponent of the Fischer's model, lay more weight on the probability of being 
detected as being guilty of noncompliance (Bosco & Mittone, 1997).  
 
The perceived risk of being detected has a positive relationship with tax compliance 
(Carnes & Englebrecht, 1995; Eisenhauer, 2008; Lewis et al., 2009). Thus, when the 
probability of detection is high, tax compliance may also be high (Alm, 1991). 
Slemrod et al. (2001 and Young (1994) separately revealed that the probability of 
being detected was negatively correlated with compliance behaviour. Although these 
studies all found that the probability of detection was an influential determinant of 
taxpayer compliance. Slemrod et al. (1988) found the nature of the relationship 




studies linking the probability of detection and tax compliance behaviour were 
mixed, the detection probability is expected to influence the compliance behaviour 
of taxpayers either negatively or positively.  
 
Because of these contradicting findings, a promising avenue for research is 
examining the moderating effects of PSO and perceived corruption on their relationship. 
As Alm and Torgler (2011) pointed out, if both taxpayers and relevant tax authorities 
considered themselves to be partners in progress in terms of service provision, then 
the climate of deterrence and distrust will fail to exist. To support further this 
viewpoint, Rahmani and Fallahi (2012) also inferred that more democracy and less 
corruption might increase the willingness and ability to pay tax. Therefore, drawing 
from social influence theory, social exchange theory, as well as the economic 
deterrence theory, the following hypotheses are proposed: 
H4:  There is a significant relationship between the probability of detection and tax 
compliance behaviour. 
H4a:  Perceived service orientation will moderate the relationship between the 
probability of detection and tax compliance behaviour. 
H4b:  Perceived corruption will moderate the relationship between the probability 




4.3.5 The Relationship between Tax Complexity and Tax Compliance in the                    
Presence of PSO and Perceived Corruption 
Complexity arises when the relevant tax authorities try to improve the equity of the 
tax system and, at the same time, reduce its ambiguity (McKercher et al., 2005). In 
relationship to tax compliance, past studies (for example, Cox and Eger, 2006; 
Gambo et al., 2014; McKerchar, 2003) have discovered a statistically significant 
negative relationship between tax complexity and tax compliance. Conversely, Kirchler 
et al. (2006) found a positive relationship between tax complexity and tax 
compliance. Forest and Sheffrin (2002) failed to discover the influence of 
complexity on taxpayers' perceptions of fairness and compliance.  
 
Aligning with equity theory, Fjeldstad et al. (2012) stated that, when the tax system 
is perceived to be complex, taxpayers might question its fairness. Thus, the more 
complex a tax system is, the more taxpayers perceive inequity in the whole system. 
Based on this judgment, tax complexity may portray some element of negativity on 
tax compliance behaviour. This means that, when the tax system is found to be 
complex or cumbersome, taxpayers may perceive a lack of equity in the system, 
which may then result in low compliance. 
 
Because the literature has been inconsistent in this regard, the relationship between 
tax complexity and tax compliance behaviour might be moderated by the affects of PSO 
and perceived corruption. As a result, as Gangl et al. (2013) pointed out, taxpayers 




reiterate further, Alm et al. (2010) and Eichfelder and Kegels (2010) are of the view 
that a service-oriented approach will aid in reducing the administrative burdens 
taxpayers feel, which, in turn, will cut down the costs of compliance. That means 
that the services being provided by relevant tax authorities could go a long way in 
reducing the complexity of the tax system. Intrinsically, if a country is also 
characterized by more democracy and less corruption, tax compliance may improve 
as well as the willingness to pay taxes (Rahmani & Fallahi, 2012). Hence, drawing 
from the tenets of equity, social influence and social exchange theories coupled with 
the above discussion, the following propositions are posited: 
H5:   There is a significant relationship between tax complexity and tax 
compliance behaviour. 
H5a:   Perceived service orientation will moderate the relationship between tax 
complexity and tax compliance behaviour. 
H5b:   Perceived corruption will moderate the relationship between tax complexity 
and tax compliance behaviour. 
4.3.6 The Relationship between Incentives (Positive inducement) and Tax 
Compliance in the Presence of PSO and Perceived Corruption 
Quite a number of scholars have pointed out that a good tax system needs to provide 
taxpayers with the proper incentives. These incentives may be in the form of positive 
inducements that encourage taxpayers to comply with the relevant tax laws and 
regulations, as well as negative inducements like penalties or sanctions in situations 




Richardson and Sawyer (2001) were of the view that effective positive 
reinforcements should be encouraged in all aspects in order to increase compliance 
behaviour. 
 
In the literature, Harju and Kosonen (2012) pointed that providing better tax 
incentives will help in boosting the economic activities of entrepreneurs. A direct 
relationship between positive inducements and tax compliance behaviour has been 
documented in the literature (e.g., Manaf, 2004). These positive inducements could 
be in different forms, including polite and helpful services provided by the staff of 
the relevant tax authority  
 
Thus, the direct effects of positive inducements will be further tested in this study 
because this variable has witnessed less attention in the literature, especially in the 
African region. In addition, the affects of PSO and perceived corruption may 
moderate the relationship between incentives (positive inducement) and tax 
compliance behaviour. This is because service orientation has been conceived of as 
the attitudes of being helpful, thoughtful, considerate and cooperative, which may 
serve as a form of positive inducement so as to encourage compliance (Hogan et al., 
1984). Rahmani and Fallahi (2012) reiterated that more democracy and less 
corruption increases tax compliance and willingness to pay taxes. On the basis of the 
foregoing discussion and drawing upon the social exchange and social influence 




H6:   There is a significant relationship between incentives (positive inducement) 
and tax compliance behaviour. 
H6a:   Perceived service orientation will moderate the relationship between 
incentives (positive inducement) and tax compliance behaviour. 
H6b:   Perceived corruption will moderate the relationship between incentives 
(positive inducement) and tax compliance behaviour. 
4.3.7 The Relationship between Tax knowledge and Tax Compliance in the 
Presence of PSO and Perceived Corruption 
The importance of tax knowledge cannot be underestimated in shaping the 
compliance behaviour of taxpayers (Eriksen & Fallan, 1996; Fallan, 1999; Mustafa, 
1997; Saad, 2014). Hofmann et al. (2008) identified knowledge of taxation as an 
essential factor in influencing tax compliance. However, no consistent findings 
relating to tax knowledge and tax compliance behaviour exist in the literature. 
Previous studies, for example, Kasipillai and Jabbar (2003), Kirchler et al. (2006), 
Manaf et al. (2005), Milliron (1985), and Palil and Mustapha (2011) have 
investigated the relationship between tax knowledge and tax compliance. These 
studies found a positive and significant relationship between tax knowledge and tax 
compliance irrespective among the respondents. In short, these studies found that 
higher tax knowledge had a high correlation with compliance rates. Conversely, Dubin 
and Wilde (1988), McGee et al. (2009), McKerchar (1995), and Ritsema et al. 
(2003) documented a negative relationship between tax knowledge and taxpayer‘s 




Theoretically, an individual with high level of good tax knowledge should enhance 
their behaviours in dealing with their tax obligations. However, the findings with 
respect to this variable have been mixed. One explanation might be that the effects of 
PSO and perceived corruption might moderate the influence of taxpayers' knowledge 
on compliance behaviour. That is because a taxpayer may possess the requisite 
knowledge of tax, but may not be oriented on the need to pay his/her tax. 
 
Gang et al. (2013) revealed that service orientation was recognized as an important 
approach in addressing tax noncompliance of taxpayers. Rahmani and Fallahi (2012) 
also opined that perceived corruption was more significant in influencing the 
willingness and ability of taxpayers to pay taxes. In line with the above discussion 
and drawing from the social influence and social exchange theories, the following 
hypotheses are formulated: 
H7:  There is a significant relationship between tax knowledge and tax 
compliance behaviour. 
H7b:   Perceived service orientation will moderate the relationship between tax 
knowledge and tax compliance behaviour. 
H7c:   Perceived corruption will moderate the relationship between tax knowledge 




4.3.8 The Relationship between PGQ and Tax Compliance in the Presence of 
PSO and Perceived Corruption 
When government provides public services matching the preferences of taxpayers as 
a result of an exchange for an adequate tax price, taxpayers will be more willing to 
comply with their tax obligations. In an attempt to relate PGQ and tax compliance 
behaviour, Alabade et al. (2011), Everest-Philips and Sandall (2009), and Lassen 
(2003) said that, if the political goods mix that the government provides is 
determined as being distinct and unique from that which taxpayers prefer, then the 
attractiveness of the vertical contract between the two parties will start to diminish, 
which, in turn, could lead to lower tax compliance. 
 
This is because the average rate of compliance is always rated higher when public 
goods and services are provided to taxpayers. Torgler and Schneider (2009) also 
noted that the lack of efficient and effective administration of the rule of law might 
undermine the willingness of the taxpayers to comply with their tax obligations. 
They related this variable with social exchange theory, which states that individuals 
in any commitment always direct their reciprocal or symbiotic efforts directly 
towards the sources of the rewards they have received. Therefore, if taxpayers 
perceive the government to be fair in providing quality goods and services to the 
public, the behaviour of those taxpayers towards tax compliance may tend to change 
positively. Conversely, if taxpayers perceive the government to be unfair in 
providing quality goods and services to the public, the behaviour of those taxpayers 





Moreover, the effect of PSO and perceived corruption may moderate the relationship 
between the PGQ and tax compliance behaviour. Therefore, as Braithwaite (2009) 
opined, the major obligation of the relevant tax authorities is seen as providing 
relevant service-oriented programs to the taxpayer in order to improve their 
compliance levels. Thus, if services are adequately supplied to the taxpayers either in 
the form of orientations or awareness, such provisions will go far in encouraging 
taxpayers to fulfil their tax obligation. Similarly, Uslaner (2007) also pointed out that 
corruption in developing countries is far worse than in the developed countries of the 
West. Such corruption invariably sweeps the government treasury of the desired 
resources for the execution of public projects and also erodes people‘s trust in 
government. This simply means that corruption is a tool that reduces tax revenues as 
well as tax compliance, which, in return, makes public expenditure policies 
ineffective for achieving social objectives. 
 
Based on the foregoing discussion and drawing from the social exchange theory as 
well as the social influence theory, the following hypotheses are formulated: 
H8:   There is a significant relationship between PGQ and tax compliance 
behaviour. 
H8a:   Perceived service orientation will moderate the relationship between PGQ 
and tax compliance behaviour. 





4.4  Summary 
This chapter outlined the study's theoretical framework, which is used to investigate 
the determinants of tax compliance behaviour in relationship to SMEs. This 
theoretical framework adds to the extant literature of tax compliance as shown in the 
previous sections. In the context of this study, eight direct and twelve indirect 
hypotheses have been developed. Table 4.1 presents a summary of the research 
hypotheses to be tested later. 
Table 4.1 
Summary of Research Hypotheses 
Hypothesis Statement 
H1 There is a significant relationship between work - family financial commitment and 
tax compliance behaviour. 
 
H2 There is a significant relationship between fuel subsidy removal and tax compliance 
behaviour 
 
H3 There is a significant relationship between tax rates and tax compliance behaviour 
 
H3a Perceived service orientation will moderate the relationship between tax rates and 
tax compliance behaviour. 
H3b Perceived corruption will moderate the relationship between tax rates and tax 
compliance behaviour. 
 
H4 There is a significant relationship between probability of detection and tax 
compliance behaviour. 
 
H4a Perceived service orientation will moderate the relationship between the probability 
of detection and tax compliance behaviour. 
 
H4b Perceived corruption will moderate the relationship between the probability of 
detection and tax compliance behaviour. 
 
H5 There is a significant relationship between tax complexity and tax compliance 
behaviour. 
 
H5a Perceived service orientation will moderate the relationship between tax complexity 
and tax compliance behaviour. 
 






H6 There is a significant relationship between incentives (positive inducement) and tax 
compliance behaviour. 
 
H6a Perceived service orientation will moderate the relationship between incentives 





Table 4.1 (continued) 
Hypothesis Statement 
H6b Perceived corruption will moderate relationship between incentives (positive 
inducement) and tax compliance behaviour. 
 
H7 There is a significant positive relationship between tax knowledge and tax 
compliance behaviour. 
 
H7a Perceived service orientation will moderate the relationship between tax knowledge 
and tax compliance behaviour. 
 
H7b Perceived corruption will moderate the relationship between tax knowledge and tax 
compliance behaviour. 
 
H8 There is a significant relationship between public governance quality and tax 
compliance behaviour. 
 
H8a Perceived service orientation will moderate the relationship between public 
governance quality and tax compliance behaviour. 
 
H8b Perceived corruption will moderate the relationship between public governance 











The preceding chapter discussed the research framework and hypotheses 
development for the study constructs. This current chapter discusses the research 
methodology and procedures undertaken to achieve the objectives of this study. In 
particular, this chapter covers the research paradigm followed by the research design. 
Furthermore, the population and sampling techniques and the operational definitions 
of the construct are given. Additionally, the result of the pilot test, and the various 
methods used for data analysis were also presented. 
 
5.2  Research Paradigm 
According to Gummesson (2000), a research paradigm is referred to as "theories, 
ideologies, myths, standards, frames of reference, perspectives, norms, approved 
procedures, and peoples value judgment that drive's individuals thinking and action" 
(p. 18). The design of a good research starts with the proper identification of a topic 
and a research paradigm (Creswell, 2003). Guba and Lincoln (1989) viewed 
paradigm as "a basic set of beliefs individuals are willing to make that eventually 
serve as touchstones upon which one's activities are guided" (pp. 107-108). For their 
part, researchers generally have their perceptions about the nature of a specific social 




know that quantitative research using empirical methods and empirical statements 
(Cohen & Manion, 1980) was employed in this study. 
 
Furthermore, Chisick (2008) suggested that, for research to be accorded the highest 
level of acceptance or respect, it must be built on the basis of good scientific method, 
especially in the field of social sciences. Scientific methods apply to "quantitative 
research" that is anchored on "positivism paradigm". Creswell (1994) was of the 
view that quantitative research was a type of research, in which phenomena are 
explained by collecting and analysing numerical data using statistically based 
methods. 
 
However, other schools of thought think differently about the "positivism paradigm". 
Onwuegbuzie (2002) argued that the positivism paradigm was an effective approach 
when issues were properly known and regarded as facts or other measurable entities. 
This school of thought that social science research dealt with actions and behaviour, 
derived from the human mind, and these actions and behaviours required 
interpretation.  
 
Therefore, another prototype known as "constructivism model" evolved (Guba & 
Lincoln, 2005). Subsequently, social science scholars have adopted what is referred 
to as "qualitative research" that is based on a ―constructivism paradigm". According 
to Othman (2012), constructive norms are based upon and use a sociological 




ethnography. In essence, Shank (2002) saw qualitative research "as a form of 
systematic empirical inquiry into meaning" (p. 5), and Denzin and Lincoln (2000) 
affirmed that "qualitative research involves an interpretive and naturalistic approach; 
in short, it means qualitative scholars study things in their natural form" (p. 3). 
 
As Hartini (2012) and Othman (2012) pointed out, quantitative scholars are always 
obsessed with discovering the answers to questions of "how often" and "to what 
magnitude?" On the other hand, qualitative scholars are always keen to find the 
answers to the questions of "how" and "why". 
 
Nowadays, both models have become widely accepted for research in the social 
sciences by advocates of mixed-mode approaches (Creswell & Clark, 2007; 
Creswell, 2012). Although researchers have adopted the mixed mode approach, its 
application sometimes is a bone of contention (Creswell & Tashakkori, 2007). Table 
5.1 shows the features of the Quantitative and Qualitative paradigms. 
Table 5.1 
Key Characteristics of Quantitative and Qualitative Paradigms 
Characteristic Quantitative Qualitative 
Focus Quantity 
 
Quality (nature, essence) 




Associated phase Experimental, empirical, 
statistical 
 






Table 5.1 (continued) 
Characteristic Quantitative Qualitative 





discovery, meaning, hypotheses 
generating 
Design Characteristics Predetermined, structured 
 
Flexible, evolving, emergent 
Sample Large, random, representative 
 
Small, non-random, purposeful, 
theoretical 
Data Collection Inanimate instrument (scale, 
tests, surveys, questionnaires, 
computers) 
 
Researcher as primary instrument, 
interviews, observations, 
documents 
Mode of analysis Deductive (by statistical 
methods) 
 
Inductive (by researchers) 
Findings Precise, numerical Comprehensive, holistic, 
expansive, richly descriptive 
Source: Othman (2012, pp. 29-30). 
5.2.1 Justification for the Choice of Quantitative Approach 
This research adopts the positivist ontology, which is the quantitative methodology. 
The main reasons for doing so are the following: 
1. Scientific — quantitative data lend themselves to different forms of statistical 
techniques; 
2. Confidence — as statistical tests of significance give a researcher added 
credibility in its findings; 
3. Measurement — the analysis of quantitative data are based on measured 
quantities rather than impressions; 
4. Analysis of large quantitative data becomes easy and simple; and  





Another reason for employing the quantitative approach stems from the audience or 
respondent. In the literature, a remarkable number of past studies in the area of tax 
compliance have employed quantitative approach, for instance (Alabede et al., 2011; 
Alm, 2013; Alm & Torgler, 2006; Manaf, 2004; Mustafa, 1997; Palil and Mustafa, 
2011; Palil et al., 2013; Richardson, 2006; Stefura, 2011, 2012; Tayib, 1998).  
 
Creswell (1994) is of the view that quantitative research is seen as research in which 
phenomena are explained by analyzing data that have been collected via statistical 
methods. Hence, this current study is among those that are quantitative in nature and 
judiciously employs statistical tools to understand relationships existing among 
WFFC, FSR, economic factors (i.e., tax rates, the probability of detection and tax 
complexity), the psychological factors (incentives via positive inducement, tax 
knowledge, and PGQ), PSO, and perceived corruption on tax compliance behaviour.  
 
Primarily, this study sought to causally predict, confirm, support or disagree with the 
findings of other authors in different contextual settings. For the above reasons, this 
research employed the quantitative paradigm. However, quantitative research is not 
devoid of some setbacks, which include: 1) quality of data; 2) data overload, and 3) 
quantitative analysis is as scientifically objective as it might appear. Thus, the 
researcher acknowledges that all these may influence the outcomes of the research in 





5.3 Research Design 
The quantitative research design was adopted in this study because it was considered 
to be more suitable by allowing for the testing of the relationship between variables 
using statistical methods. This design achieves the primary objective of this study, 
which was to examine the relationship between WFFC, FSR, and the moderating 
role of PSO and perceived corruption between economic factors, psychological 
factors, and tax compliance behaviour. In addition, the design allows for the analysis 
to be conducted on a sample, which can be generalized to an entire population. It 
also permits the use of a standard and formal set of questions contained in survey to 
be distributed to every respondent. 
 
This research was conducted in a natural environment in which the researcher's 
interference was minimal. Conducting a study in a natural environment helps creates 
high external validity, and the findings will be more robust, relevant and 
comprehensive (Hair, Money, Samuoel, & Page, 2007; Zikmund, 2003). In addition, 
the unit of analysis of this study was at individual level (i.e., SME 
owners/managers), and the primary data for this study were collected through the 
administration of questionnaires. Respondents‘ perceptions about WFFC, FSR, and 
the remaining variables became the basis for understanding the influence of their 
behaviours on tax compliance. This study was cross sectional in nature, whereby 
data were collected at a point in time. A cross-sectional design is simple, inexpensive 





5.4 Population and Sampling Techniques 
This section discusses the population of the study, followed by the discussion of the 
sample size, determination of the sample size, sampling frame, and the sampling 
technique. The section ends with a discussion on estimating the expected response 
rate. 
5.4.1 Population of the Study 
A population of a study refers to the entire group of people, events or things of 
interest that the researcher wishes to investigate (Sekaran & Bougie, 2010). In this 
study, the population included all the SMEs owners / or proxy by the managers in 
Nigeria who were licensed by the SMEDAN operating as of 31 December 2014. 
 
The total number of SMEs operating and carrying out business activities in Nigeria 
as of 31 December 2014 was 3,273 (SMEDAN, 2014), constituting the population 
for this research. The population was further narrowed down to 472 SMEs in 
Kaduna and Kano States located in the North West, geopolitical zone of Nigeria, 
whose incomes are taxable under the Personal Income Tax Cap P8 of 1993, as 
amended in 2004 and 2011. The two States in the North West geopolitical zone was 
selected for this study for the following reasons: 
 
First, the North West geopolitical zone had the second highest number of SMEs 
among the six geopolitical zones of the country (National MSMEs Collaborative 




populated as well as the commercial nerve centre of the country with an estimated 
human population of 35, 915, 467 out of the total estimated Nigerian population of 
140, 431, 790 (NPC, 2006; National MSMEs Collaborative Survey, 2010).  The two 
States were reported to have the highest number of SMEs among the seven states 
located in the zone (National MSMEs Collaborative Survey, 2010; SMEDAN, 
2014). 
Table 5.2  
Number of SMEs across the Country as of 31 December 2014 
S/n Geopolitical Zone State Number of 
SMEs 
Total 
1 North West Jigawa 34  














Zamfara 57 771 



















Table 5.2 (continued) 
S/n Geopolitical Zone State Number of 
SMEs 
Total 


















Plateau 98 465 















Oyo 210 954 












Imo 82 384 















Bayelsa 19 452 
        3,273 
Source: SMEDAN (2014). 
   
Second, other geopolitical zones of Nigeria, particularly the North East geopolitical 
zone, comprising Adamawa, Bauchi, Borno, Gombe, Yobe, Taraba, and the 
remaining States in the North West (Jigawa, Katsina, Kebbi, Zamfara and Sokoto 
States) were not covered by this study due to the activities of the Boko Haram 
insurgency. Boko Haram, which literally means "Western Education is Forbidden", 




and economic activities across the northern part of the country as well as the Federal 
Capital Territory, Abuja. It conducts violent attacks and bomb explosions on 
individual businesses, individual residential houses, government offices, and places 
of worship on a daily basis (Gwamna, 2011). Due to this unfortunate situation in the 
country, business activities were shut down in most of the affected areas until further 
notice as the leader of Boko Haram has called for more attacks in the country 
(Omomia, 2015). 
 
Third, the present study did not cover the South East, South South, South West, or 
North Central geopolitical zones of the country. That was because of their 
vulnerability and inaccessibility for the researcher due to the Niger Delta Militancy 
and the BIAFRA struggle for self-independence that is agitating for a new country to 
be carved out from Nigeria. Attacks on innocent individuals and their businesses in 
those regions make them off limits (Mohammed, 2014). Thus, the population 
covered 472 SMEs in the remaining two States, comprising 185 SMEs in Kaduna 
State and 287 SMEs in Kano State, of North West Nigeria (see Table 5.2). 
 
Because the study under review examined the influence of WFC, FSR and the 
moderating role of PSO and perceived corruption on the relationship between 
economic factors, psychological factors and the tax compliance behaviour of SMEs 
owners/managers, the unit of analysis for this study was naturally the individual. To 




5.4.2 Sampling Frame 
Sekaran and Bougie (2013) defined a sampling frame as a set of elements that are 
available for selection in some predefined stage of the sampling process. Similarly, 
Popoola (2014) also posited that a sample frame comprised the list of all entire 
elements in the population from which the sample is drawn. Because the study 
concentrates on the determinants of tax compliance in relationship to SME 
owners/managers in Kaduna and Kano states, Nigeria. The Small and Medium 
Enterprises Development Agency of Nigeria (SMEDAN) list was employed. The 
SMEDAN contained a list of all SMEs operating and doing businesses in the country 
at a particular point in time. 
 
The authenticated list included a total of 472 SMEs that were reported to have been 
registered in Kaduna and Kano States as at 31 December 2014 (SMEDAN, 2014). 
Those SMEs who registered with SMEDAN were the main focus of this study. 
Those SMEs who were not registered with the regulator were excluded from the 
study due to the lack of business addresses. Table 5.2 shows the sample frame of this 
study. 
5.4.3 Sample Size 
The general norm is to use a sample in order to ensure generalisation of the study 
population in research because collecting data from an entire population is 




sampling process must be carried out to determine a sampling size. Hence, not all the 
elements in the population comprise the sample (Sekaran & Bougie, 2010). 
 
The literature has documented that a reasonable sample size is needed to enhance the 
robustness of the overall estimates as well as to reduce the standard errors of models 
(Chin & Newsted, 1999; Marcoulides & Saunders, 2006). Chin and Newsted (1999) 
were of the view that a given small sample size of (N = 20), if employed in a large 
complicated models, would not definitely isolate low valued structural path 
coefficient (β = 0.20) but that a larger sample size of (N = 50) should be considered. 
As Salkind (2003) posited, it is of utmost important to consider an appropriate 
sample size when conducting any research so as to avoid committing a Type I error. 
When the sample is low, the sample may not portray a good representation of the 
entire population. 
 
According to Sekaran and Bougie (2013), a type I error has to do with the 
probability of accepting inappropriate or wrong findings instead of rejecting them.  
A large sample size may not be too good either, for that large size may result in a 
problem associated with a Type II error, accepting a finding that should be rejected. 
Additionally, statistical precision, practical issues, and availability of resources are 
the top priorities to be considered before any choice of sample size. In the context of 
this study, 321 numbers were drawn from a given population of 472 SMEs 





5.4.4 Sample Size Determination 
Ascertaining an appropriate sample size that is independent of any given population 
under consideration is necessary. In this regard, Barlett, Kotrlik, and Higgins (2001) 
outlined two critical flaws that always accompany any sample selection. These flaws 
include: 1) disregarding sampling error when determining the sample size; and 2) 
disregarding problems emanating from both response and non-response biases. 
 
Bruin (2006), Cavana, Delahaye, and Sekaran (2001), Hau and Marsh (2004), and 
Krejcie and Morgan (1970) pointed that one important aim of carrying out 
quantitative research is to gather data that will speak for the overall population under 
investigation. A remarkable number of scholars have employed information 
generated from the field to make generalizations based on the findings drawn from 
the sample of the population in relationship to a given acceptable limit of a random 
error (Cavana et al., 2001; Barlett et al, 2001).  
 
Going by the above discourse and in relationship to the sample size determination, 
the recommendation has been made that a sample of 15 participants for an individual 
predictor is appropriate in order to ensure the reliability of the equation. Hence, in 
this current study, the formula for the number of needed participants is: 
N = 15*(Number of predictors)                                                                             (5.1) 
   = 15*(8) 





Another method of determining the appropriate sample size is the power of a 
statistical test. This method focuses on the ability to minimize the total costs of 
sampling error. Cohen (1988) and Faul, Erdfelder, Lang, and Buchner (2007) 
defined the power of a statistical test as the probability that the null hypothesis 
(which predicts no significant relationship between variables) will be rejected when 
it is in fact not true. However, general norm is that, the larger the sample size, the 
greater the power of a statistical test (Borenstein, Rothstein, & Cohen, 2001; Kelley 
& Maxwell, 2003; Snijders, 2005).  
 
Therefore, power analysis is a statistical procedure for determining an appropriate 
and adequate sample size for a research (Bruin, 2006). In the application of power 
analysis, an a priori power analysis was conducted using G*Power 3.1 software 
(Faul, Erdfelder, Buchner, & Lang, 2009; Faul et al., 2007). In applying the 
following predefined parameters; Power (1-β err prob; 0.95), an alpha significance 
level (α err prob; 0.05), medium effect size f² (0.15) and eight main predictor 
variables (WFFC, FSR, TR, PD, TC, IPI, TK, and PGQ), a minimum sample of 160 
would be required to test a regression based models (Figure 5.1) (Cohen, 1992; Faul 





Figure 5.1. The Output of A Priori Power Analysis. 
 
As shown in Figure 5.1, the output of the a priori power analysis shows that a 
minimum of 160 respondents would be appropriate for the present study. However, 
the response rate among Nigerians is typically poor (Adomi, Ayo, & Nakpodia, 
2007; Ofo, 1994). Based on the above argument, the sample size derived using a 




considering other methods in order to determine an appropriate and adequate sample 
size for a given population was necessary.  
 
Krejcie and Morgan (1970) created a sample size table. This table is aimed at 
ensuring a good yardstick for arriving at a sample that is a true representation of the 
entire population. Thus, Krejcie and Morgan‘s (1970) sample size determination is 
therefore derived at thusly: 
s = X2 NP (1 - P) / d2 (N - 1) + X2 P (1 - P)                                                             
(5.2) 
Where; 
s = required sample size, 
X2 = the tabulated value of chi-square for 1 degree of freedom at the desired              
confidence level (3.841), 
N = population size, 
P = the population proportion (assumed to be 0.50 since this would provide the 
maximum sample size), and 
d = the degree of accuracy expressed as a proportion of (0.05). 
Therefore, at a population of 472 SMEs owners/managers, a sample size of 214 was 
arrived at. 
 
In the same vein, Dillman (2000) identified another vigorous method of sample size 




capable of representing a given population of interest. Dillman created the following 
formula: 




n = required sample size for the desired level of precision, 
N = population of interest, 
p = proportion of population expected (assume to be 0.50 for maximum sample 
size), 
b = acceptable amount of sampling error (which can be set at 0.10; 0.05; or 0.3) at 
10%; 5%; or 3% accordingly), and 
c = z statistics related with a confidence level of 1.96 at the 95% significance level. 
 
In the context of this study, a proportion of 5% was employed for an appropriate 
sample size, which is in line with Biemer and Lyberg‘s (2003) guidelines to ensure 
an adequate sample size for either larger or smaller population. Hence: 
 
N = 472; p = 0.5; b = 0.05; and c = 1.96 
n = [(472) (0.5) (1 - 0.5)] / [(472 - 1) (0.05/1.96)2] + [(0.5) (1 - 0.5)] 
n = [(472)(0.5)(0.5) / [(471)(0.0255102)2] + [(0.5)(0.5)] 
n = 118 / [(471) (0.0006507703)] + 0.25 




n = 212 
 
Drawing from the above results from computations based on Bruin (2006) Cavana et 
al. (2001), Dillman (2000), and Krejcie and Morgan (1970), the suggested sample 
size of 214 determined based on Krejcie and Morgan (1970) was a little bit higher 
than others. Furthermore, this computation accounted for the level of confidence and 
precision, ensuring that sampling error was minimized. Based on the above 
discussion, this study adopted a sample size of 214 as computed using Krejcie and 
Morgan (1970).  
 
Other guidelines were taken into consideration as well. Roscoe‘s (1975) rule of 
thumb suggested that sample sizes between 30 and 500 are appropriate for most 
research. In addition, Hair, Black, Babin, and Anderson (2010) stated that, for 
multivariate research, the sample size should be 10 or more times larger than the 
number of the research variables. The present study had eleven variables and the 
required sample should, therefore, be 110 or more. Similarly, Hoyle (2005) also 
suggested that a sample size ranging from 100 to 200 was usually a good starting 
point in conducting path modeling. 
 
However, in order to compensate for non-response, a remarkable number of 
researchers have increased the sample size so as to obtain adequate data (Sekaran & 
Bougie, 2010; Israel, 2009; Salkind, 1997). In particular, Salkind (1997) revealed 




sample size by at least 40%. Considering the above argument, and taking into 
consideration the population of this study, the sample size of 214 was increased by 
50% as Salkind (1997) suggested. Adding this number to 214 gave a total of 321 in 
order to account for uncooperative respondents and unusable questionnaires. This 
was done because people in Nigeria are reluctant to complete questionnaires (Adomi 
et al., 2007). Thus, a final sample size of 321 was used in this study. 
5.4.5 Sampling Techniques 
Many types of sampling techniques exist in the area of academic research, but they 
are fundamentally classified into probability and non-probability sampling. 
Probability sampling is a sampling technique in which all individuals in a population 
have an equal chance of being selected (Sekaran & Bougie, 2014). The most 
commonly used probability techniques include simple random sampling, stratified 
random sampling, cluster sampling and systematic sampling. 
 
Briefly, random sampling is founded on the principle of randomization thereby 
providing for every component in the population an equal chance of being selected 
for a survey. A simple random sample is based on the proposition that each 
individual has the sample probability of being chosen (Bryman & Bell, 2007). 
Similarly, stratified sampling is concerned with splitting up the entire population into 
sub-groups called ―strata‖ as relevant to the researcher‘s study (Sekaran & Bougie, 
2014). Stratified sampling has the advantage of providing more accurate data 




2012). Cluster sampling deals with the choice of the group instead of individuals and 
is mostly used when a large and widely spread population is present. A systematic 
random sample is a variation of a simple random sample. 
 
The probability sampling technique was used in this research. The technique 
provides every individual an equal opportunity/chance of being selected as the 
sample object (Sekaran, 2003). One major benefit of this sampling technique is that 
no bias of the researcher is present with respect to the choice of sample objects 
(Salkind, 2003). The technique is also highly regarded for purposes of 
generalizability (Cavana et al., 2001). 
 
This study aimed at drawing samples from two states; hence, the need existed for 
stratified random sampling. A simple random sampling entails selecting a sample at 
random by the researcher from the sampling frame (Saunders, Lewis, & Thornhill, 
2009). The random selection can be executed or achieved by the computer, or 
through an online number generator or manually using a random number table. A 
stratified random sampling involves classifying sample elements into strata, and then 
selecting the elements from each stratum using a simple random sampling procedure 
(Sekaran, 2003). A stratified random sampling can either be proportionate or 
disproportionate. It is proportionate when the subjects are drawn from each stratum 
according to a specific or predetermined percentage. It is disproportionate when the 




but a number of the elements contained in each stratum. This study adopted the 
proportionate sampling procedure.  
 
First, SMEs were categorized into two strata: 1) SMEs in Kaduna State with a 
population of 185; 2) SMEs in Kano State with a population of 287. Information 
about the population elements, sampling frame and the actual sample are shown in 
Table 5.3 below. The lists of the population elements for the SMEs in the respective 
states were obtained from the SMEDAN directory (2014). The population elements 
for SMEs in Kaduna and Kano states were 185 and 287 respectively, totalling 472 
SMEs as shown in Table 5.3. 
 
The proportionate stratified random sampling is seen as the best technique for the 
present study because the aim of this study is to have samples drawn from the SMEs 
located in the two states. Therefore, the stratified random sampling according to 
Sekaran (2003) is appropriate for a study when a researcher has a subdivided 
population that demands treating each subdivision as a stratum in order to obtain 
estimates of known precision. Based on the above justification, proportionate 
stratified random sampling was used in this study. 
 
Furthermore, the selection of the prospective respondents from the population frame 
was done without any bias. After the list was verified, the questionnaires were 
distributed to the respondents based on a simple random sampling. Random numbers 




the following mathematical formula {= Rand ()} was employed in the process of the 
sample selection. 
Table 5.3 
Proportionate Stratified Random Sampling 
State Population Sample 
Size 
Kaduna 185 126 
Kano 287 195 
Total 472 321 
 
5.4.6 Estimating Expected Response Rate 
In the current study, the researcher distributed a total of 450 survey questionnaires to 
the SME owners/managers in Kaduna and Kano States, Nigeria. The first reason 
behind the oversampling questionnaires instead of the required sample size of 321 
was to account for the loss that may have arisen from unpredicted behaviours of the 
respondents as well as damaged questionnaires (Salkind, 1997). 
 
Second, oversampling, according to Phokhwang (2008) and Ringim, Razalli, and 
Hassan (2012), was necessary to further account for non-response bias and non- 
response rate that may alter the result of the survey. Furthermore, in Nigeria it has 
been established that a response rate for survey researches typically ranges from 
45% to 73% (Nakpodia, Ayo, & Adomi, 2007) and this study aimed at achieving the 
higher end of the response rate. The period for data collection lasted for 





5.5 Operational Definitions and Measurements of Variables 
As show in Figure 4.1 in the previous chapter, the present study has eleven major 
constructs to be measured, namely, WFFC, FSR, tax rates, the probability of 
detection, tax complexity, incentives (positive inducements), tax knowledge, PGQ, 
PSO, perceived corruption and tax compliance behaviour. Before a thorough 
discussion of the measurement of these constructs, this section explores the 
differences between formative and reflective measures. 
5.5.1 Formative versus Reflective Measures  
Formative measures are measures that cause the creation or change in the underlying 
construct (Blalock, 1964). They are illustrated in Figure 5.2 below. Formative 
measures arise in cases in which the measures jointly influence the construct and the 
full meaning of the construct is derived from its measures (Saad, 2011). This 
suggests that the measures are not expected to correlate with one another because 
they are not determined by the construct, therefore reliability may not be a yardstick 
for validating formative measures. 
 
Additionally, formative measures capture the conceptual domain of the study 
constructs as a group. In particular, this demonstrates that formative measures are 
dynamic (not redundant) in the process of capturing the varied aspects of the 
conceptual domain. The implication is that dropping one formative indicator from a 
measurement model could be disastrous because the model may then omit a unique 





The opposite of formative measures are reflective measures that are commonly 
referred to as ―effect indicators.‖ These measures are regarded as effect indicators 
because they reflect the said construct that they represent (MacKenzie et al., 2005). 
In Figure 5.3 below, the reflective measures are illustrated in the instance in which 
the direction of causality flows from the construct to the measures. Unlike formative 
measures, reflective measures are expected to highly correlate because they reflect 
the same underlying construct. 
 
They are capable of showing a high level of internal consistency reliability. 
Reflective measures are assumed to be one-dimensional whereby the measures are 
seen as individually tapping the entire conceptual domain. This feature reveals that 
the damages derived from dropping a reflective indicator are less than dropping a 









Source: Adapted from Bollen and Lennox (1991, p. 306). 
 














Source: Adapted from Bollen and Lennox (1991, p. 306). 
Figure 5.3. Reflective Measures. 
In order to differentiate between the formative and reflective measures, Jarvis, 
MacKenzie, and Podsakoff (2003) provided several guidelines, which are shown in 
Table 5.3. The guidelines suggest that formative and reflective measures can be 
identified subject to four criteria: 1) direction of causality between the 
constructs/variables and their measures; 2) interchange ability of the measures; 3) 
co-variation among the measures; and 4) similarity in antecedents and consequences. 
Table 5.4 
Decision Rules to Differentiate Between Formative and Reflective Construct 
  Formative Reflective 
1 
 
Direction of causality from the 
construct to measure implied 
by the conceptual definition 
Direction of 
causality is from 
items to construct 
Direction of causality from 
construct to items 
2 
 
Interchangeability of the 
indicators 
Indicators need not 
be interchangeable 
Indicators should be 
interchangeable 
3 Covariation among the 
indicators 
Not necessary for 
indicators to 
covary with each 
other 
Indicators are expected to covary 
with each other 
4 
 
Are the indicators expected to 
have the same antecedents and 
consequences? 
Indicators are not 




Indicators are required to have the 
same antecedents and 
consequences 












In order to illustrate the differences between formative and reflective measures, Chin 
(1998a) provided the example of mental inebriation as a construct. In his illustration, 
the formative measures of mental inebriation represented the quantity of beer, wine 
and hard liquor consumed, while the reflective measures might be the blood alcohol 
level, driving ability, MRI brain scan and performance on mental calculations. 
 
In relationship to the reflective measures, an improvement in the blood alcohol level 
measure would also imply an improvement in MRI activity and other measures, 
because they are all meant to tap into the same concept. In contrast, a change in the 
formative measures, for example, an increase in beer consumption, does not indicate 
an increase in wine or hard liquor consumption (Chin, 1998a). Therefore, based on 
the theoretical framework, and the review of related literature conducted in this 
study, all the eleven constructs in this current study contains only reflective 
indicators. As a result, the following section discusses how the variables were 
defined and measured in the context of this study. 
 
5.5.2 Dependent Variable / Construct 
Literature has documented that tax compliance is one critical factor to the fiscal 
viability of any government (Joulfaian, 2009). Presently, tax compliance issues are 
of concern to academics, institutions and policy makers. Therefore, the endogenous 




5.5.2.1 Tax Compliance Measures 
Tax compliance is seen as the willingness of the taxpayers to abide by the tax laws, 
declare the correct income, claim the correct deductions, relief and rebates and pay 
all taxes on time (Palil & Mustapha, 2011). In the context of this study, tax 
compliance is operationalized as the willingness and ability of the taxpayers to obey 
the tax laws, declare their actual income and pay the correct amount of taxes on the 
due date to the appropriate relevant authority or jurisdiction. Any behaviour 
exhibited by the SME owners/managers contrary to the above is regarded as 
noncompliance.  
 
Several methods exist to measure compliance Alabede et al. (2012), Kasipillai et al. 
(2003), Chan et al. (2000), Kasipillai, Mat-Udin, and Ariffin (2003), Kirchler and 
Maciejovsky (2001), Reckers, Sanders, & Roark (1994), and Saad (2011) used 
scenario cases to measure tax compliance behaviour in their studies. However, 
Yankelovich, Skelly, and White (1984) developed and refined a 15-item tax 
compliance list was therefore adapted in this study. These items were rated on a 
minimum score of 1 and a maximum score of 5. Richardson (2005) has reported that, 
this scale had adequate internal consistency and reliability with Cronbach‘s alphas 
ranging from 0.78 in Australia to 0.89 in Hong Kong, indicating a satisfactory level 
of reliability. That is because these values exceeded the minimum acceptable 
threshold of 0.70 as Hair et al. (2010 and Nunnally (1978) recommended. 
Richardson (2005) in Australia and Hong Kong utilized an interval scale with a 5-





Because the refined Yankelovich et al. (1984) version is simple, and bearing in mind 
the characteristics of the SMEs and the low level of literacy in the Northern part of 
the country (World Bank, 2011), this 15-item scale was adapted in this current study. 
See Table 5.5 below. 
Table 5.5 
Distribution of Items used to Measure Tax Compliance Behaviour 
Construct  Code  Indicator  Source 
Tax Compliance 
Behaviour 
TCB01 Trading or exchanging goods or services from 
one SME to another without reporting it in a tax 





TCB02 Reporting income fully by SMEs, but not 





TCB03 Being paid cash to an SME for a job and then 




TCB04 Not reporting some earnings by the SME from 
interest earn or investment, which the 





TCB05 Adding a little bit of what the SME actually 










Since a lot of rich people pay no taxes at all, if 
SMEs underpay a little, it‘s not a big deal. 
 
Tax rates are just too high, so it is not really 
cheating when SMEs find ways to pay less tax 







Table 5.5 (continued) 
 
5.5.3 Independent Variables / Constructs 
In relationship to the exogenous constructs, the following subsections discuss work - 
family financial commitment, fuel subsidy removal, tax rates, probability of 
detection, tax complexity, incentives (positive inducement), tax knowledge, as well 
as public governance quality. 
 Code Indicator  
 
TCB08 When SMEs are not really sure, whether or not 
they deserve a tax deduction, it makes sense to 




TCB09 With the rising cost of living these days, it is 
okay for SMEs to cut a few corners on its tax 




TCB10 It is not wrong for SMEs to hold back a little bit 





TCB11 When a SME knows it deserves a deduction 
that the government will not let it take, it makes 
sense to take it some other place where they 




TCB12 It is not so wrong to under-report certain 




TCB13 The chances of getting caught are so low that, it 




TCB14 It is all right to occasionally under-report 
certain income or claim an undeserved 





TCB15 Stretching self-relief deductions by the SME 
owner/manager to include some deductions that 





5.5.3.1 Work - Family Financial Commitment (WFFC) Measures 
Work - family financial commitment is seen as a form of inter-role obligation in 
which either commitment to work makes it difficult to have valuable time with the 
family or when commitment to family makes it difficult to be engaged fully at work 
or to meet individual or organisational responsibilities and obligations (Greenhaus & 
Beutel, 1985). 
 
The construct is operationalized in the context of this study as an inter-role conflict 
in which role pressures from work and family environment are mutually 
incompatible. Carlson, Kacmar, and William‘s (2000) 18-item was adapted in the 
course of this study to measure this construct. The items have shown to be reliable 
and valid for measuring WFFC related issues affecting individuals. The scale has 
been reported to possess adequate internal consistency, with Cronbach‘s alphas 
ranging from 0.78 to 0.87 (Carlson et al., 2000), indicating a satisfactory level of 
reliability exceeding the minimum acceptable level 0.70 as Hair et al. (2010) and 
Nunnally (1978) recommended.  
 
The items as shown in Table 5.6 are interval scale using a 5-point Likert-type scale 
whereby, 1 = strongly disagree, and 5 = strongly agree, with a minimum score of 1 
and maximum score of 5. Participants are expected to rate their degree of agreement 







Distribution of Items used to Measure Work - Family Financial 
Commitment 
 Construct  Code Indicator Source 
Work - family 
financial 
commitment 
WFFC01 SME work keeps me from my family 





WFFC02 The time I must devote to my business keeps 
me from participating equally in household 




WFFC03 I have to miss family activities due to the 





WFFC04 The time I spend on family responsibilities 





WFFC05 The time I spend with my family often 
causes me not to spend time in activities at 




WFFC06 I have to miss business activities due to the 





WFFC07 When I get home from work, I am often too 





WFFC08 I am often so emotionally drained when I get 
home from work that it prevents me from 




WFFC09 Due to all the pressures at work, sometimes 
when I come home I am too stressed to do 
the things I enjoy. 
  
  
WFFC10 Due to stress at home, I am often 




WFFC11 Because I am often stressed from family 
responsibilities, I have a hard time 




WFFC12 Tension and anxiety from my family life 





WFFC13 The problem-solving behaviours I use in 
my business are not effective in resolving 






Table 5.6 (continued) 
T Code Indicator Source 
 
WFFC14 Behaviour that is effective and necessary 
for me at home would be counterproductive 




WFFC15 The behaviours I perform that make me 
effective at work do not help me to be a 




WFFC16 The behaviours that work for me at home 




WFFC17 Behaviour that is effective and necessary 





WFFC18 The problem-solving behaviour that works 
for me at home does not seem to be as 
useful at work.   
 
5.5.3.2  Fuel Subsidy Removal (FSR) Measures 
Fuel subsidy removal is defined as a form of price manipulation in which the 
government fixes the pump price of fuel for sale to consumers without paying the 
retailer the difference between the actual market price and the regulated or official 
price per litre (Iyobhebhe, 2011). Fuel subsidy removal is operationalized in this 
study as a unit of price that consumers are supposed to pay to enjoy the use of fuel 
that is not paid by the government resulting in a compounding of the price burden to 
the consumer. To measure the FSR, the 13 items Abdelrahim (2014) developed were 
adapted.  
 
The items have been shown to be reliable and valid for measuring the influence of 
FSR. As shown in Table 5.7, the scale has been reported to have an adequate internal 




recommended satisfactory level of reliability, which is above the minimum 
acceptable threshold of 0.70 (Hair et al., 2010; Nunnally, 1978). The items were 
rephrased in order to suit the context of the study and bearing in mind the level of 
literacy in the North West Nigeria which falls below the minimum standard (World 
Bank, 2011). In this study, the extent of the participants‘ agreement was rated with a 
minimum score of 1 and a maximum score of 5 anchored on a 5-point Likert-type 
scale ranging from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree. 
Table 5.7  
Distribution of Items used to Measure Fuel Subsidy Removal 
 Construct Code  Indicator  Source 
Fuel subsidy 
removal 
FSR01 Fuel subsidy removal increases the cost of energy 





FSR02 Fuel subsidy removal increases the cost of electricity 









FSR04 Fuel subsidy removal has a negative impact on the cost 




FSR05 Fuel subsidy removal has a positive impact on SMEs 




FSR06 Fuel subsidy withdrawal has stimulated a general 




FSR07 Fuel subsidy removal has improved comparative 




FSR08 Fuel subsidy removal has improved the comparative 
advantage of trading by a local SME and other SMEs 




FSR09 Fuel subsidy removal has negative impact on the SMEs 






Table 5.7 (continued) 
T Code Indicator Source 
 
FSR10 Fuel subsidy withdrawal has a negative impact on the 





FSR11 Fuel subsidy removal has a negative impact on national 





FSR12 Fuel subsidy removal has brought untold hardship to the 





FSR13 Fuel subsidy removal poses an obstacle to SMEs in 
obtaining credit facilities from the commercial banks. 




5.5.3.3 The Tax Rates (TR) Measures 
Tax rate is defined as a percentage of taxes to be paid to the relevant tax authorities. 
It is operationalized in this study as a percentage of taxes to be paid to the relevant 
tax authorities. The 6 items used in measuring tax rates were adapted from Gilligan 
and Richardson (2005) with a minimum score of 1 and maximum score of 5. These 
items were shown to be reliable and valid for measuring tax rates. Respondents were 
asked to indicate their responses to statements relating to tax rates anchored by 1 = 
strongly disagree and 5 = strongly agree as shown in Table 5.8. A high score 
suggests that the tax rate is perceived to be fair and a low score suggests that the tax 





Distribution of Items used to Measure Tax rates 
 Construct  Code Indicator  Source 
Tax rates TR01 It is absolutely okay that the higher the profit 






 TR02 It is not okay that a SME which earned higher returns 
on its investment proportionately pay higher taxes 




TR03 An appropriate tax rate should be the same for every 




TR04 The share of the total income taxes paid by SMEs 




TR05 SMEs who declared moderate profits typically pay 




TR06 The share of total income taxes paid by the SMEs 
who declared lower profit is not too high.   
5.5.3.4 The Probability of Detection (PD) Measures 
The probability of detection is defined as the likelihood the relevant tax authorities 
will uncover an individual‘s noncompliance and seek to remedy the evasion (Chau & 
Leung, 2009).  In this study, this is operationalised as the likelihood that the relevant 
tax authorities will uncover an individual‘s noncompliance. The perceived detection 
probability was measured with 8 hypothetical scenario item statements developed by 
Wenzel (2004a) and adapted in this research. 
 
These items have been shown to be reliable and valid (Alabede et al., 2012). The 
items were shown to possess adequate internal consistency, with Cronbach‘s alphas 
ranging from 0.70 to 0.91 (Alabede et al., 2012). The items were interval scale which 




agree with a minimum score of 1 and a maximum score of 5. Small and Medium 
Enterprises, owners/managers were asked to indicate their degree of agreement with 
the detection probability statements concerning the chances that someone would be 
caught in an attempt to underreport income or overstate tax claims. The highest score 
was 5 showing that a high chance of being caught exists; whereas the lowest score 
was 1, indicating a low chance of being caught by the relevant tax authority as 
shown in Table 5.9. 
Table 5.9 
Distribution of Items used to Measure Probability of Detection 
 Construct 
 
Indicator  Source 
Probability of detection 
 








Detection of underreporting of small amount 
 
   
 
Detection of overstating of small deductions   
5.5.3.5 Tax Complexity (TC) Measures 
The complexity of the tax system can simply be referred to the process of improving 
the equity of the tax system by the relevant tax authorities, which, in turn, reduces its 
ambiguity (McKercher et al., 2005). In this study, complexity is operationalized as a 
process whereby the relevant tax authorities try to improve the equity of the tax 
system as well as simultaneously reduce its ambiguity. Saad (2011) developed and 
used 7 items for tax complexity, and these items were adapted from Saad (2011) and 





The items were shown to be reliable and valid for measuring the perception of the 
taxpayers in relation to tax complexity. Saad (2011) reported that the scale had 
adequate internal consistency, which was within the required threshold of .70. Thus, 
respondents indicated the extent of their responses to the statements in relationship 
to the complexity of the Nigerian SMEs tax system.  
 
Saad (2011) used a 7-point Likert-type scale in measuring the items. However, in 
this study, the 7-point interval scale was reduced to 5 points whereby, 1 = strongly 
disagree, and 5 = strongly agree with a minimum score of 1 and a maximum score of 
5. This was done for several reasons.  Previous researchers have indicated that a 5-
point scale is just as good as any other and that an increase from 5 to 7 or even 9 
points or a reduction from 7 to 5 points does not necessarily improve the reliability 
of the ratings (Elmore & Beggs, 1975). A long scale of 7 to 9 points may be 
cognitively difficult for respondents and, while a short scale of 3 points may be 
cognitively easy, such a scale may not adequately differentiate the opinions of 
respondents (Weisberg, Krosnick, & Bowen, 1996). In this current study, a high 
score suggests that the SME owners/managers perceived the tax system to be more 
complex, while low scores suggest that SME owners/managers perceived the system 





Distribution of Items used to Measure Tax complexity 
 Construct Code Indicator Source 
Tax Complexity TC01 I think the terms used in tax publications (e.g., SIRS guide 
books) and in tax return forms are difficult for SME owner 





TC02 The sentences and wording in the SMEs Income Tax Return 








TC04 Most times our SME does refer to others for assistance in 




TC05 Our SME does not always have a problem with completing 







As an SME, we find it tedious to maintain all our relevant 




TC07 As an SME we do not have to make a lot of effort to 
understand the explanations given in the State Internal 
Revenue Service (SIRS) guide books and other similar 
explanatory material.   
 
5.5.3.6  Incentives (Positive Inducement) (IPI) Measures 
Incentives may be seen as a form of positive inducement that encourages taxpayers 
to comply with the relevant tax laws and regulations, as well as the penalties or 
sanctions where there is a likelihood of noncompliant (Slemrod, 1992; Smith, 1992). 
In the context of this study, incentives (positive inducements) are operationalized as 
monetary rewards, in the form of monetary incentives for timely filing, as well as 
other forms of incentives to the taxpayers who comply with the tax laws and 





Incentives (positive inducements) were measured by adapting the 2 items that Manaf 
(2004) developed. The 2 items were sufficient because, there is evidence suggesting 
that even a single-item can be very reliable in measuring a construct (e.g. de Boer et 
al, 2004; Shamir & Kark, 2004). As far as internal consistency reliability is 
concerned, there is substantial evidence indicating acceptable reliability values for 
single-item scales (e.g., Ginns and Barrie, 2004; Wanous, Reichers, & Hudy, 1997; 
Kwon & Trail, 2005), hence 2 items to measure incentives are sufficient. 
 
A 5-point Likert-type scale was used for ranking the items (i.e., interval scale), 
where 1 = strongly disagree, and 5 = strongly agree comprising the scale with a 
minimum score of 1 and a maximum score of 5. The measures are shown in Table 
5.11. Higher scores indicate their absolute agreement that a higher positive 
inducement increases compliance and lower scores indicate their absolute agreement 
that a lower inducement decreases compliance. 
Table 5.11 
Distribution of Items used to Measure Incentives (positive inducement) 
 Construct Code Indicator Source 
Incentives (positive 
inducement) 
IPI01 Tax collection for SMEs would increase, if 





IPI02 If government plans to give positive inducement 
to compliant SMEs, the inducement should be 
given both in kind and cash.   
 
5.5.3.7 Tax Knowledge (TK) Measures 
Tax knowledge is another exogenous construct. According to Loo et al. (2009), tax 




laws and regulations in order to fulfil their tax statutory obligations. In the context of 
this study, tax knowledge is operationalized as the ability of the taxpayer to fully 
understand the tax law and compute his/her tax liability. 
 
Ahmad et al. (2007), Kasipillai (1997), Manaf (2004), and Mustafa (1997) measured 
taxpayers‘ knowledge based on the tax laws and concepts, while Eriksen & Fallan 
(1996), measured taxpayer understanding in relationship to tax laws and 
computations of tax liabilities. 
 
To measure tax knowledge, the 6 items that Eriksen and Fallan (1996) and Kasipillai 
(1997) developed were adapted for this study. The items, which are shown in Table 
5.12, have been demonstrated to be valid and reliable in measuring taxpayers' 
knowledge (Alabede, 2012; Kasipillai, 1997).  
 
The items were ranked on a scale of (Yes = 3, No = 2, and I don't know = 1). The 
interpretation of the scores is as follows: a score of 3 suggests that the respondents 
are aware and well informed about tax issues; a score of 2 shows they are not 
informed about the tax issues; while a score of 1 means the respondents are 
misinformed about the tax issues.  
Table 5.12 
Distribution of Items used to Measure Tax Knowledge 
 Construct Code Indicator Sources 
Tax knowledge TK01 Is interest on savings account taxable under 
the SMEs income tax law? 
 




TK02 Rent received from sub-letting part of the 





income tax law 
 
 
TK03 Dividends received by the SME from another 
investment are taxable under the Nigerian 




TK04 Are provisions for doubtful debt and other 
business/personal expenses allowed for 





TK05 Medical expenses and other business expenses 
allow for deduction under the Nigerian SMEs 




TK06 Loss on sale of assets and other 
business/personal expenses are allowed for 




5.5.3.8 Public Governance Quality (PGQ) Measures 
Public governance quality is an exogenous construct. According to Rotberg (2005), 
public governance quality can be defined as the provision of efficient necessary 
quality political goods by the government to the taxpayers. In this study, PGQ is 
operationalized as the efficient provision of desired public goods and services by the 
government to the taxpayers.  
 
In the context of this study, PGQ was measured with 13 items that Alabede et al. 
(2011) developed and was adapted in this study. The scales have been shown to be 
reliable and valid for measuring governance quality. Alabede et al. (2011) also 
reported that the scale has adequate internal consistency with a Cronbach‘s alpha of 
0.87, indicating a satisfactory level of reliability that exceeded the minimum 




A 5-point Likert-type scale interval scale was used in which responses of the 
respondents ranged from 1 = strongly disagree to 5 = strongly agree with a minimum 
score of 1 and a maximum score of 5. A high score indicates that the respondents 
perceived that PGQ was high, while a low score meant the respondents perceived 
that PGQ was low. 
Table 5.13 
Distribution of Items used to Measure Public Governance Quality 
 Construct  Code Indicator Source 
Public governance 
quality 
PGQ01 I trust the National Assembly in making good 
laws for Nigeria. 
 
Alabede et al. 
(2011) 
 




PGQ03 I have access to the published accounts and 




PGQ04 I am not satisfied with the quality of general 
infrastructure in Nigeria. 
  
 
PGQ05 I am satisfied with the manner in which the 




PGQ06 I am not satisfied with the manner in which the 









PGQ08 The diversion of public funds due to corruption 






Table 5.13 (continued) 
 Code Indicator  
 




PGQ10 Ethnic and religious conflict is not a threat to 




PGQ11 Nigeria‘s Judiciary is free of interference of 












   
5.5.4 Moderating Variables/Constructs 
A moderating variable is seen as a variable/construct that alters the strength and 
direction of the relationship between dependent and independent variables (Baron & 
Kenny, 1986). As such, a moderating variable enhances the relationship between two 
variables. Perceived service orientation and perceived corruption were used as 
moderating variables in this study and are measured as shown below. 
5.5.4.1 Perceived Service Orientation (PSO) Measures 
Perceived service orientation can be defined as comprising attitudes of being helpful, 
thoughtful, considerate and cooperative (Hogan et al., 1984). In this study, PSO is 
operationalized as the opportunity to increase trust and confidence, through 
facilitating cooperation with citizens in public administration and governance. The 
concept is measured with the 5 items that Gangl et al. (2013) developed that were 
adapted in this study as shown in Table 5.14. The items were rated on an interval 




disagree to 5 = completely agree with a minimum score of 1 and a maximum score 
of 5.  
 
Past studies have reported that the scale has adequate internal consistency with 
Cronbach‘s alphas ranging from 0.81 to 0.83 with factor loadings of 0.68 and 0.73 
respectively (Gangl et al., 2013). These indicate a satisfactory level of reliability, 
which exceeded the minimum acceptable level of 0.70 as Hair et al. (2010) and 
Nunnally (1978) recommended. 
Table 5.14 
Distribution of Items used to Measure Perceived Service Orientation 




PSO01 The tax authority does everything possible to serve 








PSO03 The tax authority keeps its promises in relation to SME‘s 
 
 
 PSO04 The tax authority treats every SME fairly. 
 
 




5.5.4.2 Perceived Corruption (PC) Measures 
Perceived corruption can be seen as an abuse of public power for private benefit 
(Habib & Zurawicki, 2002). In this study, it is operationalized as bribery or 
dishonest dealings. Perceived corruption was measured by 4 items that Gbadamosi 






The scale has been shown to be reliable and valid with a Cronbach‘s alpha of 0.72. 
Gbadamosi and Bello (2009) also reported that the scale has adequate internal 
consistency, with a Cronbach‘s alpha of 0.62 indicating a satisfactory level of 
reliability that exceeded the minimum acceptable level 0.60 that Juul, Rensburg, and 
Steyn (2012) recommended. 
The items were rated on a 5-point Likert-type scale (interval scale) anchored by 1 = 
strongly disagree, to 5 = strongly agree with a minimum score of 1 and a maximum 
score of 5. Respondents rated their degree of agreement with respect to how they 
perceived corruption in the country. Higher numbers indicate greater levels of 
corruption and lower numbers indicated lower levels of corruption. 
Table 5.15 
Distribution of Items used to Measure Perceived Corruption 
 Construct  Code Indicator Source 
Perceived 
corruption 
PC01 Individuals pay bribes and tips to get things done. Gbadamosi and 
Joubert (2005) 
 





PC03 If public officials act against rules, help can be 
obtained elsewhere. 
 
   PC04 Bribery and corruption is common in Nigeria.   
5.5.5  Demographic Variables 
In the course of this research, the demographic variables related to the respondents 
were incorporated. These variables included: gender, age, educational qualification, 
years of experience, and the length of existence of the SMEs. Gender was measured 




and the length of existence of SMEs were treated as continuous variables. Gender 
was coded with a categorical variable ―1‖ for male and ―2‖ for female. 
 
The respondents were required to indicate their age. Therefore, age was also coded 
using dummy variables with ―1‖ = less than 30 years, ―2‖ = 31-40 years, ―3‖ = 41-50 
years, and ―4‖ = above 50 years. 
 
Similarly, the educational qualifications of the respondents were also assessed using 
categorical variables with ―1‖ = Doctorate Degree, ―2‖ = Master‘s Degree, ―3‖ = 
Bachelor degree or equivalent, ―4‖ Diploma or A - level equivalent, and ―1‖ GCE or 
O - level equivalent. Years of experience of the respondents was also anchored using 
dummy variables with ―1‖ = 1-5 years, ―2‖ = 6-10 years, and ―3‖ = above 10 years.  
 
Furthermore, the same coding system was also applied to the years of existence of 
the SMEs with ―1‖ = Less than 5 years, ―2‖ = 6-10 years, ―3‖ = 11 -15 years, ―4‖ = 
16-20 years, and ―5‖ = More than 20 years.  
 
5.6 Research Ethical Considerations  
Research ethic is normally seen as a set of behaviours, norms or standards that must 
be conformed to by researchers. Ethical behaviour should be adhered to by 
researchers to avoid infringement on the rights of the participants (Bryman & Bell, 
2003). Researchers should not force respondents in any way to partake in the 




and should also have access to the results of the research at any point in time. 
Additionally, objectivity in terms of reporting is maintained when emphasis is laid 
on the ethical considerations of research (Zikmund, 2005). 
 
In the conduct of this study, this research addresses the following ethical issues with 
regards to the development of questionnaire, and data collection and analysis stages 
as well as the whole research. The ethical issues employed and treated in this study 
are as follows:  
1. Voluntary Participation: In compliance with this, the researcher provided 
an introductory letter from Universiti Utara Malaysia and the Department of 
Accounting, Kaduna State University, Nigeria with the research 
questionnaire indicating to the respondents that they were free to answer any 
question at their convenience. 
2. Adequate information: The letter furnished the respondents with the 
required information on the aims and objectives of the research. 
3. Privacy and confidentiality: The participants were assured of the 
confidentiality of the information provided in the course of the research. 
Assurance was also given to the respondents that the information provided 
would only be used for research purposes.  
This research adhered to ethical consideration in line with the rules that Bouma 
(2000) highlighted including: 1) respondents‘ dignity, 2) the benefits of the research 
outweighed the potential harm of the research, 3) no one was forced to participate, 4) 




access the results of the research to ensure that their interests were not 
misrepresented. 
 
5.7  Pilot Study 
Carrying out a pilot study before actual data collection is always necessary. A pilot 
study is not necessarily seen as a pre-test, but is used more formatively to help the 
researcher in constructing pertinent lines of questioning (Yin, 1994). Sekaran (2000) 
noted that a pilot study is normally conducted to correct any inadequacies in the 
instrument and the method prior to data collection. This is because the researcher has 
ample time to check the reliability, validity and viability of the research instrument 
as well as to determine the time needed for conducting the actual study.  
 
Consequently, this study underwent a pilot test on SME owners/managers in Katsina 
state, Nigeria. The purpose of conducting the pilot study was to achieve a flawless 
questionnaire, so that the researcher could make all necessary modifications 
afterwards. In the process, the pilot study incorporated two stages including: 1) 
question development and 2) questionnaire development after the pilot study. The 
purpose of these stages is to establish how to rephrase each question, to evaluate how 
respondents interpreted the meaning of the questions, and to also check whether the 
range of response alternatives was sufficient (De Vaus, 1995).  
 
In summary, the reasons behind the pilot study can be summarized into: 1) examining 




the adequacy of item wording, phrasing and construction for producing accurate 
results; 3) evaluating whether questions are framed in a way that would yield a better 
response; and 4) determining if the respondents could supply the needed data 
(Bambale, 2013). By and large, a pilot test provides an avenue for the researcher to 
address technical issues and the interpretation of the questions in terms of ambiguity 
and to avoid potential errors (Hair et al., 2007). 
 
An appropriate sample size for a pilot study according to Malhotra (1999) normally 
comprises 15 to 30 elements, which, however, can be increased depending on the 
situation. In this study, one hundred and ten questionnaires were issued for the 
purpose of conducting the pilot test. The number of questionnaires was increased to 
one hundred and ten to account for a low response rate.  
 
The questionnaires were distributed to SMEs in Katsina State, Nigeria, which was 
not part of the two states considered for this study. Primarily, the SMEs 
owners/managers were the target respondents of this study. However, in some SMEs 
visited, the owners were not in situ; instead, some had their managers in situ. 
Because of this, either the owners or the managers were accepted as respondents in 
all the SME branches visited because their operational procedures and structures 
were similar. 
 
Of the one hundred and ten questionnaires issued for the pilot test, seventy-four were 




February 2015. This was a response rate of 67%. However, eight questionnaires were 
rejected due to improper filling. Thus, the usable questionnaires stood at sixty-six, 
which comprised a usable response rate of about 60%. In the course of the pilot test, 
some SMEs out rightly rejected the questionnaires whereas others politely received 
the questionnaires.  
 
In the literature, different tests of reliability exist. Nevertheless, the most commonly 
used method that scholars employ is "the internal consistency reliability" test that 
Litwin (1995) proposed. Internal consistency has to do with the extent to which 
items of a particular construct/variable align together and are capable of measuring 
the said construct and are correlated with one another. Traditionally Cronbach‘s 
alpha is used to measure internal consistency and reliability in the area of social 
science research, but this tends to provide a too conservative measurement for PLS-
SEM, which was not used in this current study. Prior studies have suggested using 
composite reliability as a replacement (Bagozzi & Yi, 1988; Hair, Sarstedt, Ringle, 
& Mena, 2012), and composite reliability was employed in this study. 
 
PLS path modeling (Wold, 1974; 1985) using Smart PLS 2.0 M3 software (Ringle, 
Wende, & Will, 2005) was used to assess the internal consistency reliability of the 
constructs used in the pilot study. Specifically, the PLS algorithm, as recommended 
by Geladi and Kowalski (1986), was calculated to ascertain the values of the average 
variance extracted (AVE) and the composite reliability coefficients of the constructs 





Reliability and Validity of Constructs (n = 66) 










1 Tax compliance 
behaviour 
 
5 0.72 0.896 0.926 




10 0.516 0.907 0.913 
3 Fuel subsidy 
removal 
 
6 0.744 0.928 0.945 
4 Tax rates 
 
4 0.558 0.753 0.834 
5 Probability of 
detection 
 
4 0.626 0.807 0.869 
6 Tax complexity 
 
3 0.585 0.651 0.808 
7 Incentive (positive 
inducement) 
 
2 0.760 0.698 0.863 
8 Tax knowledge 
 
3 0.505 0.523 0.741 
9 Public governance 
quality 
 
4 0.599 0.781 0.856 
10 Perceived service 
orientation 
 
4 0.761 0.895 0.927 
11 Perceived 
corruption 
2 0.782 0.778 0.876 
 
As a rule of thumb, the recommended threshold values for composite reliability are 
.70 and above. As shown in Table 5.16, the calculated values for composite 
reliability ranged from .741 to .945, which exceeded the recommended level of .70 
as set in previous studies (Bagozzi et al., 1991; Gefen, Straub, & Boudreau, 2000), 
suggesting that the measurement model achieved satisfactory internal consistency 




coefficient greater than .70 was considered to be acceptable. Hence, the adapted 
instruments were reliable. 
 
In addition to composite reliability, Cronbach‘s alpha was also used to get the inter-
item consistency reliability. As a rule of thumb, higher Cronbach‘s coefficient alpha 
demonstrates higher reliability. In the literature, it has been reported that, a 
satisfactory level for reliability with a Likert-type scale that is lesser than 10, should 
have a Cronbach‘s alpha ≥ 0.7, nevertheless a Cronbach‘s alpha values of 0.60 to 
0.70 are consider the minimum limit of acceptability (Hair et al., 1998, p. 88). 
Similarly, Sekaran (2000, p. 312) suggested that a Cronbach‘s alpha of 0.60 is 
acceptable. Studies suggested that a Cronbach‘s alpha values of 0.60 to 0.70 are 
considered the minimum limit of acceptability (Hair et al., 1998, p. 88). However, 
Griffee (2012) recommended an acceptable threshold of 0.5 to be adequate, while 
0.7 to be high. As shown in Table 5.16, all the Cronbach‘s alphas of the study 
constructs were 0.5 to 0.7 which were considered acceptable. 
 
Furthermore, in order to assess the convergent validity of the constructs, the Average 
Variance Extracted (AVE) should be above .50 (Bagozzi & Yi, 1988; Bagozzi et al., 
1991; Chin, 1998; Fornell & Larcker, 1981; Gefen et al., 2000). As shown in Table 
5.16, all the values of AVE were greater than the acceptable values of .50 (Bagozzi 
& Yi, 1988; Bagozzi et al., 1991; Chin, 1998). That means that at least 50% of the 
measurement variance was captured by the constructs. Factor loadings exceeded the 




included while other items with factor loadings below .70 were deleted consistent 
with the suggestions Hair et al. (2012) made, as such the convergent validity of the 
constructs used were confirmed. 
 
5.8 Data Collection Methods and Procedure 
In the process of data collection, this study adopted the quantitative technique that 
has the purpose of providing objective and reliable numerical facts about a particular 
phenomenon (Fowler, 2013). In the literature, one method identified for data 
collection when using the quantitative technique is the survey approach through a 
questionnaire. Several previous researches in the area of tax compliance have used 
the survey as the method of data collection. These includes Gangl et al. (2013), 
Jabbar & Manaf (2006), Kasipillai (1997), Mustafa (1997), Saad, 2011, 2012, Song 
& Yarbrough (1978), and Stefura (2011, 2012). 
 
The current study judiciously adopted the questionnaire method in gathering 
information from the respondents (SME owners/managers). It further utilized a self-
administered procedure called the ―drop-off and pick procedure‖ in administering 
the questionnaire to the SME owners (Sekaran, Robert, & Brain, 2001). This was 
necessitated because access to the Internet and other infrastructural facilities such as 
postal services are very poor and inefficient, and because of this the researcher 
embarked on self-administration of questionnaire in the form of the drop-off and 





Moreover, Ilobube, Ubogu, and Egbezor (2007) noted that poor access to the Internet 
and other telecommunications, as well as poor postal services, are challenges in 
Nigeria. Adomi et al. (2007) further showed that about 72% of potential respondents 
were served with the research instruments through personal contact in Nigeria while 
about 17% were served through the postal method and 11% through Internet 
facilities. Thus, the drop off and pick-up method was employed to improve the 
response rate (Hair et al. 2007). Accordingly, the researcher administered the 
questionnaire to the respective SMEs businesses located in Kaduna and Kano states, 
Nigeria. 
 
The data collection was scheduled to last for 4 months during the period from 1 
March 2015 to 11 July 2015. The researcher commenced data collection on 9 March 
2015. The researcher set one month for the actual distribution of the questionnaires 
to the respondents, which ended on 11 April 2015. During that time, a total of 450 
questionnaires were distributed, and each questionnaire was accompanied by a 
covering letter. 
 
As of 29 May 2015, a total of 269 questionnaires were retrieved from the 
respondents, even though the researcher gave additional days to the respondents in 
order to allow them to celebrate Nigeria's democracy day plus the change of 
government held on 29 May 2015.  During the period from 1 June 2015 to 11 July 
2015 an additional 18 questionnaires were collected from the respondents. In sum, a 




5.8.1 Survey Questionnaire 
Several authors have defined a survey questionnaire. As Sekaran (2003) noted, a 
research questionnaire can be seen as ―a pre-formulated written set of questions to 
which respondents record their answer, usually within closely defined alternatives‖ 
(p. 236). Fowler (2013) also defined a questionnaire as a set of structured questions 
tailored to collect data required for research, particularly information from the 
targeted respondents. Therefore, gathering data through questionnaire leads to both 
cost and time reductions allowing the respondents to complete the instrument at their 
own convenient time without undue interference from the researcher (Adomi & 
Nakpodia, 2007). The questionnaire designed for this study examined the 
determinants of tax compliance behaviour of SMEs in Nigeria, and further examined 
the perceived service orientation and perceived corruption as the moderating 
variables/constructs. 
 
Consequently, all the questions were prepared in the English language, as English is 
the official language of communication in Nigeria, which SME owners/managers 
can easily understand. The questionnaire was divided into two sections. Section one 
was further divided into eleven parts. 
 
Section one; Part One examined the tax compliance behaviour (TCB) of the Nigerian 
SMEs owners/managers. Part Two determined the work family financial 
commitment (WFFC) faced by SME taxpayers. Part Three investigated the effects of 




Part Four examined the magnitude of the tax rates. Parts Five, Six, Seven, Eight, and 
Nine examined the probability of detection, tax complexity, incentives (positive 
inducement), tax knowledge and the public governance quality (PGQ) of the entire 
country as they relate to SMEs taxpayers. Parts Ten and Eleven investigated the 
moderating effect of perceived service orientation and perceived corruption on the 
relationship between economic factors and psychological factors. 
 
Section Two was only one part:  Part Twelve of the study. This was related to the 
background profile of the respondents. This information included age, gender, years 
of experience, highest educational qualifications, and the life span of the SME in 
question (See Appendix F for the sample questionnaire). The structure of the 
questionnaire is shown in Table 5.17. 
Table 5.17 
Structure of Questionnaire 
  Part Construct Type of question Number of items 
1 Tax compliance behaviour Likert scale 15 
2 Work -  family financial commitment Likert scale 18 
3 Fuel subsidy removal Likert scale 13 
4 Tax rates Likert scale 6 
5 Probability of detection Likert scale 8 
6 Tax complexity Likert scale 7 





Table 5.17 (continued) 
Part Construct Type of question Number of items 
8 Tax knowledge Categorical 6 
9 Public governance quality Likert scale 13 
10 Perceived service orientation Likert scale 5 
11 Perceived corruption Likert scale 4 
12 Demographic Categorical 5 
 
5.8.2  Instrument Validity 
The validity of an instrument can be grouped into two main categories, namely, 1) 
content validity and 2) construct validity. Content validity refers to the suitability of 
the questions to measure what they are supposed to measure. This can be achieved 
through adopting or adapting items, which were used in previous research (Boo, 
Busser, & Baloglu, 2009; Konecnik & Gartner, 2007).  
 
This questionnaire was first checked for content validity by experts to assess whether 
misunderstandings or ambiguities of expressions existed (Chen & Hu, 2010; Gay, 
1987). Experts at the Universiti Utara Malaysia carried out the first content test. The 
second content validity was carried out by a panel of experts, comprising four 
professors, three senior lecturers and four tax professionals at Ahmadu Bello 
University, Nigerian Defence University, and Kaduna State University, all in Nigeria 
from 28 February 2015 to 1 March 2015. 
 
Generally, they all agreed that most measures were valid except for a few items and 




benefit the Nigerian economy. Based on their feedback, some modifications were 
made to the original questionnaire. 
 
They advised that certain items be modified before the actual survey was conducted. 
They included: 1) "I think the terms used in tax publications (e.g., SBIRS guide 
books) and in the tax return forms are difficult for an SME owner like me to 
understand." This was replaced by "I think the terms used in tax publications (e.g., 
SBIRS guide books) and in tax return forms are difficult" and 2) "Trading or 
exchanging goods or services from one SME to another without reporting it in a tax 
return is permissible.‖ This was replaced by "trading goods or services from one 
SME to another without reporting it in a tax return is permissible". 
 
The few items used in this research were adopted while others were adapted with 
few modifications from the literature in which previous research had confirmed their 
convergent and discriminate validities. Investigating the validity of the instrument is 
important due to the fact that the items were used in different settings. Hence, checks 
were carried out during pilot testing of the questionnaire. Lastly, all the 97 items 
were applied for data collection.  
 
Construct validity is concerned with the theoretical and the hypothetical 
development of the relationships between the variables (Pallant, 2007). Hair et al 
(2007) were of the view that construct validity could be verified using two methods. 




of the research relates positively in the evaluation of the construct. The second 
method was discriminant validity, which investigates whether correlations exist 
between the research construct and other different constructs. 
Before going to the field, on 27 February 2015 a cover letter from the Department of 
Accounting Kaduna State University, Nigeria was prepared to request the 
cooperation of the SME owners/managers, which further supported the letter for data 
collection prepared by OYAGSB, Universiti Utara Malaysia for the researcher (See 
Appendices A and B). 
 
In addition, the researcher also visited the SMEDAN and the States Board of Internal 
Revenue Services, in Kaduna and Kano on 1 to 4 March 2015 to seek their support 
for the cooperation of SMEs. As a result, the data collection letter was stamped by 
the agencies that had authenticated the survey (See Appendices C, D, and E). 
 
5.9 Control for Measurement Error 
Measurement error can be seen as a degree to which the variables the researcher 
measures do not perfectly describe the variable of interest (Hair et al., 2010). 
Measurement error may surface from many sources, for instance from data entry to 
the operationalization and the definition of construct.  At times, it might even arise 
from the responses of the target participants. Illustratively, some participants may 
respond to some answers in a one way or manner, when the questions are supposed 
to be interpreted in another way. This type of scenario may result in measurement 




in this study, the researcher kept measurement errors at a minimum by employing 
interval scales for the items and conducting several validity and reliability tests for 
both the pilot test and the main study. 
 
Convergent and discriminant validity were conducted for the main study, which 
showed that the measures determined for this study were actually capturing the 
respective constructs. Moreover, employing PLS-SEM also addressed other issues of 
measurement error in making the estimates of relationships among the various 
constructs (Hair et al., 2010). This study employed PLS-SEM or variance based 
SEM using Smart PLS 2.0 M3 software Ringle et al. (2005) developed, which seeks 
to ensure that measurement errors are properly accounted for, especially from the 
onset of the measurement model or outer model. 
 
5.10  Method of Data Analysis 
This section outlined the proposed method of analysis in evaluating the survey data. 
In accomplishing the research objectives, the analysis begins with the response rate, 
followed by the missing data, then the non-response bias test and common method 
variance test was also discussed. Next was a brief discussion of the descriptive 
analysis as well as an introduction to structural equation modeling and partial least 
squares. This was followed by the justification for choosing PLS-SEM and the various 




5.10.1 Response Rate 
In proving the representativeness of the response rate of the participants, the 
demographic characteristics of the responses with the entire population are normally 
compared (McInnis, 2006). In this study, the response rates in both Kaduna and 
Kano States reflected the representation of the entire population.  
5.10.2 Missing Data 
Differing opinions exist among experts concerning the best technique for dealing 
with missing data in research. Missing data do pose a problem for scholars and 
researchers and affect the results of an empirical study negatively (Cavana et al., 
2001). Missing data normally occur when omissions are present in one or more items 
in a survey. The inability of a researcher to accurately find and treat missing data is 
capable of creating negative consequences for the outcomes of an empirical inquiry.  
 
Hair et al. (2010) felt that missing data less than 10% of the respondents (cases) 
might be replaced through any imputation method. Other researchers have suggested 
that mean substitution is the easiest way of replacing missing values if the total 
percentage of missing data is 5% or less (Little & Rubin, 1987; Raymond, 1986; 
Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007), and most scholars have agreed that missing data of 5% 
or less is non-significant (Kura, Shamsudin & Chauhan, 2013; Tabachnick & Fidell, 
2007). In the context of this study, the mean substitution method was used to replace 




5.10.3 Non-Response Bias 
To ensure a lack of bias in the responses of the respondents, a non-response bias test 
was conducted. Tse et al. (1995) said that non-response bias could affect the validity 
of the survey results. In this regard, Benke and Street (1992) opined that the most 
widely used approach to prove non-response bias was by comparing early responses 
to late responses. If no significant differences exist between the two groups of 
responses, the assumption can be made that no problem of non-response bias exists. 
In order to account for the possibility of non- response bias, Armstrong and Overton 
(1977) suggested time-trend extrapolation for estimating non-response bias. This 
method compares the early and late respondents (i.e., non-respondents). They 
claimed that late respondents share almost the same features with non-respondents. 
In the context of this study, the extrapolation method was adopted in order to 
identify the lack of non-response bias in line with other tax compliance studies of 
Alabede et al. (2012), Jabbar (2009), and Manaf (2004). 
5.10.4 Common Method Variance Test 
Common Method Variance (CMV) is seen as the variance that is habitually aligns 
itself with the measurement procedure rather than with the actual constructs the 
measures represent. It has been generally agreed that common method variance is a 
major concern for self-reported survey research (Lindell & Whitney, 2001; Spector, 
2006). This issue, therefore, is viewed as a potential threat to behavioural research 





In the process of addressing the issue of CMV in this study, the recommendations of 
Podsakoff, Mackenzie, Lee, and Podsakoff (2003) and Viswanathan and Kayande 
(2012) were taken into consideration. To minimize the effect of CMV, some 
procedural and statistical controls that Podsakoff et al. (2003) recommended were 
employed. 
 
They included: reverse-worded questions, elimination of item ambiguity, allowing 
the respondents‘ anonymity and Harman‘s single-factor test. In the literature, 
Harman‘s single-factor test has been identified as one of the most widely used 
techniques by researchers to address the problem of common method variance and was 
therefore adopted in this study. In this procedure, Podsakoff and Organ (1986) pointed 
out that all variables of interest are normally subjected to an exploratory factor 
analysis. Then the results of the unrotated factor solution are examined to ascertain 
the number of factors that are necessary to account for the variance in the variables. 
5.10.5  Descriptive Analysis 
Sekaran and Bougie (2010) posited that descriptive statistics are normally employed 
to describe a given phenomenon of interest vis-à-vis its interpretation and 
presentation. In the context of this study, the information was analyzed statistically 
with regards to how frequently the phenomenon of interest actually occurs, in terms 
of averages or central tendencies and the magnitude or extent of their variability in 




check all the variables to ensure that the underlying assumptions of the technique 
used in the study were not violated (Coakes, 2013; Pallant, 2010).  
 
The descriptive statistics provide a statistical analysis of the profile information of 
the respondents and the characteristics of the SMEs. The demographic profile was 
also analysed in terms of their frequency of occurrence and percentages. 
 
Finally, the descriptive statistics of all the variables in the model with respect to 
minimum and maximum values, fair score, or standard of central tendency (mean) 
and the scope of variability (standard deviation) were calculated. Thus, this study 
used descriptive statistics analysis to adequately reveal the characteristics as well as 
the constituent elements of the study‘s sample. The descriptive statistics of this study 
are contained in the next chapter. 
5.10.6 Introduction to Structural Equation Modeling and Partial Least Squares             
           Methods 
a. Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) 
In modern-day research, Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) has been widely 
accepted among researchers as a result of its versatility in performing path modeling 
with unobserved variables (Chin & Newsted, 1999). Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson, 
and Tatham (2006) noted that this relatively new statistical tool originated in the first 
half of the twentieth century but only became widely used in the 1990s. In particular, 




flexibility in terms of interaction between theory and data (Chin & Newsted, 2003; 
1999). Additionally, the wide acceptability of SEM aligns with four attributes of 
SEM itself. They are:  
1. The ability to represent latent concepts and correct for measurement error in 
the estimation process;  
2. The estimation of multiple and interrelated dependence relationships; 
3. Aimed at explaining the covariance among the measured items; and  
4. A theory-based approach, where strong theory is needed to specify 
relationships in the models (i.e., confirmatory analysis) (Hair et al., 2006). 
 
Two components are embedded in SEM. These components are: 1) a measurement 
model connecting a set of observed indicators or manifest variables to a smaller set 
of latent or unobserved constructs, and 2) a structural model linking the hypothesized 
model's latent constructs (Hair et al., 2006). Latent constructs could be seen as 
unobserved variables that are to be measured indirectly by two or more observed 
indicators or manifest variables. In a measurement model for instance, the validity 
and reliability of these observed indicators in measuring the latent constructs are 
addressed. 
 
Having established the reliability of the measures in the measurement model, the 
relationship between the latent constructs then can be assessed by path analysis in 
testing the research hypotheses. Regardless of the positive attributes of SEM, the 




(CB-SEM) demonstrated by software such as LISREL, EQS, AMOS, SEPATH and 
RAMONA) that demand further attention (Chin, 1998a). The constraints are as 
follows:  
1. It is based on parametric assumptions wherein the observed variables are 
expected to be distributed normally and observations are independent of one 
another (Chin & Newsted, 1999).  
2. An adequate sample size is needed because an inadequate sample size may 
lead to spurious results (i.e., poor parameter estimates and model test 
statistics) (Chou & Bentler, 1995; Hu & Bentler, 1995), and a tendency to 
over-reject models, especially when the latent variables are dependent (Hu & 
Bentler, 1995). 
3. It is also associated with model complexity because a complex model with a 
number of indicators approaching 50 or even 100 may likely slow down the 
software packages (Chin & Newsted, 1999). 
4. In the application of CB-SEM, the measured items of a latent variable are 
expected to all be reflective. An attempt to use formative measures will pose 
a problem for CB-SEM. If the researcher attempts to include formative 
measures and treat them as reflective, the results of the estimate will be 
invalid (Chin, 1998), as a result, may result in a misleading research 
conclusion (Cohen, Cohen, Tereci, Marchi, & Velez, 1990). 
 
MacCallum and Browne (1993) clearly demonstrate that attempts to explicitly model 




efforts to modify them are generally unrewarding. Another problem with the CB-
SEM is factor indeterminacy in which the case values for the latent variables cannot 
be obtained in the process (Chin & Newsted, 1999). Considering this scenario, the 
scores for the latent variables cannot be estimated to predict the observed indicators. 
Thence, CB-SEM may be unsuitable for studies aiming at prediction.  
 
Finally, CB-SEM places an emphasis on a strong theoretical footing. In CB-SEM, 
the assumption is that the analyses are performed using a strong theory with well-
developed measures that have gone through a series of exploratory analyses (Chin & 
Newsted, 1999). This requirement suggests that it might not be an appropriate 
technique when the theory is relatively tentative. In this regard, consideration should 
be more aligned with the data than with the theory. 
 
b. Partial Least Squares Structural Equation Modeling (PLS - SEM)  
Bearing in mind some of the drawbacks of CB-SEM, a Component-Based SEM was 
developed. This approach first came into being in the 1960s and 1970s based on the 
work of Wold (1975) who proposed a solution to the multicollinearity problem by 
employing PLS regression (Rouse & Corbitt, 2008). Unlike covariance-based SEM, 
which emphasises model testing more, the introduction of PLS was aimed at 
prediction (Chin, 1998b; Chin et al., 2003; Chin & Newsted, 1999). 
 
The PLS algorithm aims at obtaining the best weight estimates for each block of 




with the problem of indeterminacy, and hence is capable of providing an accurate 
definition of component scores (Chin et al., 2003). The component score generated 
for each latent construct will then maximise the variance to explain the dependent 
variables. Also indicators can be in the form of either formative or reflective 
measures (Chin, 1998b). 
 
Currently, PLS has also been gaining interest and popularity, not only due to its 
ability to model latent constructs under abnormal or non-normal conditions (Chin et 
al., 2003), but also because of its limited requirements for measurement scales, 
wherein it can combine categorical, interval, and ratio level indicators in a single 
model (Chin & Newsted, 1999). Furthermore, attributes such as sample size do not 
pose a problem in PLS, because PLS has shown to successfully work with a sample 
of as little as 30 to a more complex model with 672 indicators, 21 latent variables 
and 200 cases (Chin et al., 2003).  
 
In a nutshell, Chin and Newsted (1999) summarized the key differences between the 
CB - SEM and PLS - SEM, as reproduced in Table 5.18. 
Table 5.18 
Comparison between Covariance-based SEM and PLS Criteria 
S / n Criteria Co-variance based SEM  PLS-SEM 












Table 5.18 (continued) 
S / n Criteria Co-variance based SEM  PLS-SEM 
3 Assumption Typically multivariate normal 





4 Parameter estimates Consistent Consistent as indicators and 
sample size increase 
 
5 Latent Variable scores 
 
Indeterminate Explicitly estimated 
 
6 Epistemic relationship Typically only with reflective 
indicators 
Can be modelled in either 
formative or reflective 
mode 
 
7 Implication Optimal for parameter accuracy Optimal for prediction 
accuracy 
 
8 Model complexity Small to moderate complexity 
(e.g., less than 100 indicators) 
 
Large complexity (e.g., 100 
constructs and 1,000 
indicators) 
 
9 Sample size Minimal recommendations 
ranging from 200 to 800 
Minimal recommendations 
ranging from 30 to 100 
cases 
5.10.7 Justification for using PLS - SEM  
The preceding section provided the yardstick for justifying the use of PLS in this 
study. PLS was considered more appropriate than CB-SEM for several reasons. 
First, PLS provides better prediction capability, which suits the objective of this 
study that is to predict the tax compliance behaviour of SME owners/managers. 
Second, the data distribution in this study fails to follow a multivariate normal 
distribution, which is a requirement under CB-SEM, but not for component-based 






Therefore, this method was selected for this study to help counter the normality 
problem in the course of data analysis for the current study. Third, all the constructs 
in this study are measured in the reflective mode, which can fit in the PLS model as 
well as in the CB-SEM. Fourth, the PLS technique was preferred over others for this 
study because structural equation models have been demonstrated to be superior 
models that perform estimations better than other forms of regressions (Preacher & 
Hayes, 2004).  
 
As such, the use of PLS seems more appropriate in this study because it combines 
both interval and categorical indicators in a single model. Finally, it has been 
reported that PLS-SEM accounts for measurement errors and can provide more 
accurate and robust estimates of moderating effects (Chin, 1998a). The PLS software 
used in this study was SmartPLS Version 2.0 M3 (Ringle et al., 2005). The next 
section describes model evaluation under PLS-SEM.  
5.10.8  PLS Model Evaluation  
Because PLS-SEM does not make any distributional assumptions other than 
predictor specification, traditional-based techniques methods (embedded with 
parametric assumptions) would not be appropriate for the evaluation of significance. 
Wold (1980) argues that the PLS approach should apply prediction-oriented 
measures that are also nonparametric. For that reason, several techniques were 
implemented to evaluate both the measurement model and the structural model. The 




the model, while the structural model assessment is important for the model‘s 
predictive capability. The details on the techniques employed are discussed in the 
following sections. 
 
a. Assessing the Measurement Model  
In assessing the measurement model, several statistical measures were adopted in 
order to ascertain its validity and reliability. For easy assimilation and understanding, 
the techniques are discussed in the following two subsections. 
 
i. Construct and Item reliability  
In ascertaining construct reliability, the reliability of reflective constructs that require 
high internal consistency among their indicators was adopted. In reflective 
constructs, the reliability of the measures is normally demonstrated by a high 
Cronbach‘s alpha or internal consistency scores (Petter, Straub, & Rai, 2007). 
However, this study adopts internal consistency scores, also known as composite 
reliability, generated by PLS bootstrapping analysis. Prior studies have suggested the 
use of ―composite reliability‖ as a replacement for Cronbach's alpha in PLS-SEM 
analysis (Bagozzi & Yi, 1988; Hair et al., 2012).  
 
Additionally, the composite reliability coefficient provides a much less biased 
estimate of reliability than Cronbach‘s alpha coefficient because the composite 
reliability coefficient assumes that all items contribute the same magnitude to its 




Higgins, & Thompson, 1995; Gotz, Liehr-Gobbers, & Krafft, 2010). Cronbach‘s 
alpha may lead to spurious estimates of the scale reliability. Composite reliability 
takes into account the differences in the loadings, which of course can be interpreted 
in the same way as Cronbach‘s alpha.  
 
Similarly, another measure of reliability for reflective constructs is the Average 
Variance Extracted (AVE) scales. The scales should exceed 0.5 (Fornell & Larcker, 
1981) indicating ―50% or more variance of the indicators should be accounted for‖ 
(Chin, 1998b, p. 321). The interpretation of internal consistency reliability using the 
composite reliability coefficient should be in accordance with the rule of thumb 
Bagozzi and Yi (1988) and Hair, Ringle, and Sarstedt (2011), who recommend that 
the composite reliability coefficient should be at least .70 or more. 
 
Furthermore, item or indicator reliability is critical because higher outer loadings of 
the manifest variable are perhaps an indication of communality of the indicators, 
which are always captured by the said construct. According to Creswell (2010) and 
Hair et al. (2010), item reliability shows the extent of the variability possessed by the 
item that are explained by the construct, and, at times, is known as the variance 
extracted from the item. Item reliability, which is the square of the standardized 
indicators outer loadings, was also adopted in this study. 
 




For reflective constructs to be valid, they are required to meet the convergent and 
discriminant validity conditions. The AVEs of each construct show the ratio of the 
sum of its measurement item variance as extracted by the construct relative to the 
measurement error attributed to its items (Chin, 1998b; Gefen & Straub, 2005). The 
constructs are said to be converged when the Average Variance Extracted (AVE) is 
.50 or above as the minimum threshold (Chin, 1998; Bagozzi & Yi, 1988; Fornell & 
Larcker, 1981), and this criterion was therefore adopted in this study.  
 
Discriminant validity has to do with whether measures that should not be related are 
actually not related. Duarte and Raposo (2010) see discriminant validity as the extent 
to which a particular latent variable is different from another. Similarly, discriminant 
validity occurs when each indicator correlates weakly with all other constructs 
except its associated construct (Gefen & Straub, 2005). Furthermore, Hair et al. 
(2010) and Sekaran and Bougie (2010) said that the magnitude to which a construct 
appears to be naturally distinct from others through empirical standards describes the 
discriminant validity of that construct. 
Primarily, two ways of describing discriminant validity exist in the literature. First is 
by examining the cross loadings of the manifest variable through ascertaining that 
the outer loadings on the associated construct are greater than all of its loadings on 
another construct (Chin, 1998; Hair et al., 2011). If any of the cross loadings exceed 
the indicators‘ outer loadings, a problem of discriminant validity may be the cause. 
Second, the discriminant validity of the construct can be ascertained by using the 




correlation among the latent variables is compared with the square root of the 
average variance extracted as Fornell and Larcker (1981) suggest. 
 
In this study, discriminant validity was ascertained based on the suggestions of Chin 
(1998) and Fornell and Larcker (1981) by comparing the indicator loadings with 
other reflective indicators in the cross loading table, as well as using the square root 
of the AVE of the construct. As a rule of thumb for ascertaining and evaluating 
discriminant validity, a score of .50 or more has been suggested for the values of 
AVE of a construct (Fornell & Larcker, 1981). The second criterion is that the 
square root of the AVE should be greater than the correlations among the latent 
construct (Fornell & Larcker, 1981). 
 
b. Assessing the Structural Model 
Prediction-oriented indicators, such as the coefficient of determination R squared 
(R2) value, path coefficients, effect size (f2), predictive relevance (Q2), moderating 
effect test, and strength of the moderating effects techniques, are used in this study to 
evaluate the structural model. All these tests, which are nonparametric in nature, are 
used to be consistent with the distribution-free approach of component-based SEM. 
 
i. Coefficient of Determination (R2) Value 
One critical reason for adopting PLS-SEM as a statistical technique lies in its 
predictive powers. Hair et al. (2011), Hair et al. (2012), and Henseler, Ringle, and 




an important criterion for assessing the structural model in PLS-SEM. The R-
Squared value represents the magnitude of explained variance of the endogenous 
construct that can be explained by one or more predictor variable (Elliott & 
Woodward, 2007; Hair et al., 2010; Hair et al., 2006). Hair et al. (2010) claimed that 
an acceptable value of R - Squared depended on the context of the research. Falk and 
Miller (1992) proposed a minimum value of .10 as an acceptable level for research. 
R - Squared values of .25, .50, and .75 in PLS-SEM can be considered as being 
weak, moderate and substantial respectively Falk and Miller (1992), and this 
standard was adopted in this study as a basis. 
 
ii. The Path Coefficient  
In the structural model, two important issues were considered in this current study in 
line with Hair, Hult, Ringle, and Sarstedt‘s (2013) suggestion. The issues are: 1) the 
significance of the construct relationship; and 2) the relevance of the coefficient in 
the structural model. With regard to the above considerations, the routine assessment 
of the t - values or bootstrapping confident interval was adopted. Specifically, the t - 
values were used in either supporting or disproving the study‘s hypotheses. 
 
iii. The Effect Size (f2) 
According to Chin (1998), effect size reveals the actual relative effect of a particular 
predictive latent construct on criterion latent construct(s) as a result of changes in R -
Squared. Specifically, the effect size f2 captures the individual contribution of 




PGQ, tax complexity, tax knowledge, tax rates, and WFFC) to the R – squared value 
of a given targeted construct of tax compliance behaviour in the structural model. 
 
Effect size can be calculated as the increase in R – Squared of the latent construct to 
which the path is connected relative to the latent construct's proportion of 
unexplained variance (Chin, 1998). Wilson, Callaghan, Ringle, and Henseler, (2007) 
outlined the following formulae for the easiest calculation of effect size, which is 
expressed below: 
                               5.4 
 
 
Furthermore, Cohen (1988) provided guidelines for assessing the f2 values, with .02, 
.15, and .35 respectively representing small, medium, and large effects of the 
endogenous constructs. This standard was adopted in this study. 
 
 
iv. The Predictive Relevance (Q2) 
In addition to the assessment of R2 values as one criterion of predictive relevance. 
Geisser (1974) and Stone (1974) recommended the use of Stone-Geisser's Q2 value, 
which portrays a model‘s predictive importance. This study also applied Stone-
Geisser test of predictive relevance of the research model using blindfolding 
procedures (Geisser, 1974; Stone, 1974). Duarte and Raposo (2010) pointed out that 
the Stone-Geisser test of predictive relevance is normally employed as a 





In this study, the researcher applied blindfolding in ascertaining the predictive 
relevance of the research model because the ―blindfolding procedure is only applied 
to endogenous latent construct that possess a reflective measurement model 
operationalization‖ (Sattler, Völckner, Riediger, & Ringle, 2010). McMillan and 
Conner (2003) were of the view that a reflective measurement model ―specifies that 
a latent or unobservable concept causes variation in a set of observable indicators‖ 
(p. 1). Because the criterion latent variable was reflective in nature, a blindfolding 
procedure was applied mainly to the criterion latent variable (tax compliance 
behaviour). 
 
Specifically, a cross-validated redundancy measure (Q²) was applied in the process 
of examining the predictive relevance of the research model (Chin, 2010; Geisser, 
1974; Hair, Ringle and Sarstedt (2013). Chin (1998) and Hair, Hult, Ringle, and 
Sarstedt (2014) indicated that Q² is a criterion to assess or measure how well a model 
predicts the data of omitted cases. Thus, following Henseler et al.‘s (2009) 
suggestion, a research model with Q2 statistic(s) greater than zero was regarded as 
having predictive importance in this study. 
 
v. Moderating or Indirect Effect Test 
In testing the moderating effect of PSO and perceived corruption, this study applied 
a product indicator approach using PLS-SEM in detecting and estimating the 




economic factors (tax rates, the probability of detection, tax complexity), 
psychological factors (incentives (positive inducement), tax knowledge, and public 
governance quality) and tax compliance behaviour (Henseler & Chin, 2010a; 
Henseler & Fassott, 2010b). The product term approach is considered to be 
appropriate because the two moderating variables are continuous in nature (Rigdon, 
Schumacker, & Wothke, 1998). Henseler and Fassott (2010) recommended the use 
of the product term approach because its results are usually equal or superior to those 
of the group comparison approach. 
 
In applying the product indicator approach for testing the individual moderating 
effects, the product terms between the indicators of the latent exogenous variable and 
the indicators of the latent moderator variables actually need to be created. These 
product terms are used as indicators of the interaction term in the structural model 
(Kenny & Judd, 1984). Additionally, in ascertaining the strength of the moderating 
effects, Cohen‘s (1988) guidelines for determining the effect size were applied 
accordingly.  
 
vi. Strength of the Moderating Effects 
In order to actually determine the strength of the moderating effects of PSO and 
perceived corruption on the relationships between economic factors, psychological 
factors and tax compliance behaviour, Cohen‘s (1988) effect sizes were calculated. 
Therefore, the strength of the moderating effects was assessed by comparing the R -




that incorporates both the independent latent variables and the moderating variable 
(Henseler & Fassott, 2010; Wilden, Gudergan, Nielsen, & Lings, 2013). Thus, the 
strength of the moderating effects was expressed using (Cohen, 1988; Henseler & 
Fassott, 2010b) formula: 
 
                     (5.5)     
 
 
Moderating effect size (f2) values of .02 can be considered as small, effect sizes of 
.15 as medium while the effect sizes above .35 may be regarded as large (Cohen, 
1988; Henseler & Fassott, 2010). Chin et al. (2003) said that a low effect size does 
not necessarily mean that the underlying moderating effect is insignificant. Even a 
small interaction effect can be meaningful under extreme moderating conditions, as 
far as the resulting beta changes are meaningful, "then it is important to take these 
conditions into account‖ (Chin et al., 2003, p. 211). 
5.11 Summary 
This chapter specifically dealt with the approaches and methodology for achieving 
the desired research objectives. The chapter discussed the research design and the 
diverse approaches to reach the research aims, including the research paradigm. 
Furthermore, the population, the sample size, sample size determination, sampling 
frame, and the sampling technique were discussed. Similarly, the section presented 
the estimated response rate, and the operational definitions of the constructs. Data 
collection methods and procedures, the survey questionnaire, and instrument validity 













In this current chapter, the empirical results of data analyses were presented using 
PLS path modeling. The chapter begins with the initial data screening and 
preliminary analysis, the descriptive statistics for the study constructs as well as the 
multivariate assumptions of the data was also reported. Next, the chapter justifies 
why PLS is adopted in this study, as well as the assessment of PLS which is split 
into two parts in line with the main results of the present study. The first part 
presents the results of the measurement model comprising four sections, which 
assessed the individual item reliability, internal consistency reliability, convergent 
validity and discriminant validity of the constructs. The second part presents the 
results of the structural model comprising the significance of the path coefficients, 
level of the R-squared values, effect size, and predictive relevance of the model. The 
final section reports the PLS-SEM analysis, which examines the moderating effects 
of PSO and perceived corruption on the relationship between the exogenous latent 
variables and the endogenous latent construct in the structural model.  
 
6.2 Response Rate 
Of the 450 questionnaires that were distributed to the respondents, a total of 287 
respondents sourced from SME owners/managers in Kaduna and Kano States, 




Table 6.1, a total of 281 questionnaires were finally retained for analysis. After data 
collection and the sorting of the returned questionnaires, a total of six responses were 
excluded from the analysis due to incompleteness.  
Table 6.1  
Response Rate of the Questionnaire 
Response Rate of the Questionnaire Frequency / Rate 
Number of distributed questionnaires 450 
Returned questionnaires 287 
Returned and usable questionnaires 281 
Returned and excluded questionnaires 6 
Questionnaires not returned 163 
Response rate 64% 
Valid response rate 62% 
 
 
6.3 Data Screening and Preliminary Analysis 
Embarking on an initial data screening before applying any appropriate data analysis 
technique is important. This screening is necessary to avoid any possible violations 
of key assumptions regarding the application of multivariate techniques of data 
analysis by the researcher (Hair et al., 2007). This process is aimed at ensuring the 
chosen sample size has a direct impact on the choice of data analysis techniques and 
test that are selected (Byrne, 2010). 
 
Therefore, prior to the initial data screening all the returned and usable 
questionnaires (281) were appropriately coded and entered into the SPSS version 18. 
Negatively worded items in the questionnaires were reversed accordingly. The 
negatively worded items that were reverse coded included TCB10, TCB12, TR2, 




consider any distributional assumptions as PLS-SEM is regarded as a non-parametric 
method of statistical analysis technique, therefore both univariate and multivariate 
outliers as well as the abnormality of the data do not pose problems in PLS-SEM 
(Hair et al., 2013). 
6.3.1 Missing Data 
This study had total of 27,257 (i.e., 281 cases multiplied by 97 items) data points, 
and 69 randomly missed values. Of the missing values, tax compliance behaviour 
and work family financial commitment had 15 and 19 missing values respectively. 
Fuel subsidy removal, tax rates, and probability of detection had 6, 7, and 9 missing 
values each. Tax knowledge had 5 missing values; public governance quality had 8 
missing values; and no missing values were found in tax complexity, incentives 
(positive inducement), perceived service orientation and perceived corruption.  
 
The 69 randomly missed values represented .25% of the total values of the study. 
Because the percentage of missing items was less than 5%, the mean substitution 
method was used to replace the missing items as recommended in Little and Rubin 
(1987), Raymond (1986), and Tabachnick and Fidell (2007). This method was 
utilized because it was simple to accomplish and time efficient. It is not only the 
easiest option but it can lower variability with the resultant issue of bias results. 







Total and Percentage of Missing Values 
Latent construct Number of missing values 
Tax compliance behaviour 15 
Work family financial commitment 19 
Fuel subsidy removal 6 
Tax rates 7 
Probability of detection 9 
Tax complexity 0 
Incentives (positive inducement) 0 
Tax knowledge 5 
Public governance quality 8 
Perceived service orientation 0 
Perceived corruption 0 
Total 69 of 27,257 data points missing 
Percentage 0.25% 
Note: The percentage of missing values was obtained by dividing the total number of 
randomly missing values for the entire data set by total number of data points multiplied by 
100. 
 
6.3.2 Analysis of Non-Response Bias 
In analysing the non-response bias of the respondents, the extrapolation method was 
adopted in this study in order to identify the presence of non-response bias, a method 
that was also employed in other similar tax compliance studies (e.g., Alabede et al., 
2012; Jabbar, 2009; Manaf, 2004). In applying the extrapolation method, the 
independent T statistic was used in comparing the early respondents and the late 
respondents as Pallant (2007) suggested. Pallant (2007) asserted that, if the result 
under Levene‘s test for equality of variance showed a significant value greater than 
.01. The data failed to violate the assumption of equal variance. Thus, a non-





In this study, a period was fixed for the return of the questionnaires by the 
respondents. The respondents who returned the completed questionnaire after the 
expiration of the time frame were considered to be late respondents, which is 
representative of non-respondents (Armstrong & Overton, 1977; Sax, Gimartin, & 
Bryant, 2003). In the process of data collection, the researcher retrieved the 
questionnaires, which were numbered and dated sequentially in order to avoid any 
confusion.  
 
At the end of 29 May 2015, a total of 268 (95%) usable questionnaire forms were 
retrieved, and, between 1 June 2015 and 30 June 2015, an additional 13 (5%) usable 
questionnaire forms were also returned. Then, the responses of those who responded 
to the questionnaires distributed early before 29 May 2015 (before the break of the 
swearing in of the new government) and those who responded to the questionnaires 
distributed after May 2015 (after the break) were compared. Those who responded to 
questionnaires after May 2015 were, in effect, regarded as non‐respondents relative 
to the first collected questionnaires and were hence assumed to be the representative 
of the non-respondents group. Therefore, the first group represented the early 
respondents while the second group was referred to as the late respondents. The two 
groups were compared using the independent T statistic and the results are shown in 






Results of Independent-Samples T-test for Non-Response Bias 





          F Sig. 
Tax compliance behaviour Early response 268 2.47 .55 .20 .65 
 
 Late response 13 2.63 .55   
 














 Late response 13 2.62 .27   
 






























 Late response 13 2.44 .43   
 




























































 Late response 13 1.86 .40   
 


















Table 6.3 (continued) 





     F Sig. 
Perceived service 
orientation 
Early response 268 3.28 .78 5.68 .02 
















  Late response 13 3.17 .55     
 
 
Table 6.3 shows that the differences between the mean score and standard deviation 
of early responses and late responses were almost the same. For instance, the mean 
score for tax compliance for early responses was 2.47 while that of late responses 
was 2.63 indicating a variation of .16 between the two groups. This implies that the 
differences between the two were marginal and negligible. The result of the 
independent-samples t-tests as shown in Table 6.3 also revealed that the equal 
variance significance values for each of the eleven constructs were greater than the 
.01 significance level of Levene's test for equality of variances as Field (2009) and 
Pallant (2010) suggested. 
 
Probability of detection had the greatest significant value of .87 while perceived 
service orientation had the lowest significant value of .02. Because significant values 
of all the constructs were larger than .01 (p > .01), this result suggests that the 
differences between early responses and late responses were insignificant. Using 




a reasonable level of 64% response rate, it can be deduced that the issue of non-
response bias does not appear to be an issue of concern. Therefore, the assumption of 
equal variance between the two groups was not violated; hence, it can be fairly 
assumed that non-response bias did not exist in the data for the study. 
6.3.3 Common Method Variance Test 
Following the recommendation of Podsakoff and Organ (1986) for the common 
method variance, all items in this study were subjected to a principal components 
factor analysis as shown in Appendix G. The results of the analysis explained a 
cumulative of 78.4% of the variance, with the first (largest) factor explaining 11.7% 
of the total variance, which was less than 50% (Kumar, 2012). Furthermore, the 
results also showed that no single factor accounted for the majority of covariance in 
the predictor and criterion variables (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, & Podsakoff, 2012). 
Thus, common method bias was not an issue of concern in the data of the present study. 
 
6.4 Demographic Characteristics of the Respondents 
This section is concerned with the description of the sample of the present study. 
Therefore, the data reflected all the 281 SME owners/managers who participated in 
the survey. Table 6.4 presents the background information of the respondents who 
participated in the current survey. The respondents comprised SMEs operators in 
Kaduna and Kano States, Nigeria. The demographic characteristics examined in this 
study include gender, age group, educational qualification, years of experience and 





Demographic Information of the Respondents 
Category Frequency  
(N = 281) 
Percentage (Total = 100) 
Gender 
  Male 154 54.8 
Female 127 45.2 
   
Age group 
  Less than 30 years 58 20.6 
31 - 40 years 125 44.5 
41 - 50 years 79 28.1 
Above 50 years 19 6.8 
   
Qualification   
Doctoral degree 7 2.5 
Master degree 84 30.0 
Bachelor degree or equivalent 106 37.7 
Diploma or A - level or equivalent 51 18.1 
GCE or O - level or equivalent 33 11.7 
   
Experience 
  1 - 5 years 87 31.0 
6 - 10 years 141 50.1 
Above 10 years 53 18.9 
   
Existence of SMEs 
  1 -  5 years 11 3.9 
6 - 10 years 27 9.6 
11 - 15 years 80 28.5 
16 - 20 years 113 40.2 
Above 20 years 50 17.8 
    
Table 6.4 shows that, about 55% of the respondents were male leaving 45% as 
female. This is actually a fair representation of both genders taking into account that 




male and female respectively, with a substantial number of males in employment and 
business (National Population Commission, 2006).  
 
In terms of age grouping, about 20.6% of the respondents were less than 30 years of 
age and 44.5% were between 31 to 40 years of age. Those respondents who were 
between 41 to 50 years of age represented 28.1% of the total respondents while the 
remaining 6.8% of the respondents were more than 50 years of age. The age 
distribution of the respondents fairly reflected the age distribution of the studied 
areas, as more people in the population are between 31 and 40 years of age are 
actively involved in economic activities (National Population Commission, 2006). 
This shows that the sample of this study largely comprised the young men and 
women of the total workforce. 
 
Regarding to the educational qualification of the participants, the vast majority of the 
respondents 88.3% had a higher educational qualification including doctorate degree 
2.5%, master‘s degree 30%, bachelor‘s degree or its equivalent 37.7%, and diploma 
or the A level equivalent 18.1%. This was also followed by 11.7% of the respondents 
who had GCE or an O level equivalent. The low proportion of doctorate degree 
holders in the sample reflects the assertion made by the Nigerian President that 60% 
of the Nigerian population do not have a doctorate degree (Odiegwu, 2012). 
  
Additionally, in terms of experience, Table 6.4 also shows that a high proportion of 




50.1% or 141 participants. This is followed by 31% of the participants who had 1 - 5 
years of work experience, while the remaining 53 respondents, representing 18.9% 
had more than 10 years of work experience. This reveals that a substantial sample of 
the population have had quite long working experiences.  
 
Finally, the descriptive statistics show that 40.2% of SMEs have been in existence 
for 16 - 20 years, followed by 11 - 15 years at 28.5%, 17.8% of the businesses have 
been in existence for more than 20 years, while 3.9% of the SMEs have been in 
existence for less than 5 years. 
 
6.5 Descriptive Statistics 
This section specifically dealt with the descriptive statistics for the latent constructs 
used in this study. In respect of the descriptive statistics, the mean and standard 
deviation for the latent constructs were explored and computed accordingly. The 





Descriptive Statistics for Latent Variables 
Latent variable Number 
of Items 
Mean (M) Standard 
Deviation (STD) 
Tax compliance behaviour 15 2.475 .547 
Work family financial commitment 18 2.717 .411 
Fuel subsidy removal 13 2.861 .537 
Tax rates 6 2.517 .565 
Probability of detection 8 2.367 .279 
Tax complexity 7 2.786 .368 
Incentives (positive inducement) 2 2.553 .540 
Tax knowledge 6 1.827 .496 
Public governance quality 13 3.784 .462 
Perceived service orientation 5 3.281 .768 
Perceived corruption 4 2.951 .671 
 
 
Table 6.5 shows that the overall mean for the latent constructs ranged between 1.827 
and 3.784. Specifically, the mean score of tax compliance behaviour tended to have 
a low score (M = 2.475; STD = .547). Perhaps this is not surprising, because the 
descriptive statistics suggest that compliance among the individual taxpayers in 
Nigeria is low.  
 
The opinions of the respondents concerning work family financial commitment were 
expressed with 18 items (M = 2.717, STD = .411) as documented in Table 6.5. The 
descriptive analysis of this construct also indicates a moderate perception on the part 






The mean and standard deviation for fuel subsidy removal were 2.861 and .537 
respectively. This is an indication that the perception of the participants in 
relationship to fuel subsidy removal was moderate. 
 
Opinions about the tax rates as shown in Table 6.5 also indicate moderate scores in 
terms of mean and standard deviation at 2.517 and .565 respectively. This variable 
has been seen to be significantly active right from the Allingham and Sandmo model 
(1972), and as such made a significant contribution to the variation in the 
endogenous variable in this current study. 
 
Probability of detection is another exogenous variable with a very low mean score of 
2.367 and the standard deviation of .278. This indicates that the respondents tended 
to possess low levels of perception in relationship to the likelihood being detected 
for any act by the relevant tax authorities.  
 
In addition, Table 6.5 also shows the mean and standard deviation of tax complexity. 
The descriptive analysis of this construct shows a mean score of 2.786 and a 
standard deviation of .368. This is an indication that the respondents considered the 
tax system to be moderately complex. Similarly, the results show a moderate score 
for incentives (positive inducement) (M = 2.553; STD = .540). 
 
Moreover, Table 6.5 revealed that tax knowledge had the lowest scores (M = 1.827; 




had very weak knowledge of tax rules concerning taxable income and expenses 
deductible for tax purposes. Additionally, public governance quality was one of the 
constructs that showed a high mean among other constructs (M = 3.784; STD = 
.462). This could be as a result of the values attached to infrastructural facilities by 
the taxpayers, even though the level of infrastructural facilities is inadequate. 
 
Furthermore, the descriptive statistics also reveal a moderate score in terms of mean 
and standards deviation for perceived service orientation (M = 3.281; STD = .768). 
Finally, the descriptive statistics in relationship to perceived corruption also revealed 
a moderate perception (M = 2.951; STD = .671). This was possibly due to the desire 
of the newly elected government to combat corruption in the country. 
 
6.6 Multivariate Assumption Tests 
To attain the fundamental assumptions of multiple regression, the constructs were 
checked for outliers, normality, linearity and multicollinearity following Hair et al. 
(2010). 
6.6.1 Treatment of Outliers 
According to Barnett and Lewis (1994), outliers are observations or subsets of 
observations that are not in agreement with the main data. Cases that have 
significantly dissimilar values than the rest of the cases are considered outliers (Hair, 
Anderson, Tatham & Black, 1995).  In a regression base analysis, outliers are 




value in the cases affects the statistics, these cases may have greater effect on the 
regression coefficient (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007) than any other cases.  
 
Furthermore, there are different ways of detecting outlier some are graphical such as 
normal probability plot, univariate which is based on the items and multivariate 
which is based on the variables (Aggarwal & Yu, 2001). Thus, to identify if there are 
presence of outliers, firstly, the data of this study were examined for univariate 
outliers using standardized values with a cut-off of ±3.29 (p < .001) as suggested by 
Tabachnick and Fidell (2007). Following Tabachnick and Fidell (2007), standard for 
identifying univariate outliers, all the cases were below ±3.29 threshold as such, the 
data are free from univariate outliers. Apart from checking the univariate outliers, 
multivariate outliers were also detected through the use of Mahalanobis distance 
(D2) (Pallant, 2007).  According to Tabachnick and Fidell (2007), Mahalanobis 
distance (D2) is ―the distance of a case from the centroid of the remaining cases 
where the centroid is the point created at the intersection of the mean of the entire 
variable‖ (p. 74). Based on 97 observed cases in this study, the suggested threshold 
of chi-square is 145.789 (p = 0.001). Following this criterion, no multivariate 
outliers were detected, because their values were below 145.789. 
6.6.2 Test of Normality 
Previous research (e.g., Cassel, Hackl, & Westlund, 1999; Reinartz, Haenlein, & 
Henseler, 2009; Wetzels, Odekerken-Schroder, & Van Oppen, 2009) has 




situations with extremely non-normal data. However, normality test help to check if 
the data score is normally distributed. Normality test forms part of the data screening 
before the actual analyses (Pallant, 2007). Normality can be identified either with a 
graphical method and/or numerical method (Razali & Wah, 2011). In view of the 
above, this study uses both the two methods in testing the normality of the data sets 
in order to know the actual level the data deviate from normal distribution (Hair et 
al., 1992).  The methods used are reported below.  
6.6.3 Graphical Methods 
One of the methods to evaluate the normality is through histogram residual plots. It 
refers to the shape of data distribution for each constructs and its connection to 
normal distribution.  To achieve this, the distribution of the plot is required to be 
normally distributed. According to Field (2009), in a large sample of 200 and above, 
it is important to examine the shape of the distribution graphically than looking at 
the value of the skewness and kurtosis statistics. Following this, this study uses a 
graphical technique to check for the normality of the data collected (Tabachnick & 
Fidell, 2007). Figure 6.1 is one of the examples of the normal histogram pictorially 
showing that the normality was not attained because all the bars on the histogram 
were not closed to a normal curve. Thus, the data distribution for all the constructs is 





Figure 6. Histogram and Normal Probability Plots for WFFC. 
6.6.4 Numerical Method: Skewness and Kurtosis Test 
In order to further check the normality of the data set, this study also conducted 
another set of normality test using statistical method called skewness and kurtosis 
test. Skewness and Kurtosis tests are regarded as descriptive statistics (Razali & 
Wah, 2011).  Skewness is a measure of the asymmetry of the probability distribution 
of a real-valued random variable about its mean. Kurtosis is any measure of the 
"peakedness in which both are compared to normal distribution (Hair et al., 1995).  
The skewness and kurtosis value can be positive or negative, or even undefined 
(Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). Positive skewness is whereby the right tail is 
excessively longer with numerous cases piling up to the left.  Negative skewness is 
contrary to positive skewness (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). According to Pallant 




negative Kurtosis is when the data distribution is flat. Regardless, data distribution is 
completely normal if the values of skewness and kurtosis is zero (Razali & Wah, 
2011). As a simple rule of thumb if the statistics score is divided by its standard error 
and the result is greater than ±1.96, it suggests that the data are not normal with 
respect to that statistic (Rose, 2015). Applying the rule of thumb of dividing each 
value by its standard error (Std. Error) as shown in Table 6.6, most of the statistical 
values in respect to skewness and kurtosis were well above ±1.96 limits, suggesting 
that the departure from normality is too extreme. This was confirmed by visual 
inspection of the histogram of the same data in Figure 6.1.  
Table 6.6 
Numerical Method: Skewness and Kurtosis Tests 





TCB -.54 .14 -.21 .29 3.75 -.73 
WFFC -.32 .14 .22 .29 2.21 .755 
FSR -.58 .14 .84 .29 -4.02 2.88 
TR .28 .14 -.07 .29 1.95 -.23 
PD .10 .14 .06 .29 .69 .23 
TC -.11 .14 .145 .29 -.77 .50 
IPI -.06 .14 -.09 .29 -.41 -.32 
TK .32 .14 -.57 .29 2.23 -1.99 
PGQ -.36 .14 .64 .29 -2.46 2.20 
PSO -.47 .14 -.58 .29 -3.26 -1.98 
PC .88 .14 .69 .29 6.10 2.38 
 
Descriptively, the skewness and kurtosis of the variables were mix, some negative 
while some positive and some were above the ±1.96, as recommended by 
Tabachnick and Fidell (2010). In other word, the variables do not have a flat data 





6.6.5 Testing of Linearity 
Linearity assumption examines the link between the residuals and the predicted 
values (Pallant, 2007). According to Pallant (2007), when there is no clear 
relationship between the residuals and the predicted values, linearity assumption has 
been met. The residual scatter plot was used in checking for the normality of this 
study. The assumption is that majority of the scores should be in the centre at zero 
point (Flury & Riedwyl, 1998).  The scatter plot in Figure 6.2 confirmed that the 
residual scores are not within the centre along the zero point, indicating that the 
linearity assumption was not met. Besides, the residual should have a straight line 
connection with the predicted dependent constructs scores in which   Figure 6.2 does 
not vividly showed. 





Figure 6.2. Residual Plots between Independent Factors and Dependent Variable 
(TCB) 
6.6.6 Multicollinearity Test 
Multicollinearity is another data checking process needed before further analysis can 
be conducted. Multicollinearity is a situation whereby more exogenous latent 
constructs turn out to be highly correlated. This relationship causes great harm by 
making the coefficients statistically non-significant (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2007). It 
increases the variance of regression coefficients in addition, put the validity of 
regression equation under threat. 
 
To detect multicollinearity, two methods were used in this study (Chatterjee & 
Yilmaz, 1992; Peng & Lai, 2012). First, variance inflation factor (VIF) was 
examined to detect if there is any multicollinearity problem in the data set. 
According to Lahore and Kedia (2009), variance inflationary factor (VIF) is use to 




for determining the presence of multicollinearity. According to Lahiri and Kedia 
(2009), if the values of VIF exceed 10 it indicates there is multicollinearity. 
Similarly, Hair et al., (2011) suggested that there is multicollinearity if the value of 
VIF is greater than 5 and the tolerance value is less than 0.20. As indicated in Table 
6.7, the VIF between the independent variables were below the suggested threshold 
values of five (5) and ten (10) (Hair et al.  2011; Lahiri & Kedia, 2009) and the 
tolerance values are higher than 0.20 (Hair et al., 2011). Hence the data sets are free 
from multicollinearity as shown in Table 6.7.  
Table 6.7 
Tolerance and Variance Inflation Factors (VIF) 
Construct Tolerance VIF 
WFFC 0.953 1.049 
FSR 0.956 1.047 
TR 0.971 1.030 
PD 0.933 1.072 
TC 0.984 1.016 
IPI 0.932 1.073 
TK 0.776 1.289 
PGQ 0.957 1.045 
PSO 0.777 1.287 
PC 0.983 1.017 
 
Furthermore, bivariate correlation of all the exogenous latent constructs is another 
approach employed to confirm multicollinearity problem in this research. The value 
of Pearson‘s correlation shows the relationships between the exogenous variables 
used for identifying multicollinearity (Allison, 1999; Meyer et al., 2006). According 
to Cooper and Schindler (2003), no precise standard for the level of correlation that 
make up a serious multicollinearity problem but, a correlation of 0.8 above is 
problematic. The general rule of thumb is that it should not exceed .75.  As a result, 




Pearson‘s correlation (see Table 6.8).  The results in the correlation table show that 
no multicollinearity exists between the exogenous variables because the Pearson‘s 
correlation indicators for all the exogenous constructs are less than 0.7. It indicates 
that the exogenous latent constructs are independent.  Therefore, multicollinearity is 
not a threat to this study as showed in Table 6.7 and 6.8. 
Table 6.8  
Correlation Matrix of the Exogenous Latent Constructs 
Construct 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
1.WFFC 1          
2. FSR .005 1         
3. TR .039 .089 1        
4. PD .041 .142* .120* 1       
5. TC -.114 .030 .002 -.007 1      
6. IPI -.136* -.088 .015 .116 -.009 1     
7. TK .013 .045 .006 -.066 .017 -.089 1    
8. PGQ -.030 -.029 .063 -.010 -.029 .015 .107 1   
9. PSO -.089 -.051 -.021 .035 -.002 .009 -.454** -.067 1  
10 PC .025 -.053 .040 .000 .010 -.040 -.025 -.027 .092 1 
 
 
6.7 Further Justification for Using Partial Least Square (PLS) Approach  
Application of structural equation modeling (SEM) in this study has been explained 
previously in sections 5.10.7 and 5.10.8. Because some of the assumptions of 
normality have not been met in the data sets, Rose (2015) recommended that 
subsequent significance testing should be done using methods that do not require 
normality (e.g. nonparametric tests) such as PLS SEM. Therefore, this study resorted 
to using SEM for testing hypothesis which evolved from the proposed theoretical 
framework. The two mostly used approaches to SEM have been: covariance based 
(AMOS, LISREL) and variance based (Partial Least Squares), wherein one approach 




upon the study objectives and nature of data, they offer a researcher alternative and 
relevant options to choose from. However, the prime difference between the two is 
that CBSEM has been mainly considered as confirmatory (towards testing a strong 
theory) in nature whereas PLS- VBSEM has been considered as prediction oriented 
(facilitating theory development) which this study was aimed at. 
 
Though CBSEM has been a traditionally popular approach, nowadays researchers 
tend to appreciate and give emphasis on VBSEM (PLS) because of its advantages 
pertaining to absence of factor indeterminacy or convergence issues (Henseler, 
2010); comparatively simpler distributional assumptions (Reinartz, Haenlein, & 
Henseler, 2009); when the focus is on theory development or prediction; ability to 
estimate models which have got more variables than the observations (Dijkstra & 
Henseler, 2012); and ability to run both interval and categorical constructs 
simultaneously (Haenlein & Kaplan, 2004). There have been several studies 
describing the development and importance of PLS-VBSEM‘s methodological 
aspects, for example: Chin (1998), Ringle, Sarstedt, and Straub (2012), Tenenhaus, 
Vinzi, Chatelin, and Lauro (2005), and Wold (1982). 
 
As this study contained of a complex model consisting of several independent, 
moderating and dependent constructs as such resorted to using Smart PLS 2.0 (Beta) 
software developed by Ringle et al. (2005) for the SEM to statistically explain the 
relationships among these constructs. Highly complex models with several latent and 




estimating hierarchical models, or moderating effects (Chin, Marcolin, & Newsted, 
2003). The complexity inside a model can be calculated after considering a causality 
relationship among the model‘s latent concepts, termed as latent variables, each 
estimated by the means of various observed indicators which are called manifest 
variables (Vinzi, Trinchera, & Amato, 2010). As Wold (1985) pointed out PLS is 
quite useful among larger models amidst abnormal data wherein the prominence 
shifts from individual variables and parameters to sets of variables and aggregate 
parameters. 
 
Moreover, the focus of this study was on making prediction which also gave rise to 
the need of using PLS. Also, PLS is said to be free of any assumption in terms of 
sample size, normality, multicollinearity and linearity issues, etc. Alternatively 
speaking, as a major advantage, PLS relies on making minimal distributional 
assumptions, and as such, tests for normality, for instance skewness, kurtosis, 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test, etc. are not needed to be done while using Smart PLS 
(Hossain, 2013). Furthermore, Hair et al. (2013) and Iglewicz and Hoaglin (1993) 
also recommended that outliers and other normality issues do not have the tendency 
of distorting the statistical results of analysis in PLS, because PLS has the ability to 
produce good results amidst the presence of abnormal data. 
 
And in line with it, one of the reasons to select PLS SEM was to estimate the model 
of this study without letting it imposed by any kind of limiting constraints which 




analysis in this study was done using Smart PLS software meant to perform PLS 
path modeling. It is also in line with Ringle et al. (2012) who pointed out that PLS-
SEM can facilitate in enhancing the already existing good reporting practices in the 
area of social sciences. Moreover, SEM is said to be a unification of two dominant 
approaches— factor analysis and path analysis, which seeks to enable the 
researchers in examining concurrently the two important facets of a model which 
are: 1) measurement model (conventionally estimated through factor analysis), and 
2) structural model (conventionally estimated through path analysis) (Lee, Peter, 
Fayard, & Robinson, 2011). 
 
In this study, the data analysis was carried out through PLS path modeling 
performed for the two parts: firstly, for the measurement model which is called outer 
model in PLS; and secondly for the structural model which is termed as inner model 
in PLS. The relationship between latent or unobserved variables was explained in the 
inner model, whereas the link between a latent variable and its manifest variables 
was described in the outer model. Furthermore, the PLS algorithm sought to produce 
loadings between the reflective constructs and their respective indicators as this 
study consisted of all reflective constructs only. In overall terms, similar to 
regression, PLS always attempted to stress on maximizing the variance of the 
dependent variables of the study explained through the independent variables (Chin, 






6.8 Assessing the PLS-SEM Results 
Partial least square structural equation modeling (PLS-SEM) was employed for the 
purpose of estimating the model of the current study. To achieve the targeted result, 
the SmartPLS 2.0 3M - next generation path modeling software application that 
Ringle et al. (2005) developed was employed. Therefore, this study adopted a two-
step process in evaluating the report of the PLS-SEM path results as Henseler et al. 
(2009) suggested. PLS models do not follow any distributional normality 
assumptions of the observations in their procedures for estimating parameters, 
therefore the traditional parametric-based techniques for significance testing are not 
appropriate in PLS (Chin, 2010). Thus, the two-step process employed in this study 
included: 1) the assessment of a measurement model, and 2) the assessment of a 
structural model as represented in Figure 6.4 (Hair et al., 2014; Hair et al., 2012; 
Henseler et al., 2009).  
Assessment of model Function 
Measurement model  Examining individual item reliability 
 Ascertaining internal consistency 
reliability 
 Ascertaining convergent validity 
 Ascertaining discriminant validity 
 
Structural model  Assessing the significance of path 
coefficients 
 Evaluating the level of R-squared values 
 Determining the effect size 
 Ascertaining the predictive relevance 
 Examining the moderating effect 
Source: Henseler et al. (2009). 
 





The two-stage modeling approach is also consistent with the recommendation of 
Anderson and Gerbing (1988). The reason behind the adoption of the two-stage 
approach in this study was due to its popularity and acceptability by researchers in 
the field of social sciences (Hair et al., 2006). Additionally, the method has been 
employed in similar areas of taxation studies in developed and developing countries 
(Saad, 2011).  The process of PLS-SEM algorithm has been used to carry out all the 
analysis in relationship to the evaluation of both the measurement and structural 
models. In lieu of this, all the measurements of the constructs in this study were 
adapted from previous studies; hence, exploratory data analysis is not needed (Hair 
et al., 2010). 
6.8.1 Assessment of PLS SEM Measurement Model (Path Model Analysis) 
In assessing the measurement model, this study judiciously follows the suggestions 
of Hair et al. (2014), Hair et al. (2011) and Henseler et al. (2009), which involves 
determining individual item reliability, internal consistency reliability, content 
validity, convergent validity and discriminant validity. The measurement model is 





Figure 6.4. Measurement Model (Outer Model). 
 
After conducting the PLS-SEM algorithm, of the 97 manifest variables from the 11 






Items Retained after PLS Algorithm 
Construct Indicator 
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6.8.1.1 Individual Item Reliability 
Assessing item or indicator reliability is critical because the outer loadings of the 
manifest variables are perhaps an indication of communality of the indicators, which 
are always captured by the said construct and higher loadings are better. Item 




In Table 6.10 below, all the items, except TK1 with an item reliability of .312, 
ranged from .437 to .868 and were above the recommended threshold of .40 (Hair et 
al., 2014). This is an indication that the significance of the PLS-SEM path model 
was adequately preserved by these manifest variables because almost all of the 
indicators were above .40 (Coakes, 2013; Hair et al., 2010; Hair et al., 2011; Pallant, 
2010). 
 
In this study, individual item reliability was also assessed by examining the outer 
loadings of each construct‘s measure (Duarte & Raposo, 2010; Hair et al., 2014; 
Hair et al., 2012; Hulland, 1999). Hair et al. (2014) suggested a rule of thumb for 
retaining items with loadings between .40 and .70, and this rule was applied in this 
study. In the process of deleting items that did not meet these values, 46 of the 97 
items terms were deleted due to factor loadings below .40. Deleting items with low 
loadings increased the average variance explained of the construct (Bambale, 2013). 
Hence, in the whole model, only 51 items were retained as their loadings were above 
.40. The retained manifest variables had factor loadings ranging from .559 to .932 as 
presented in Table 6.10.  
6.8.1.2 Internal Consistency Reliability 
In terms of internal consistency reliability, the values for composite reliability for all 
the study constructs ranged from .743 to .950 as shown in Table 6.10, These actually 




1991; Gefen et al., 2000); hence, the assumption was that a satisfactory internal 
reliability of the measurement model was achieved. 
Table 6.10 
Loadings, Composite Reliability and Average Variance Extracted 





Fuel subsidy removal 
(FSR) FSR1 .777 .604 .921 .594 
 
FSR2 .739 .546 
  
 
FSR3 .828 .685 
  
 
FSR4 .775 .601 
  
 
FSR5 .720 .518 
  
 
FSR6 .788 .622 
  
 
FSR7 .822 .676 
    FSR8 .708 .501     
Incentives (positive 
inducement) (IPI) IPI1 .900 .810 .832 .713 
  IPI2 .784 .615     
Perceived corruption (PC) PC1 .749 .561 .743 .592 
  PC2 .789 .623     
Probability of detection 
(PD) PD1 .814 .663 .862 .677 
 
PD2 .900 .809 
    PD3 .748 .559     
Public governance quality 
(PGQ) PGQ12 .783 .614 .830 .619 
 
PGQ3 .829 .687 
  
 
PGQ7 .747 .557 
  Perceived service 
orientation (PSO) PSO1 .752 .565 .753 .504 
 
PSO3 .714 .510 
    PSO4 .661 .437     
Tax complexity (TC) TC1 .783 .614 .826 .705 




Table 6.10 (continued) 






behaviour (TCB) TCB1 .785 .617 .948 .646 
 
TCB11 .788 .621 
  
 
TCB13 .821 .674 
  
 
TCB14 .755 .570 
  
 
TCB2 .868 .754 
  
 
TCB4 .790 .623 
  
 
TCB6 .827 .684 
  
 
TCB7 .761 .579 
  
 
TCB8 .753 .567 
    TCB9 .881 .776     
Tax knowledge (TK) TK1 .559 .312 .860 .682 
 
TK2 .930 .864 
    TK5 .932 .868     
Tax rates (TR) TR1 .922 .849 .900 .694 
 
TR2 .883 .780 
  
 
TR5 .748 .559 
    TR6 .767 .588     
Work - family financial 
commitment (WFFC) WFFC01 .836 .699 .950 .635 
 
WFFC10 .824 .678 
  
 
WFFC11 .839 .704 
  
 
WFFC12 .732 .536 
  
 
WFFC14 .839 .704 
  
 
WFFC15 .732 .536 
  
 
WFFC18 .827 .684 
  
 
WFFC02 .728 .529 
  
 
WFFC05 .827 .684 
  
 
WFFC06 .837 .700 
    WFFC07 .728 .530     
 
6.8.1.3 Convergent Validity 
In assessing the convergent validity in this study, the recommendation of Fornell and 
Larcker (1981) was followed. The convergent validity was assessed by examining 




course of action (i.e., adequate convergent validity), Chin (1998) was of the view 
that the AVE of each latent construct should be .50 or above as a minimum 
threshold. As shown in Table 6.10, the AVE values had loadings greater than the 
minimum threshold of .50 in relationship to all the constructs; hence, an adequate 
convergent validity was arrived at. 
6.8.1.4 Discriminant Validity 
In this study, discriminant validity was ascertained based on the suggestions of Chin 
(1998) and Fornell and Larcker (1981) by comparing the indicator loadings with 
other reflective indicators in the cross loading table, as well as using the square root 
of the AVE of the construct. As a rule of thumb for ascertaining and evaluating 
discriminant validity, a score of .50 or more has been suggested as the threshold for 
the values of AVE of a construct (Fornell & Larcker, 1981). The second criterion is 
that the square root of the AVE should be greater than the correlations among the 
latent construct (Fornell & Larcker, 1981).  
 
As shown in Table 6.11 below, the values of the average variances extracted ranged 
from .504 to .713, suggesting acceptable values. Additionally, Table 6.11 also shows 
the correlations among the latent constructs, which were compared with the square 
root of the average variances extracted shown in boldfaced type. Table 6.11 further 
revealed that the square root of the average variances extracted were all greater than 
the correlations among the latent variables, and hence suggested adequate 





Latent Variable Correlations and Square Roots of Average Variance Extracted 
Latent variable 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 
1 Fuel subsidy removal .77 
          2 Incentives (positive  
inducement) -.12 .84 
         3 Perceived corruption .01 -.05 .77 
        4 Probability of detection .01 .11 -.01 .82 
       5 Public governance 
quality .00 .12 -.01 .16 .79 
      6 Perceived service 
orientation -.04 .04 .09 .12 .03 .71 
     7 Tax complexity .07 -.13 -.05 -.02 -.04 -.01 .84 
    8 Tax compliance      
behaviour -.20 .79 -.13 .20 .21 .11 -.15 .80 
   9 Tax knowledge .04 -.11 -.07 -.01 .05 -.31 .00 -.10 .83 
  10 Tax rates .07 .00 .02 .08 .03 -.05 -.03 .02 .01 .83 
 11 Work - family 
financial commitment .11 -.21 .01 -.02 .00 -.07 .00 -.26 
-
.02 .02 .80 
Note: Entries shown in bold represent the square root of the average variance extracted. 
 
 
Additionally, as Chin (1998) and Hair et al., (2011) has pointed out, discriminant 
validity can be ascertained by comparing the indicator outer loadings with cross-
loadings. To achieve this objective, Table 6.12 was used to compare the manifest 
variable loadings (shown in bold face) with other reflective indicators. It shows that 
all indicators loadings were found to be greater than the cross loadings, and as such 






  FSR IPI PC PD PGQ PSO TC TCB TK TR WFC 
FSR1 .777 -.009 -.034 -.017 -.101 -.059 .090 -.088 -.034 .074 .052 
FSR2 .739 -.144 .026 .044 -.118 .032 .020 -.154 -.008 .017 .116 
FSR3 .828 -.131 -.023 -.013 .076 -.072 .070 -.200 .100 .074 .074 
FSR4 .775 -.021 -.030 .002 -.113 -.001 .126 -.080 -.012 .085 .042 
FSR5 .720 -.103 .051 -.002 -.105 -.028 .012 -.119 -.005 .020 .104 
FSR6 .788 -.111 -.016 .015 .105 -.037 .057 -.210 .021 .047 .080 
FSR7 .822 -.083 .058 -.027 .043 -.047 .023 -.148 .095 .064 .083 
FSR8 .708 -.015 .044 .084 .033 .041 .049 -.045 .039 .066 .174 
IPI1 -.084 .900 -.040 .134 .039 .057 -.121 .769 -.093 -.034 -.150 
IPI2 -.133 .784 -.045 .034 .191 .008 -.087 .540 -.087 .048 -.228 
PC1 .002 -.045 .749 -.002 .011 .085 -.024 -.100 -.026 -.045 -.005 
PC2 .012 -.032 .789 -.017 -.021 .052 -.046 -.107 -.080 .066 .018 
PD1 -.011 .132 -.033 .814 .121 .087 -.088 .192 -.009 .054 .015 
PD2 .003 .077 .024 .900 .135 .112 .056 .175 -.023 .093 -.016 
PD3 .051 .028 -.029 .748 .162 .094 .002 .083 .004 .020 -.074 
PGQ12 -.049 .130 .019 .110 .783 -.031 -.039 .154 -.025 .044 -.016 
PGQ3 .006 .084 -.028 .184 .829 .059 -.082 .194 .041 -.013 .017 
PGQ7 .035 .068 -.001 .063 .747 .029 .038 .132 .106 .052 -.006 
PSO1 -.084 .046 .071 .084 .009 .752 .043 .087 -.169 -.100 -.127 
PSO3 -.021 .049 .070 .032 .000 .714 -.052 .081 -.283 -.026 -.045 
PSO4 .039 -.009 .044 .144 .056 .661 -.026 .068 -.215 .041 .040 
TC1 .054 -.132 -.015 -.008 -.006 .009 .783 -.101 .043 .022 .010 
TC4 .058 -.088 -.057 -.021 -.061 -.026 .892 -.139 -.038 -.058 -.012 
TCB1 -.180 .448 -.133 .174 .272 .133 -.122 .785 -.088 .040 -.307 
TCB11 -.106 .843 -.067 .136 .026 .062 -.110 .788 -.069 -.011 -.166 
TCB13 -.061 .654 -.158 .103 .143 .063 -.079 .821 -.074 .049 -.316 
TCB14 -.284 .505 -.065 .225 .202 .078 -.093 .755 -.039 -.001 -.078 
TCB2 -.232 .565 -.131 .203 .262 .138 -.158 .868 -.118 .069 -.187 
TCB4 -.096 .860 -.065 .128 .023 .063 -.120 .790 -.078 -.018 -.173 
TCB6 -.053 .681 -.156 .094 .138 .060 -.094 .827 -.085 .037 -.327 
TCB7 -.275 .529 -.064 .216 .197 .076 -.106 .761 -.049 -.010 -.089 
TCB8 -.155 .473 -.131 .165 .270 .113 -.110 .753 -.090 -.037 -.237 
TCB9 -.216 .606 -.128 .192 .254 .139 -.175 .881 -.133 .057 -.201 
TK1 .014 -.072 -.134 -.057 -.035 -.326 -.101 -.075 .559 -.021 -.015 
TK2 .034 -.102 -.032 .012 .088 -.227 .034 -.090 .930 .029 -.010 
TK5 .054 -.085 -.018 .002 .052 -.221 .041 -.087 .932 .019 -.017 
TR1 .044 -.007 -.004 .071 .048 -.036 -.019 .025 .036 .922 -.023 




Table 6.12 (continued) 
 FSR IPI PC PD PGQ PSO TC TCB TK TR WFFC 
TR5 .072 -.004 .005 .085 -.002 -.015 -.079 .017 -.050 .748 .059 
TR6 .069 .007 .068 .047 -.052 -.058 .001 .007 .012 .767 .093 
WFFC01 .051 -.134 .030 -.020 -.094 -.044 -.018 -.199 -.018 .032 .836 
WFFC10 .193 -.137 .000 .004 -.005 -.124 .024 -.257 -.015 -.011 .824 
WFFC11 .050 -.130 .025 -.018 -.094 -.050 -.019 -.198 -.018 .025 .839 
WFFC12 .007 -.263 -.012 -.026 .125 .011 -.014 -.158 -.006 .044 .732 
WFFC14 .050 -.130 .025 -.018 -.094 -.050 -.019 -.198 -.018 .025 .839 
WFFC15 .007 -.263 -.012 -.026 .125 .011 -.014 -.158 -.006 .044 .732 
WFFC18 .194 -.143 .006 .002 -.005 -.118 .025 -.260 -.016 -.002 .827 
WFFC02 .008 -.268 -.004 -.028 .125 .018 -.013 -.158 -.007 .054 .728 
WFFC05 .194 -.143 .006 .002 -.005 -.118 .025 -.260 -.016 -.002 .827 
WFFC06 .049 -.125 .019 -.016 -.095 -.055 -.020 -.197 -.017 .017 .837 
WFFC07 .006 -.255 -.019 -.023 .124 .004 -.015 -.155 -.006 .034 .728 
 
6.8.1.5 Summary of Result of the Measurement Model 
Considering the importance of the measurement model in PLS-SEM analysis. Table 
6.10 and Figure 6.5 give a snapshot of the reflective measurement model assessment 
as recommended by Hair et al. (2014), Hair et al. (2012) and Henseler et al. (2009). 
Furthermore, the outline of the results as presented in Table 6.10, Table 6.11, and 
Table 6.12 all shows that the criteria concerning the model have been properly met, 
and provided all the needed support for demonstrating the reliability and validity of 
the study‘s measures and constructs. 
6.8.2 Assessment of Significance of the Structural Model (Direct Effect) 
The results of the measurement model in the previous section indicated that the 
measures for all the constructs were reliable and valid. In this section, the purpose of 




relationships (exogenous and endogenous relationship) arising from the research 
objectives of this study. The path coefficients in the structural model, which are 
shown in Figure 6.6, were the result of a bootstrapping with 5,000 bootstrap samples 
which was larger than the actual sample size of this study, and, as such, met the 
condition Hair et al. (2013) suggested. The results of the structural model of the 
direct effect are presented in this section, and the structural model of the direct effect 









6.8.2.1 Assessment of Path Coefficient in the Structural Model (Direct 
Effects) 
In assessing the structural model, the significance of the construct as well as the 
relevance of the coefficient were taken into consideration. The t-values were used in 
either supporting or disproving the earlier hypotheses in Chapter Four. In this study, 
the path coefficients were estimated using t-statistics and the probability values. 
Therefore, the significance level of the t-value was assessed by a one-tailed 
distribution (Chin et al., 1996; Churchill, 1979; Sharma, 2000). In accordance with 
Churchill (1979) and Sharma (2000), in a situation in which a two-tailed statistical 
test is carried out, the significance level of a t-value of 1% is greater than or equal to 
2.326, at 5% is greater or equal to 1.645 and at 10% is greater or equal to 1.282. Any 
t-value lesser than the stated values is said to be insignificant. 
 
To buttress further, no consensus exists among researchers on the issue of what 
defines a reasonable level of significant in research (Verma, 1995). Even though 
Dallal (1998) was of the view that a probability value of 0.90 requires a very large 
sample size, which is consistent with the nature of this study. Furthermore, it has 
been documented that a probability value of less than 10% is reasonable and 
accepted in social and behavioral sciences (Cohen, 1977, 1988; Hinlde & Oliver, 
1983; Kirk, 1982).  
 
Hypothesis (H1) predicted a significant relationship between work family financial 




revealed a significant negative relationship between work - family financial 
commitment (WFFC) and tax compliance behaviour (TCB), (β = -.08, t = 2.34, p = 
.01), supporting hypothesis (H1).  
 
Hypothesis (H2) posited a significant relationship between fuel subsidy removal 
(FSR) and tax compliance behaviour (TCB). The results (Table 6.13, Figure 6.5) 
show that fuel subsidy removal had a significant negative relationship with tax 
compliance behaviour (β = -.09, t = 2.39, p < .01), supporting hypothesis (H2). 
Table 6.13 
Structural Model Results (Direct Effect) 
Hypotheses Relation 
Beta 
values Std errors T - statistics P - values Decision 
















       
H3 TR -> TCB 0.02 0.04 0.59 0.27 Not 
supported 
 
H4 PD -> TCB 0.09 0.03 2.83*** 0.00 Supported 
 
H5 TC -> TCB -0.04 0.03 1.36* 0.08 Supported 
 
H6 IPI -> TCB 0.72 0.03 23.70*** 0.00 Supported 
 
H7 TK -> TCB -0.01 0.03 0.42 0.33 Not 
supported 
 
H8 PGQ -> TCB 0.10 0.03 3.04*** 0.00 Supported 
Note: ***Significant at 0.01 (1-tailed), and *significant at 0.1 (1-tailed); WFFC = work - 
family financial commitment; FSR = fuel subsidy removal; TR = tax rates; PD = probability 
of detection; TC = tax complexity; IPI = incentives (positive inducement); TK = tax 
knowledge; PGQ = public governance quality; TCB = tax compliance behaviour. 
 
 
With respect to the influence of tax rates, hypotheses (H3) predicted a significant 
relationship between tax rates and tax compliance behaviour. The results (Table 




compliance behaviour (β = .02, t = .59, p > .10). Thus, this hypothesis was not 
supported.  
 
The results for hypothesis (H4), which predicted a significant relationship between 
the probability of detection and tax compliance behaviour, indicated that probability 
of detection had a significant positive relationship with tax compliance behaviour (β 
= .09, t = 2.83, p < .01), indicating full support for hypothesis (H4). 
 
In relationship to the influence of tax complexity, hypothesis (H5) hypothesised a 
significant relationship between tax complexity and tax compliance behaviour. This 
hypothesis was also supported because the estimates as shown (Table 6.13; Figure 
6.5) were significant (β = -.04, t = 1.36, p < .10) i.e., significant at 10% which is 
accepted in social and behavioral sciences as reported by Cohen (1977, 1988); 
Hinlde and Oliver (1983) and Kirk (1982).  
 
Regarding the influence of incentives (positive inducement) on tax compliance 
behaviour, the results (Table 6.13, Figure 6.5) indicated that incentives (positive 
inducement) had a significant positive relationship with tax compliance behaviour (β 
= .72, t = 23.70, p < .01). Therefore, hypothesis (H6) was fully supported. 
 
However, the results for hypothesis (H7), concerning the influence of tax knowledge 
on tax compliance behaviour (Table 6.13, Figure 6.5) showed no significant 




p > .10). Thus, hypothesis (H7) was not supported. As shown in Table 6.13, a 
significant positive relationship between public governance quality and tax 
compliance behaviour (β = .10, t = 3.04, p < .01) was found, indicating full support 
for hypothesis (H8). 
6.8.2.2  Evaluation of the Coefficient of Determination (R2 Value) in the     
             Structural Model 
Albers (2010) and Chin (2010) suggested values of .25, .50, and .75 in PLS- SEM 
for categorizing findings as weak, moderate and substantial respectively using R 
squared values. Table 6.14 and Table 6.15 present the R-squared values of the 
endogenous latent construct before and after the interacting effects of the 
moderators. 
Table 6.14 
Variance Explained in the Endogenous Latent Variable before the Interacting Effect 
of PSO & Perceived Corruption 
Latent variable Variance explained (R2) 
Tax compliance behaviour 68% 
 
Table 6.15 
Variance Explained in the Endogenous Latent Variable in Relation to Full Model 
Latent variable Variance explained (R2) 
Tax compliance behaviour 71% 
 
As shown in Table 6.14, the research model explains 68% of the total variance in tax 
compliance behaviour. This value means that the exogenous latent variables (i.e., 
work - family financial commitment, fuel subsidy removal, tax rates, the probability 
of detection, tax complexity, incentives (positive inducement), tax knowledge, public 




collectively explained 68% of the variance in endogenous construct (tax compliance 
behaviour). When the interacting effect of PSO and perceived corruption were 
applied in the full model as shown in Table 6.15, the model explains 71% of the 
variance in tax compliance behaviour. This means that, the exogenous latent 
constructs plus the moderating effect of PSO and perceived corruption collectively 
explained 71% of the variance in the endogenous latent construct (TCB). Consistent 
with the criteria of Albers (2010) and Chin (2010), the endogenous latent variable 
showed acceptable levels of R-squared value, which were considered to be moderate. 
6.8.2.3 Evaluation of the Effect Size (f2) 
In evaluating the effect size (f2) of the endogenous latent construct, Cohen‘s (1988) 
guidelines were adopted for assessing f2 values, with .02, .15, and .35 representing 
small, medium, and large effects of the endogenous construct respectively. 
Therefore, Table 6.16 represents the respective effects sizes f2 of the latent construct 
on the structural model of the present study. 
Table 6.16 
Effect Sizes of the Latent Constructs on Cohen’s (1988) Recommendation 
Latent construct R2 
Included 
R2 Excluded f - squared Effect size 
Fuel subsidy removal 0.68 0.68 0.02 Small 
Incentives (positive inducement) 0.68 0.24 1.39 Large 
Probability of detection 0.68 0.68 0.02 Small 
Public governance quality 0.68 0.68 0.02 Small 
Tax complexity 0.68 0.68 0.01 None 
Tax knowledge 0.68 0.68 0.00 None 
Tax rates 0.68 0.68 0.00 None 
Work - family financial 





As shown in Table 6.16, the effect sizes for the latent construct (fuel subsidy 
removal, incentives (positive inducement), probability of detection, public 
governance quality, tax complexity, tax knowledge, tax rates, and work - family 
financial commitment) on tax compliance behaviour were .02, 1.39, .02, .02, .01, 
.00,.00, and .02 respectively. Therefore, considering the guidelines of Cohen (1988), 
the effect sizes of the eight predictor latent constructs on tax compliance behaviour 
can be considered to be small, large, small, small, none, none, none, and small 
respectively. However, those constructs categorized as having either none or small 
effect sizes were statistically important with respect to medium or large effect sizes. 
Chin et al. (2003) claimed that irrespective of the value of the effect sizes, they all 
possess their own peculiarity in predicting or influencing the endogenous variable, 
and hence should all be considered relevant. 
6.8.2.4 Evaluation of the Predictive Relevance (Q2) 
Following Henseler et al. (2009) suggestion, the results of the cross-validated 
redundancy Q² test of the current study is presented in Table 6.17. 
Table 6.17 
Construct Cross-Validated Redundancy 
Total SSO SSE 1-SSE/SSO 
Tax compliance behaviour 2810 1624.092004 0.422031 
 
 
As presented in Table 6.17, the cross-validated redundancy measure Q² for the 
criterion latent construct was above zero, hence suggesting a predictive relevance of 




6.8.3 Testing the Moderating Effect 
It has been reported that, when the impending influence of a predictor variable on a 
criterion variable is contingent upon the values of another variable, a moderating 
effect is said to exist, especially when the variable in question moderates the existing 
relationship between the predictor variable and the criterion variable (Hair et al., 
2013). As shown in Figure 6.6, the structural path of the interacting effect of 
perceived service orientation and perceived corruption is depicted. 
 






The moderating effect of perceived service orientation and perceived corruption 
were tested. The estimates were shown in Table 6.18 and Figure 6.6 after the 
application of the product indicator approach to examine the moderating effects of 
perceived service orientation, perceived corruption on the relationship between 
economic factors, psychological factors and tax compliance behaviour. 
 
As stated in Chapter Four, hypothesis (H3a) posited that perceived service 
orientation would moderate the relationship between tax rates and tax compliance 
behaviour. The results (Table 6.18, Figure 6.6) show that the interaction terms 
representing tax rates x perceived service orientation were not statistically significant 
(β = .04, t = 1.12, p > .10). 
Table 6.18 
Results of Moderating Effects 









H3a TR * PSO -> TCB 0.04 0.03 1.12 0.13 Not 
supported 
 
H3b TR * PC-> TCB 
 
0.06 0.03 2.11** 0.02 Supported 
H4a PD* PSO -> TCB 
 
-0.04 0.05 0.75 0.23 Not 
supported 
 
H4b PD * PC -> TCB 
 





TC * PSO -> TCB 
 
 




























Table 6.18 (continued) 









H6a IPI * PSO -> TCB 
 
0.08 0.05 1.73** 0.04 Supported 
H6b IPI* PC -> TCB 
 
-0.08 0.05 1.68** 0.05 Supported 
H7a TK * PSO -> TCB -0.03 0.05 0.49 0.31 Not 
supported 
 
H7b TK * PC -> TCB 
 
-0.08 0.06 1.28* 0.10 Supported 
H8a PGQ* PSO -> TCB 
 
0.08 0.05 1.37* 0.09 Supported 
H8b PGQ * PC-> TCB 0.03 0.04 0.96 0.17 Not 
supported 
Note: **significant at 0.05 (1-tailed), and *significant at 0.1 (1-tailed). TR = tax rates; PD = 
probability of detection; TC = tax complexity; IPI = incentives (positive inducement); TK = 
tax knowledge; PGQ = public governance quality; PSO = perceived service orientation; PC 
= perceived corruption; TCB = tax compliance behaviour. 
 
 
However, hypothesis (H3b) predicted that perceived corruption would moderate the 
relationship between tax rates and tax compliance behaviour. As expected, the 
results shown in Table 6.18, Figure 6.6 indicated that the interaction terms 
representing tax rates x perceived corruption (β = .06, t = 2.11, p < .05) was 
statistically significant; thus hypothesis (H3b) was fully supported. 
 
Additionally, information from the path coefficients was also used to plot the 
moderating effect of perceived corruption on the relationship between tax rates and 
tax compliance behaviour as Aiken and West (1991) and Dawson (2013) 






Figure 6.7. Interaction Effect of Tax Rates and Perceived Corruption on Tax 
Compliance Behaviour. 
Additionally, hypothesis (H4a) stated that perceived service orientation would 
moderate the relationship between the probability of detection and tax compliance 
behaviour. The results (Table 6.18, Figure 6.6) show that the interaction terms 
representing probability of detection rates x perceived service orientation was not 
statistically significant (β = - .04, t = .75, p > .10).  
 
Hypothesis (H4b) predicted that perceived corruption would moderate the 
relationship between probability of detection and tax compliance behaviour. This 
hypothesis was supported because the interaction between probability of detection 
and perceived corruption in predicting tax compliance behaviour was found be 




Figure 6.8. Hence, perceived corruption moderates the relationship between 




Figure 6.8. Interaction Effect of Probability of Detection and Perceived Corruption 
on Tax Compliance Behaviour. 
Similarly, hypothesis (H5a) also predicted that perceived service orientation would 
moderate the relationship between tax complexity and tax compliance behaviour, as 
shown in Table 6.18, Figure 6.6, the hypothesis was not supported because the 
interaction between tax complexity and perceived service orientation in predicting 
tax compliance behaviour was insignificant (β = - .02, t = .43, p > .10).  
 
Hypothesis (H5b) posited that perceived corruption would moderate the relationship 




Table 6.18; Figure 6.6 (β = .00, t = .09, p >.10) do not support hypothesis (H4b); 
thus, the hypothesis was rejected. 
 
Moreover, hypothesis (H6a) predicted that perceived service orientation would 
moderate the relationship between incentives (positive inducement) and tax 
compliance behaviour. Table 6.18 shows support for hypothesis (H6a) (β = .08, t = 
1.73, p < .05). The graphical representation of the moderating effect of perceived 
service orientation on the relationship between incentives (positive inducement) and 
tax compliance is also depicted in Figure 6.9. 
 
Figure 6.9. Interaction Effect of Incentives (positive inducement) and Perceived 
Service Orientation on Tax Compliance Behaviour. 
 
Hypothesis (H6b) predicted that perceived corruption would moderate the 




The results shown in Table 6.18, Figure 6.6 demonstrated a significant interaction 
between incentives (positive inducement) and perceived corruption in relationship to 
their compounding effects on tax compliance behaviour (β = - .08, t = 1.68, p = .05). 
The graphical illustration of this result is shown in Figure 6.10 for the moderating 
effect of perceived corruption on the relationship between incentives (positive 




Figure 6.10. Interaction Effect of Incentives (positive inducement) and Perceived 
Corruption on Tax Compliance Behaviour. 
Hypothesis (H7a) posited that perceived service orientation would moderate the 
relationship between tax knowledge and tax compliance behaviour. The results 
shown in Table 6.18, Figure 6.6 indicated that perceived corruption failed to 




because their coefficient was insignificant (β = - .03, t = .49, p > .10), and, as such, 
this hypothesis was not supported. 
 
Moreover, hypothesis (H7b) predicted that perceived corruption would moderate the 
relationship between tax knowledge and tax compliance behaviour. Table 6.18, 
Figure 6.6 indicated a significant interaction between tax knowledge and perceived 
corruption in predicting tax compliance behaviour perceived (β = - .08, t = 1.28, p = 
.10), hence granting strong support for hypothesis (H7b). Furthermore, it has been 
documented that a probability value of 10% is reasonable and accepted in social and 
behavioral sciences (Cohen, 1977, 1988; Hinlde and Oliver, 1983; Kirk, 1982) hence 
supported. Graphically, Figure 6.11 shows the interacting effects of perceived 
corruption on the relationship between tax knowledge and tax compliance behaviour. 
 





Specifically, hypothesis (H8a) posited that perceived service orientation would 
moderate the relationship between public governance quality and tax compliance 
behaviour. The findings in Table 6.18, Figure 6.6 demonstrated a significant 
interaction between public governance quality and perceived service orientation in 
predicting tax compliance behaviour (β = .08, t = 1.37, p < .10). The interacting term 
is significant at 10% and therefore accepted because a probability value of 10% is 
reasonable and accepted in social and behavioral sciences (Cohen, 1977, 1988; 
Hinlde and Oliver, 1983; Kirk, 1982). The graphical representation of the interacting 
effect is shown in Figure 6.12. 
 
 
Figure 6.12. Interaction Effect of Public Governance Quality and Perceived Service 
Orientation on Tax Compliance Behaviour. 
Finally, hypothesis (H8b) predicted that perceived corruption would moderate the 




hypothesis was not supported because the interaction between public governance 
quality and perceived corruption in predicting tax compliance behaviour was not 
significant (β = .03, t = .96, p > .10). Thus, the hypothesis was rejected. 
 
As presented above, the moderation results demonstrate that six of the hypotheses) 
(H3b, H4b, H6a, H6b, H7b, and H8a were supported, while the remaining six 
hypotheses (H3a, H4a, H5a, H5b, H7a, and H8b) were not supported, and thus were 
rejected. 
 
6.8.3.1  Determining the Strength of the Moderating Effects 
In determining the strength of the moderating effects of perceived service orientation 
and perceived corruption on the relationships between economic factors, 
psychological factors and tax compliance behaviour, Cohen‘s (1988) effect sizes 
were calculated. Hence, Table 6.19 presents the results of the strength of the 
moderating effects of perceived service orientation and perceived corruption. 
Table 6.19 
Strength of the Moderating Effect Based on Cohen's (1988) Recommendation 
R - squared Included Excluded f - squared Effect size 
TC * PC -> TCB .710 .710 .000 None 
TC * PSO -> TCB .710 .710 .000 None 
TK * PC -> TCB .710 .704 .021 Small 
TK * PSO -> TCB .710 .709 .003 None 
PD * PC -> TCB .710 .704 .021 Small 
PD * PSO -> TCB .710 .709 .003 None 
TR * PC -> TCB .710 .707 .010 None 
TR * PSO -> TCB .710 .709 .003 None 
IPI * PC -> TCB .710 .704 .021 Small 
IPI * PSO -> TCB .710 .704 .021 Small 
PGQ * PC -> TCB .710 .709 .003 None 




In line with Henseler and Fassott‘s (2010) and Cohen‘s (1988) rules of thumb for 
ascertaining the strength of the moderating effects, the effect sizes for tax knowledge 
and perceived corruption, probability of detection and perceived corruption, 
incentives (positive inducement) and perceived corruption, incentives (positive 
inducement) and perceived service orientation, were .021, .021, .021, and .021 
respectively. These results suggested that the moderating effect was small 
respectively, while tax complexity and perceived corruption, tax complexity and 
perceived service orientation, tax knowledge and perceived service orientation, 
probability of detection and perceived service orientation, tax rates and perceived 
corruption, tax rates and perceived service orientation, public governance quality and 
perceived corruption, and public governance quality and perceived service 
orientation had no effects as shown in Table 6.19 (Henseler, Wilson, Götz, & 
Hautvast, 2007; Wilden et al., 2013). This shows that, the effect of the variables 
revealed the important of each construct in the model as pointed by Cohen (1998). 
This can either increase or reduce the predictive relevance of the study model. 
 
6.9 Summary of Findings 
This section presents a comprehensive summary of the results in relation with the 
tested hypotheses and also in accordance with the research questions in Chapter One. 
A total of twenty hypothesised relationships were tested in this study. Of the twenty 
hypotheses, twelve were empirically supported, while eight were not supported. 
Table 6.20 summarizes the results of all the hypotheses that were tested, and the 





Summary of Hypotheses Testing 
Hypothesis Statement Finding 
H1 There is a significant relationship between work - family financial 
commitment and tax compliance behaviour. 
 
Supported 
H2 There is a significant relationship between fuel subsidy removal 
and tax compliance behaviour. 
 
Supported 




H3a Perceived service orientation will moderate the relationship 
between tax rates and tax compliance behaviour. 
 
Not supported 
H3b Perceived corruption will moderate the relationship between tax 
rates and tax compliance behaviour. 
 
Supported 
H4 There is a significant relationship between probability of detection 
and tax compliance behaviour. 
 
Supported 
H4a Perceived service orientation will moderate the relationship 
between probability of detection and tax compliance behaviour. 
 
Not supported 
H4b Perceived corruption will moderate the relationship between 
probability of detection and tax compliance behaviour. 
 
Supported 




H5a Perceived service orientation will moderate the relationship 
between tax complexity and tax compliance behaviour. 
 
Not supported 
H5b Perceived corruption will moderate the relationship between tax 





Table 6.20 (continued) 
Hypothesis Statement Finding 
H6 There is a significant relationship between incentives (positive 
inducement) and tax compliance behaviour. 
 
Supported 
H6a Perceived service orientation will moderate the relationship 




H6b Perceived corruption will moderate the relationship between 
incentives (positive inducement) and tax compliance behaviour. 
 
Supported 




H7a Perceived service orientation will moderate the relationship 
between tax knowledge and tax compliance behaviour. 
 
Not supported 
H7b Perceived corruption will moderate the relationship between tax 
knowledge and tax compliance behaviour. 
 
Supported 
H8 There is a significant relationship between public governance 
quality and tax compliance behaviour. 
 
Supported 
H8a Perceived service orientation will moderate the relationship 
between public governance quality and tax compliance behaviour. 
 
Supported 
H8b Perceived corruption will moderate the relationship between 





Specifically, this study carries out data analysis in two rigorous processes. First, this 
involved the preliminary analysis of the data. This process is very important to the 
data analysis in order to ensure that the data met the basic requirements for PLS-
SEM analysis. Second, the two stages of PLS-SEM evaluation criteria, which 





Furthermore, using the PLS-SEM technique, the multivariate analysis statistically 
provided evidence of the predictive relevance of both the economic and 
psychological factors as good mechanisms for influencing the behaviours of the 
taxpayers.  
 
Following the assessment of significance of the path coefficients, the key findings of 
the study were presented. Primarily, these findings revealed six main significant 
effects affecting the relationship between: 1) work - family financial commitment 
(WFFC) and tax compliance behaviour (TCB), 2) fuel subsidy removal (FSR) and 
tax compliance behaviour (TCB), 3) the probability of detection (PD) and tax 
compliance behaviour (TCB), 4) tax complexity (TC) and tax compliance behaviour 
(TCB), 5) incentives (positive inducement) and tax compliance behaviour (TCB), 
and 6) public governance quality (PGQ) and tax compliance behaviour (TCB). 
 
However, two of the direct effect relationships: 1) tax rates (TR) and tax compliance 
behaviour (TCB), and 2) tax knowledge (TK) and tax compliance behaviour (TCB), 
were not supported and, therefore, rejected because of their insignificant path 
coefficients that did not tally with their formulated hypotheses. 
  
Importantly, with respect to the moderating effects of perceived service orientation, 
perceived corruption on the relationship between economic factors, psychological 
factors and tax compliance behaviour, the PLS path coefficients revealed that of 




In particular, perceived service orientation was found to moderate the relationship 
between: 1) incentives (positive inducement) and TCB, 2) public governance quality 
and TCB, while perceived corruption was found to moderate the relationship 
between: 1) tax rates and TCB, 2) probability of detection and TCB, 3) incentives 
(positive inducement) and TCB, and 4) tax knowledge and TCB.  
 
The next chapter focuses on the results in detail for the purpose of achieving the 
objectives of this study and discusses the findings further, followed by implications 
(theoretical, methodological and practical), limitations, suggestions for future 






CHAPTER SEVEN  
DISCUSSION 
7.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter highlighted the findings and the results of the PLS-SEM. This 
chapter presents a discussion of the concluding part of this research. The chapter is 
divided into six sections. Section 7.1 provided the introduction while Section 7.2 
summarized the major findings of the study. The discussion of the findings was captured 
in Section 7.3, while the practical, theoretical and methodological implications of the 
study were discussed in Section 7.4. Section 7.5 explicitly highlighted the limitations and 
future research directions. Finally, Section 7.6 drew the conclusions for the entire thesis. 
7.2 Recapitulation of the Study Findings 
This study examined the influence of WFFC, FSR and tax compliance behaviour of 
Nigerian SMEs owners/managers. The study further explored the moderating role of 
perceived service orientation, and perceived corruption on the relationship between 
economic factors (tax rate, the probability of detection, and tax complexity), 
psychological factors (incentives such as positive inducement, tax knowledge, and PGQ) 
and tax compliance behaviour. In totality, this study has succeeded in advancing the 
current frontier of knowledge of other determinants of tax compliance behaviour that 
were not captured in Fischer's model; hence, the study is capable of providing answers to 




1. Are WFFC, FSR, economic factors (tax rates, probability of detection and tax 
complexity), and psychological factors (incentives i.e., positive inducement, tax 
knowledge and public governance quality) related to tax compliance behaviour? 
2. Do PSO and perceived corruption moderate the relationship between economic 
factors (tax rates, probability of detection and tax complexity), psychological 
factors (incentives i.e., positive inducement, tax knowledge and public 
governance quality) and tax compliance behaviour? 
 
Towards this end, twenty hypotheses representing the relationships of the constructs were 
devised. The results provided empirical support for twelve hypotheses including the main 
and moderating effects.  
 
Regarding the direct relationship between the exogenous latent construct and endogenous 
latent construct, the findings revealed that six hypotheses of the eight were supported and 
two were not. The PLS path model showed that work - family financial commitment was 
significantly and negatively related to tax compliance behaviour. Similarly, fuel subsidy 
removal was also significantly and negatively related to tax compliance behaviour. The 
results further revealed that the probability of detection, tax complexity, incentives 
(positive inducement), and public governance quality were also significantly related to 
tax compliance behaviour. However, tax rates and tax knowledge were not found to be 





With respect to perceived service orientation and perceived corruption as potential 
moderators on the relationship between economic factors (tax rates, probability of 
detection, and tax complexity), psychological factors (incentives via positive inducement, 
tax knowledge, and public governance quality) and tax compliance behaviour, the 
findings provided empirical evidence and support for six of the twelve hypotheses.  
 
In particular, perceived service orientation was found to moderate the relationship 
between incentives (positive inducement), public governance quality and tax compliance 
behaviour. In addition, perceived corruption was discovered to moderate the relationship 
between tax rates, probability of detection, incentives (positive inducement), and tax 
knowledge and tax compliance behaviour. 
  
In contrast, perceived service orientation did not moderate the relationship between: 1) 
tax rates and tax compliance behaviour, 2) probability of detection and tax compliance 
behaviour, 3) tax complexity and tax compliance behaviour, 4) tax knowledge and tax 
compliance behaviour. Perceived corruption did not moderate the relationship between 1) 
tax complexity and tax compliance behaviour, and 2) public governance quality and tax 
compliance behaviour. The next section offers discussion of the results. 
7.3 Discussion of Results 
This section discusses the results of the study's finding in relationship to both direct and 




There were twenty hypotheses testing the direct and indirect relationships. These 
hypotheses and summary of the results are represented in Table 7.1. 
Table 7.1 
Hypotheses and Summary of Results for Direct and Moderating Relationships 
No Hypothesis Result 
H1 There is a significant relationship between work - family financial 
commitment and tax compliance behaviour. 
 
Supported 
H2 There is a significant relationship between fuel subsidy removal 
and tax compliance behaviour. 
 
Supported 





H3a Perceived service orientation will moderate the relationship 




H3b Perceived corruption will moderate the relationship between tax 
rates and tax compliance behaviour. 
 
Supported 
H4 There is a significant relationship between probability of detection 
and tax compliance behaviour. 
 
Supported 
H4a Perceived service orientation will moderate the relationship 




H4b Perceived corruption will moderate the relationship between 
probability of detection and tax compliance behaviour. 
 
Supported 




H5a Perceived service orientation will moderate the relationship 




H5b Perceived corruption will moderate the relationship between tax 




H6 There is a significant relationship between incentives (positive 





Table 7.1 (continued) 
No Hypothesis Result 
H6a Perceived service orientation will moderate the relationship 




H6b Perceived corruption will moderate the relationship between 
incentives (positive inducement) and tax compliance behaviour. 
 
Supported 





H7a Perceived service orientation will moderate the relationship 




H7b Perceived corruption will moderate the relationship between tax 
knowledge and tax compliance behaviour. 
 
Supported 
H8 There is a significant relationship between public governance 
quality and tax compliance behaviour. 
 
Supported 
H8a Perceived service orientation will moderate the relationship 
between public governance quality and tax compliance behaviour. 
 
Supported 
H8b Perceived corruption will moderate the relationship between public 








Table 7.2 presents the results of hypothesis testing for direct relationships.  
Table 7.2 
Summary of Results for Direct Relationships 
No Hypothesis Results 
H1 There is a significant relationship between work - family financial 
commitment and tax compliance behaviour. 
 
Supported 
H2 There is a significant relationship between fuel subsidy removal 
and tax compliance behaviour. 
 
Supported 




H4 There is a significant relationship between probability of detection 
and tax compliance behaviour. 
 
Supported 




H6 There is a significant relationship between incentives (positive 
inducement) and tax compliance behaviour. 
 
Supported 




H8 There is a significant relationship between public governance 
quality and tax compliance behaviour. 
Supported 
 
7.3.1 Direct Effects of WFFC, FSR, Economic Factors, and Psychological Factors on 
Tax Compliance Behaviour 
The first research question was whether WFFC, FSR, economic factors and 
psychological factors actually explain tax compliance behaviour. In line with this 
research question, the first objective of this study was to examine the relationships among 
WFFC, FSR, economic factors (tax rates, probability of detection, tax complexity), 
psychological factors (incentives, tax knowledge and public governance quality) and tax 
compliance behaviour. To answer the first research question, eight research hypotheses 
were formulated and tested using PLS-SEM. In relationship to the direct effects of these 




incentives (positive inducement), and public governance quality had significant 
relationships with tax compliance behaviour. Tax rates and tax knowledge were not 
significantly related to the compliance behaviour of SMEs taxpayers. 
 
Specifically, work - family financial commitment has been defined as a form of inter-role 
obligation in which one‘s role make it difficult to have valuable time with the family, or 
when commitment in the family makes it difficult to be fully engaged at work or to meet 
individual or organisational responsibilities and obligations (Greenhaus & Beutel, 1985). 
Individuals who are able to manage this conflict have less pressure emanating either from 
the family (family obligations, such as extended family burdens) or from the work 
domain (less cost of business operations, wages, and business commitments such as tax 
payments). The first hypothesis (H1) of this study states that work - family financial 
commitment would be significantly related to tax compliance behaviour. As expected, the 
findings provided support for the hypothesis. 
 
The findings regarding this construct represent one main contribution of this research, 
and possible explanations for its direct effect could be explained from theoretical 
perspectives rather than relying on prior empirical studies. Hence, work family spillover 
theory (Staines, 1980) serves as the basis for the possible justifications of the new 
findings. 
 
Intrinsically, as work - family financial commitment become tense, individual taxpayers 




attention to either business obligations or family may be affected. Therefore, the 
reciprocal of this conflict is consistent with work family spillover theory (Staines, 1980).  
 
Work family spillover theory emphasizes that either the family or work system may have 
a spillover effect or influence on the other system (Staines, 1980). Similarly, the theory 
further highlights that either satisfaction or dissatisfaction in one area of life may extend 
to other domains. That is obligation in the family may affect individual business 
obligations in individual business obligations may affect the family (George & Brief, 
1990). This implies that, as the work - family financial commitment become severe, the 
financial position of the taxpayer is possibly affected. Because he/she could try by all 
means to meet those needs, the spillover effect may shift to his/her business environment, 
as a result may make him/her unable them to fulfil business obligations such as tax 
payments, salaries and wages, and other administrative costs. 
 
The finding of this current study also corroborates the results of Kossek and Ozeki (1998) 
who found that the presence of a high work - family financial commitment might create 
additional demands such as financial obligations to meet family pressure, which in turn 
will negatively affect tax payments and compliance behaviours of the taxpayers. The 
findings also align with those of Kalliath and Kalliath (2013) and Shaffer and Joplin 
(2001) who said that family interference with work demands was negatively associated 
with job performance, which could include the ability of the business to adhere to tax 





Such seems the case in Nigeria, especially in the northern region of the country in which 
the literacy level is very low compared to other regions (World Bank, 2011). 
Additionally, the northern region, where this study was conducted, is characterized by 
extreme poverty, which gives rise to burdens related to extended family.  Therefore, in 
the process of meeting the needs of an extended family, spillover effects may, in turn, 
affect the meeting of business obligations.  
 
The present study predicted that fuel subsidy removal would be significantly related to 
tax compliance behaviour (H2). The results provided empirical to support this hypothesis. 
The finding regarding this construct represents another contribution of this research. 
Similar to the work family financial commitment, possible explanations of the direct 
effect of fuel subsidy removal could be explained from theoretical perspectives as of 
social exchange theory (Blau, 1964). Thus, in aligning this finding with the tenets of 
social exchange theory, individuals are psychologically indebted and thus compelled to 
return benefits that they receive in material or non-material forms to the person that 
benefited them (Blau, 1964). The negative relationship between fuel subsidy removal and 
tax compliance behaviour is not surprising and aligns with (Taiwo, 2013) who found that 
fuel subsidy removal would compound pressures on disposable income as well as 
intensify loss of tax revenues and create higher costs for enforcing compliance.  
 
This implies that SMEs taxpayers who experience more hardships in trying to run their 
respective businesses may perceive that the government is responsible for causing the 




Common knowledge is that the revenue derived from the subsidy removal was supposed 
to have been used to finance the infrastructural facilities. In doing so, government may 
encourage taxpayers to reciprocate by paying their taxes. However, in a situation in 
which such a contract is void because impartments were not made, taxpayers might not 
engage in compliance behaviour.  
 
Tax rate is defined as the perceived fairness in the tax rate structure and burden 
distribution (Gilligan & Richardson, 2005). It is operationalized in the context of this 
study as a percentage of taxes to be paid to the relevant tax authorities. Hypothesis (H3) 
states that tax rates would be significantly related to tax compliance behaviour. Contrary 
to expectations, an insignificant relationship was found. Thus, hypothesis (H3) was not 
supported. 
 
This finding could be aligned with economic deterrence theory, which posits that factors 
such as the tax rate in ascertaining the rewards of evasion or noncompliance, the 
probability of detection and penalties for the crime or fraud which help in determining the 
costs influence the behaviour of taxpayers (Allingham & Sandmo 1972; Becker, 1968). 
This actually means that, if the probabilities of detection are not likely or certain and 
penalties attached to are also not severe, neither higher nor lower tax rates might 
significantly influence on the compliance behaviour of taxpayers. 
 
The results of the present study significantly differ from the previous studies (Clotfelter, 




between tax rates and tax compliance because the findings of the current study 
demonstrated that tax rates had no effect on tax compliance behaviour. One plausible 
explanation for the present findings may be related to economic, cultural, demographic, 
and business orientations of the respondents who belong to a highly under-developed 
economy. No doubt tax laws, service orientation, as well as the overall economic viability 
of SMEs found in Malaysia, Europe or the United States, in which most previous studies 
were conducted are far better than those in the underdeveloped countries like Nigeria.  
 
Against that background, a good rationale for the non-significant effect of tax rates on tax 
compliance behaviour could be aligned to the operations of SMEs in Nigeria, which 
according to Micah, Ebere, and Umobong (2012) are at a rudimentary stage without 
appropriate recordkeeping statistics that made assessments difficult for tax authorities. 
Moreover, this scenario results in tax administration estimates that are prone to a wide 
margin of error. Because this situation is prevalent in the country, most taxpayers, but 
especially SME owners, might not notice or feel the impact of the prevailing tax rates due 
to the fact that the tax administration has so many inconsistent estimates by the tax 
assessors. 
 
Supporting the above argument, Ariyo (1997) reported that, while the percentage of the 
self- employed to total working population is large in Nigeria, tax revenue from the self-
employed sector is grossly untapped. That is to say, tax authorities have not outlined an 
appropriate mechanism for collecting tax from this group of taxpayers. Because of this, 




sector has been reported to be grossly untapped whether the tax rates are high, moderate 
or low. This finding is also consistent with that of Modugu et al. (2012) who failed to 
discover either a positive or a negative relationship between tax rates and tax compliance 
in Nigeria. In their study, they did not explain why no significant relationship existed 
between the two constructs. 
 
The probability of detection is the likelihood that the relevant tax authorities will uncover 
an individual‘s noncompliance and seeks to remedy the evasion (Chau & Leung, 2009). 
Hypothesis 4 of this study states that probability of detection would be related to tax 
compliance behaviour. As expected, the findings offered support for the hypothesis. Most 
importantly and in the context of this current study, the current findings significantly 
agree with several previous studies (Alm, 1991; Carnes & Englebrecht, 1995; Eisenhauer, 
2008; Lewis et al., 2009) that found the probability of detection to be significantly and 
positively related to tax compliance. This implies that as the probability of detection 
becomes high, tax compliance may also become high.  
 
This finding, like the previous positive findings discussed in this section, is consistent 
with the tenets of economic deterrence theory as Allingham and Sandmo (1972) posited. 
The findings were positive because the taxpayers who participated in the survey were 
aware of the possible mechanisms put in place by the relevant tax authorities both at the 
state and the federal levels towards increasing the level of compliance in the country and 
the penalties attached to it that are severe, which, in turn, will lead to high level of tax 




tax compliance behaviour might be as a result of proper equipment or methods of the 
Internal Revenue Service's offices in the states. They also could be as a result of tax 
tribunal offices spread among the six geopolitical zones of the country for the purpose of 
curbing the high number of cases of low levels of tax compliance. This is especially true 
in the northern region of the country.  
 
Tax complexity arises from the process of improving the equity of the tax system while 
simultaneously reducing ambiguity (McKercher et al., 2005). Hypothesis (H5), which 
asserted a significant relationship between tax complexity and tax compliance behaviour, 
was accepted using PLS output with a significant relationship found between these two 
variables. These findings align with (Cox & Eger, 2006) who found that tax complexity 
contributed to an increase in tax non-compliance. 
 
The findings demonstrate that tax complexity has a completely negative effect on tax 
compliance behaviour. Seemingly, the more complex a tax system is, the more taxpayers 
perceive the whole system to be inequitable. Therefore, whether taxpayers have the 
requisite tax knowledge or not, as far as the system is too complex, taxpayers may resort 
to low compliance. Another explanation for the significant effect of tax complexity on tax 
compliance behaviour stems from the fact that, lack of simplicity in tax returns, feelings 
of uncertainty may accompany the perceived peculiarities of tax complexities 
encountered by so many taxpayers, and, as a result, these taxpayers are subsequently 
deterred from compliance (Vogel, 1974). This situation seems applicable to the case of 




compliance behavior could stem from the fact that frequent changes and amendments to 
the Personal Income Tax Act (PITA) 1993 as amended in 2004, and 2011, which altered 
and deleted some sections in the Act, have made the tax system more cumbersome to the 
Nigerian taxpayers (Angahar & Alfred, 2012). 
 
Another possible explanation for the nature of these findings could be aligned with the 
cultural and demographic background of the respondents. That is because the level of 
literacy level in the northern part of the country is very low falling below minimum 
standards (World Bank, 2011). As a result, this situation could further affect taxpayers in 
assessing and understanding the tax system, which of course may affect them negatively.  
In support of the above argument, McKerchar (2003) noted, that the most common 
problem faced by taxpayers in Australia was understanding the instructions in the 
Taxpack, which was followed by problems in understanding the rules, the tax return 
forms and other relevant written information provided by the tax authority. Therefore, 
shortfall in terms of literacy level will further compound the issue of tax complexity and 
reduce compliance behaviour of SME taxpayers all other things being equal. 
 
The negativity of the association of complexity could be aligned to the tenets of equity 
theory (Adams, 1965). Drawing from equity theory, Adams (1965) and Fjeldstad et al. 
(2012) stated that, when the tax system is perceived to be complex, taxpayers might 
question its inherent fairness. Thus, the more complex a tax system is, the more taxpayers 





Incentives according to Slemrod (1992) and Smith (1992) are a form of positive 
inducement that encourages taxpayers to comply with the relevant tax laws and 
regulations or negative inducements such as penalties or sanctions where a likelihood of 
noncompliant exists. Consistent with hypothesis 6, a significant relationship between 
incentives (positive inducement) and tax compliance behaviour was found. This finding 
also supports the social exchange theory (Blau, 1964). This result suggests that 
individuals are psychologically indebted and thus forced to pay back the benefits they 
received in material or non-material form to the person that have provided benefits to 
them. 
 
The positive relationship between incentive (positive inducement) is in line with previous 
studies indicating that perception of taxpayers in relationship to incentives may be one of 
the important factors in motivating them to comply to tax payment (Richardson & 
Sawyer, 2001). The result of this current study also agrees with Alm et al. (1992a), 
Manaf (2004), and Trivedi et al. (2004) who found a significant positive relationship 
between positive incentives and tax compliance behaviour. Additionally, this finding 
suggests that incentives (positive inducements) have a significant positive effect on the 
behaviour of Nigerian SMEs owners/managers. The importance of this finding is not over 
reaching because the provision of adequate and better tax incentives will help in boosting 
the economic activities of entrepreneurs. 
 
Tax knowledge encompasses general knowledge, technical knowledge and legal 




about their general knowledge of the income tax system without making reference to a 
specific type of knowledge as consistent with Saad (2011). Prior literature has 
investigated tax knowledge of the taxpayers in relation to their compliance behaviour. 
 
Hypothesis 7 of this study states that tax knowledge would be significantly related to tax 
compliance behaviour. Unexpectedly, the result failed to support the proposed 
hypothesis; the results demonstrated that taxpayers‘ knowledge did not affect their 
compliance behaviour in relationship to tax payment. Specifically, the present finding 
matched that of Harris (1989), who found no significant direct relationship between tax 
knowledge and taxpayers‘ compliance behavior. This is consistent with the findings of 
McKerchar (1995) who suggested that small business taxpayers are unaware of their tax 
knowledge shortfall, which may invariably lead to unintentional non-compliance 
behaviour. 
 
However, the finding in this current study is contrary to other previous studies in 
Malaysia, Australia, and New Zealand that found a significant relationship between tax 
knowledge and tax compliance behaviour (e.g., Kasipillai & Jabbar, 2003; Kirchler et al., 
2006; Loo et al., 2009; Saad, 2014). Additionally, the result is also contrary to the 
expectations as suggested by social learning theory (Bandura, 1977), which was premised 
on the influence of environment. The theory posits that behavior is one of the most 
important ingredients that has been identified to be either intentionally or unintentionally 




results is that these inconsistencies may arise from the jurisdictional tax differences or 
from cultural differences. 
 
Another important reason may be because of the result of the level of educational and 
literacy levels of the northern part of Nigeria, which fall below the acceptable standards 
compared to other countries in which previous findings found significant results. Finally, 
different authors used different metrics for measurement, which may serve as another 
potential reason for the differences in findings. For example, studies that found 
significant relationship were conducted in Malaysia, Australia or New Zealand, while this 
study was conducted in Nigeria. 
 
Consistent with hypothesis (H8), a significant relationship between public governance 
quality and tax compliance behaviour was found. This finding was consistent with Blau's 
social exchange theory (1964) because the results suggest the role of reciprocity in 
enforcement of compliance in social relationship. This finding also aligns with Torgler 
(2003, 2007) who found that positive behaviour by government was reciprocated by the 
taxpayers through enhanced compliance behaviour. Furthermore, this result is also in 
accord with Alabede et al. (2011) who found a positive significant relationship between 
public governance quality and tax compliance behaviour of salaried taxpayers in the 
Federal Capital Territory. The current findings also align with other past studies that 
indicated that taxpayers seem to be more willing to comply with tax rules and regulations 




between their contributions and the quality of public service (governance) provided by 
the government (Alm et al. 1992; Alm & Gomez, 2008; Fjeldstad & Semboja, 2001). 
 
The positive association between public governance quality and tax compliance 
behaviour as reflected in the findings generally portrays the concept of reciprocity, which 
suggests that both government and taxpayers are in a contract for an exchange of value. 
That is, taxpayers pay taxes in exchange for political goods, which in sum, are 
represented by public governance quality. The continuity of this relationship, particularly 
on the part of taxpayers, depends upon, among other things, the ability of the government 
to maintain or improve the quality of public governance. 
 
The work of Levi (1988) and Lassen (2003) supports this line of argument. They pointed 
that, when taxpayers perceived the rate of transformation from their tax payment to 
political goods, as captured by public governance quality was low, they may feel that 
government is not actually adhering to its obligations of the contract of reciprocity. As a 
result, they will be disenchanted, causing voluntary tax compliance to decline. 
 
In line with the findings of this current study, government ineffectiveness in the provision 
of public infrastructure, such as education, electricity, and healthcare and unfair 
administration of the rule of law, contributed significantly to the shrinking level of tax 
compliance among individual taxpayers in Nigeria. Therefore, as part of the answer to the 
first research question, the findings of this study provide proof that public governance 




7.3.2 Moderating Effects of Perceived Service Orientation and Perceived 
Corruption 
In this section, twelve hypotheses were presented to test whether perceived service 
orientation and perceived corruption separately moderate the relationship among 
economic factors, psychological factors and tax compliance behaviours. As shown in 
Table 7.3, six hypotheses were found to be significantly moderated, while the remaining 
six hypotheses were not significantly moderated.  
 
Table 7.3  
Hypotheses and Summary of Results for Moderating or Indirect Relationships 
No Hypothesis Result 
H3a Perceived service orientation will moderate the relationship 




H3b Perceived corruption will moderate the relationship between tax 
rates and tax compliance behaviour. 
 
Supported 
H4a Perceived service orientation will moderate the relationship 




H4b Perceived corruption will moderate the relationship between 






Table 7.3 (continued) 
No Hypothesis Result 
H5a Perceived service orientation will moderate the relationship 




H5b Perceived corruption will moderate the relationship between tax 




H6a Perceived service orientation will moderate the relationship 




H6b Perceived corruption will moderate the relationship between 
incentives (positive inducement) and tax compliance behaviour 
 
Supported 
H7a Perceived service orientation will moderate relationship between 




H7b Perceived corruption will moderate the relationship between tax 
knowledge and tax compliance behaviour 
 
Supported 
H8a Perceived service orientation will moderate the relationship 
between public governance quality and tax compliance behaviour 
 
Supported 
H8b Perceived corruption will moderate the relationship between public 




The following subsections discuss the findings in detail. 
7.3.2.1 Moderating Effects of Perceived Service Orientation on the 
Relationship between Economic Factors, Psychological Factors and Tax 
Compliance Behaviour  
Perceived service orientation can be seen as the attitudes of being helpful, thoughtful, 
considerate and cooperative (Hogan et al., 1984). In this study, perceived service 
orientation was proposed as a moderator on the relationship between economic factors, 
psychological factors and tax compliance behaviour. In Chapter One, part of the second 
research question was to examine the moderating role of perceived service orientation on 






Therefore, taking this research question as a basis, part of the second objective of this 
study was to assess whether perceived service orientation would moderate the 
relationship among economic factors, psychological factors and tax compliance 
behaviour of SME owners/managers. To answer this research question, six research 
hypotheses (H3a, H4a, H5a, H6a, H7a, and H8a) were formulated and tested using PLS-
SEM. The results revealed that two hypotheses (H6a and H8a) were found to be 
moderated, while the remaining four hypotheses (H3a, H4a, H5a, and H7a) were not 
moderated. 
 
Hypothesis (H3a) stated that perceived service orientation would moderate the 
relationship between tax rates and tax compliance behaviour, while hypothesis (H4a) 
posited that perceived service orientation could moderate the relationship between 
probability of detection and tax compliance behaviour. However, the present study did 
not find support for these two hypotheses (H3a and H4a). The results demonstrated that 
service awareness did not serve as an avenue in enlightening taxpayers towards 
increasing their compliance level, and, as such, service orientation did not stimulate the 
taxpayers. 
 
The lack of moderating effect of perceived service orientation on the relationship 
between tax rates, probability of detection and tax compliance behaviour might be as a 
result of participants of this study not being actually motivated by the activities of the 




Locke (1968) reported that, if people are to be motivated to behave in a rational way, 
such people need to see a good reason to act in the desired direction. 
 
This reason could be that a need exists to provide services in the form of tax education, 
calls and other services, which, in return, will induce taxpayers to behave in the desired 
direction towards tax payment. Another possible explanation for the lack of support for 
these hypothesized relationships pertains to the notion of perceived maltreatment of 
taxpayers by service providers in Nigeria. According to Feld et al. (2006) and 
Wallschutzky (1984), improper treatment of taxpayers in the course of providing service 
in tax offices may go a long way in influencing future compliance behaviour. 
 
Hypothesis (H5a) indicated that perceived service orientation would moderate the 
relationship between tax complexity and tax compliance behaviour, while hypothesis 
(H7a) posited that perceived service orientation would moderate the relationship between 
tax knowledge and tax compliance behaviour. Unfortunately, the results did not support 
the two hypotheses. One plausible reason for the lack of a significant moderating effect 
on the relationship between tax complexity and tax compliance behaviour might possibly 
be due to a significant direct relationship between tax complexity and tax compliance 
behaviour. From the findings, the deduction can be made that taxpayers‘ concern for 
perceived service orientation did not supersede their perceptions of the complexity of the 





Another reason for this fascinating result is the frequent changes in the Nigerian tax laws 
because the PITA amendment that took effect in 2011. This amendment deleted about 36 
sections of the PITAM, Cap P8, and tax authorities perhaps did not properly orient the 
stakeholders about these alterations. Hence, the complex nature of the tax system may be 
a more important factor in determining the compliance behaviour of taxpayers than 
service orientations. Thus, as tax regulations and other provisions become more complex 
over time, complexity may become a significant factor in lowering the level of tax 
compliance (Jackson & Milliron, 1986; Richardson & Sawyer, 2001). 
 
Additionally, Micah et al. (2012) pointed out that one manifestation of the poor tax 
education and weak fulfilment by tax authorities of their responsibilities might be a 
promising factor for understanding the lack of a moderating effect of perceived service 
orientation on the relationship between tax complexity and tax compliance behaviour. 
 
On the other hand, one important reason for the lack of significant moderating effect of 
perceived service orientation on the relationship between tax knowledge and tax 
compliance behaviour may have to do with the use of tax consultants, as the knowledge 
of the taxpayers may not matter enough because they can hire the services of other tax 
professionals. 
 
The finding of this current study supported hypotheses (H6a) and (H8a). These results 
supported the view that perceived service orientation moderates the relationship between 




provide support for the view that perceived service orientation moderates the relationship 
between public governance quality and tax compliance behaviour. The PLS path results 
provides evidence in support of hypothesis (H6a), indicating that SMEs taxpayers‘ 
service orientation significantly moderated the influence of incentives on tax compliance 
behaviour. One interesting aspect of this finding was that the presence of service 
orientation on the relationship between incentives and compliance behaviour made the 
relationship to more positive. 
 
This is an indication that the effects of perceived service orientation further strengthened 
the influence of incentives on taxpayers‘ compliance behaviour. Thus, one 
recommendation is that, along with a better service orientation, an increase in incentives 
would lead SME owners/managers to be more compliant. Thus, the results indicate that a 
remarkable number of SME owners believe that incentives combined with a better 
service orientation would further increase the level of compliance.  This finding is not 
surprising for a country like Nigeria. In 2004, the Nigeria Government established the 
Service Compact Office (SERVCOM) to monitor the quality of public service provided 
by Nigerian public organizations. The results of the office might be one possible reason 
that the confidence of the taxpayers in terms of service provision and orientations was 
boosted.  
 
This finding is also consistent with Odusola (2006) and Odinkonigbo (2009) who 
reported that revenue authorities in Nigeria were equipped with customer care units to 




perceived service orientation in this current study could also lend support to the 
conclusions of Gangl et al. (2013) who found that taxpayers who perceived a greater 
service orientation would be more willing to pay their taxes. Kirchler (2007), OECD 
(2007), and Torgler (2007) also discovered that an improvement in the quality of tax 
service provided by the revenue authorities would enhance taxpayer‘s compliance 
behaviour. The findings of the current study are in line with other researches in the area 
of marketing, which has established a linkage between the quality of service and 
behavioural intentions of individuals (Sivadas & Baker, 2000; Wong & Sohal, 2003).  
 
Social influence theory might help explain this result. Social influence theory has a 
lineage derived from Bandura's social learning theory (1977), which was premised on the 
influence of environment. The theory states that behavior is one of the most important 
ingredients in behaviour and that an individual was influenced either intentionally or 
unintentionally by others in the environment. Therefore, individuals learn from each 
other through observation and imitation, as well as through orientation, which explains 
human behavior in relationship to continuous exchange interactions between cognitive 
and behavioral environmental influences. 
 
Hence, Bandura (1977) documented that people not only learn the behavior of others 
through observing their attitudes, but are influenced by the outcomes of their behaviors. 
In this context, social influence theory identifies the opinions of peers and the extent of 




orientation) as one of the most important variables in determining compliance (Sutinen & 
Kuperan, 1999). 
 
Additionally, Crisp and Turner (2007) conceived that social influence is concerned with 
―how our thoughts, feelings and behaviour change in the midst of others‖. Hogg and 
Vaughan (2005) reiterated that social influence could be aligned to conformity, 
compliance and obedience. The authors further said that compliance might be influenced 
by the manner in which individuals employed persuasive ways in seeking consent as well 
as in the power that individuals perceived to have at their disposal. Power in the context 
of this study is regarded as the ability of an individual or institution to exert influence 
through service orientation. 
 
French and Raven (1959) outlined five bases of social power, which Raven (1965 & 
1993) later expanded to six. The six bases of social power are: 1) reward power, 2) 
coercive power, 3) informative power (for instance service orientation), 4) expert power 
(for instance ability to influence), 5) legitimate power, and 6) referent power. Reward 
power, according to the literature, has to do with the provision of incentives for 
compliance. For instance, Manaf (2004) found that incentives (positive inducements) had 
a significant impact on compliance attitudes of land taxpayers in Malaysia. 
 
In the context of this study, service orientation directed towards taxpayers may go a long 
way in encouraging the taxpayers to comply with the tax obligation. Expert power is the 




provision of tax education, calls and other ancillary services to the taxpayers) together 
with their knowledge to motivate compliance. In fact, these arguments suggest that 
service orientation is an important mechanism for strengthening the compliance 
behaviour of taxpayers. But, in practical terms, social influence in taxation might not be 
easily achieved due to different needs or requirements of individual taxpayers. For 
instance, an influential SME owner/manager will probably receive more attention from 
the relevant tax authorities compared to less influential a SME owner/manager despite 
their contributions.  
 
Finally, the results of the present study supported the prediction that perceived service 
orientation moderates the relationship between public governance quality and tax 
compliance behaviour. The PLS path results provide evidence in support of hypothesis 
(H8a), which revealed that SMEs taxpayers‘ service orientation significantly moderated 
the influence of public governance quality on tax compliance behaviour and also are in 
line with social influence theory (Bandura, 1977). This finding revealed that service 
orientation served as a stimulant between public governance quality and tax compliance 
behaviour, such that it further strengthened the positivity of the governance quality. In 
other words, this finding suggested that SMEs owners who are always oriented in terms 
of their tax-related matters and what their contributions in the form of tax payments will 
be used for are likely to be obedient compliant. 
 
One interesting aspect of this finding is that the presence of service orientation with 




behaviour made the relationship more positive. This is an indication that the effects of 
perceived service orientation had further strengthened the influence of incentives on 
taxpayers‘ compliance behaviour. Because of this, the presence of service orientation, 
with an increase in the provision of infrastructural facilities taxpayers, would make 
taxpayers likely to be more compliant. More importantly, this result showed that 
taxpayers with motivational postures such as the provision of public goods and services 
might warrant more commitment and capitulation towards having positive attitude to tax 
payment (Braithwaite, 2003a, 2009; Braithwaite, Reinhart, & Smart, 2007). 
 
Along the same line of argument, the education of taxpayers, assistance in the form of 
phone call advice or a website, the simplification of the tax law and procedures, and the 
development of a more service-oriented approach might go a long way to reducing the 
administrative burden for taxpayers as well as their costs of compliance (Alm & Torgler, 
2011; Eichfelder & Kegels, 2010). Provision of information on tax-related issues to 
taxpayers constitutes one aspect of perceived service orientation, which, in turn, will 
increase tax compliance (Alm et al., 2010). Thus, the advocates of the slippery slope 
framework posit that service orientation is one promising strategy for tax authorities to 
increase tax compliance (Kirchler et al., 2008). 
7.3.2.2 Moderating Effects of Perceived Corruption on the Relationship 
between Economic Factors, Psychological Factors and Tax Compliance 
Behaviour 
Perceived corruption is defined as an abuse of public power for private benefit (Habib & 




relationship between economic factors, psychological factors and tax compliance 
behaviour. 
 
Social exchange theory emphasizes that individuals are psychologically obliged and thus 
forced to return the benefits that they have received either in material or non-material 
form to the person who provided them (Blau, 1964). Therefore, the main focus of social 
exchange theory is that relationships providing more benefits than costs always yield 
enduring mutual trust and attraction (Blau, 1964). These social transactions could be in 
the form of material benefits (i.e., incentives, bonuses, and other infrastructural facilities) 
and psychological rewards (i.e., trust, transparency, loyalty and truthfulness) (Yukl, 
1994). Therefore, in a setting in which people observe that others behave in an abnormal 
way, without elements of trust (i.e., perceived to be engulf by corruption), without any 
proper measures taken to address the menace, or without being punished for such acts, 
such people may likely to be encouraged to imitate bad behaviours. 
 
From social exchange viewpoint, the expectation is that a high level of corruption could 
negatively energize taxpayers to reduce their level of compliance in relationship to tax 
payment provided a lack of trust exists between the parties.  
 
Based on the foregoing line of discussion, the last research question addressed whether 
perceived corruption would moderate the relationship between economic factors, 
psychological factors and tax compliance behaviour. In line with this research question, 




perceived corruption on the relationship among economic factors, psychological factors 
and tax compliance behaviour. Therefore, to fully achieve the second objective of this 
study, six hypotheses (H3b, H4b, H5b, H6b, H7b and H8b) were formulated.  
 
The results supported the view that perceived corruption significantly moderates the 
relationship between: 1) tax rates; 2) probability of detection; 3) incentives (positive 
inducement); and 4) tax knowledge while tax complexity and public governance quality 
were not moderated by perceived corruption. That is, hypotheses (H3b, H4b, H6b, and 
H7b) were supported, while hypotheses (H5b) and H8b) were not supported. 
 
Firstly, the results provide support for hypothesis (H3b) indicating that perceived 
corruption moderates the relationship between tax rates and tax compliance behaviour. 
One surprising thing about this finding is that perceived corruption actually strengthened 
the positive relationship between tax rates and tax compliance, thereby making it 
stronger. This finding aligned with the tenets of social exchange theory (Blau, 1964), 
which states that a relationship is absolutely built on the basis of costs and benefit, and 
for the relationship to continue or survive, that relationship must be beneficial to all 
parties. This finding is also in accord with an earlier argument in the literature that 
positive behaviour by government may be reciprocated by the taxpayers through 
enhanced compliance behaviour (Torgler, 2003 & 2007). 
 
Taxpayers always assess the benefits of their commitment, in that the amount they pay as 




provision, good roads, adequate portable clean water, constant electricity supply and a 
conducive atmosphere in which businesses can thrive. By extension, these perceived 
benefits might encourage taxpayers to keep the covenant of reciprocity. Conversely, in a 
situation in which such contract is void, the compliance behaviour of a taxpayer might be 
negatively impacted. 
 
Taxpayers were not actually deterred or affected by the magnitude of tax rates whether 
they were high or low because they perceived corruption to actually strengthen the 
positivity of the tax rates in relationship to their compliance behaviour. With the 
provision of infrastructural facilities, even though the tax rates and corruption are high, 
the level of taxpayer compliance will not diminish.  
 
The significant effect of perceived corruption in this current study also aligns with other 
early findings in Nigeria, in which the majority of the populace were not satisfied with 
the performance of the government, particularly in the areas of corruption control, 
provision of infrastructure, accountability and provision of security (Lewis, 2006; Lewis 
& Alemika 2005; Madueke, 2008). The findings also agree with the opinions of some 
Nigerians that the quality of public governance is unsatisfactory in Nigeria (Natufe, 2006; 
Oluba, 2008).  
 
Second, hypothesis (H4b) of this study states that perceived corruption would moderate 
the relationship between the probability of detection and tax compliance behaviour. As 




of this study, the present findings suggest that perceived corruption dampens the positive 
relationship between the probability of detection and tax compliance behaviour, thereby 
making the relationship weaker. The findings further suggest that, even when taxpayers 
perceived corruption to be high and the probability of detection to be low, such 
perceptions might not affect their compliance behaviour negatively compared to the way 
in which they perceived corruption. That is because the probability of detection has been 
found to possess a negative relationship with tax compliance behaviour (Slemrod et al., 
2001; Young, 1994). 
 
Furthermore, drawing upon Blau's social exchange theory (Blau, 1964), the results 
suggest that perceived corruption is more responsible for driving taxpayers‘ behaviour 
than is the probability of being detected for any illegal misdeed. This further suggests that 
tax compliance behaviour is not merely explained by taxpayers‘ perceptions in 
relationship to the probability of being detected, but also by the level of corruption that an 
individual perceives in the country.  
 
Third, contrary to expectations, hypothesis (H5b) was not supported because perceived 
corruption did not moderate the relationship between tax complexity and tax compliance 
behaviour. One plausible explanation could be due to a significant direct relationship 
between tax complexity and tax compliance behaviour. Another possible reason could be 
that this behaviour is a result of the frequent changes in the Nigerian tax laws. The PITA 
amendment that took effect in 2011 deleted about 36 sections of the PITAM, Cap P8, 




negatively affected most taxpayers in the country, and they took advantage of this 
complexity as an opportunity to indulge in many illegal acts. 
 
Therefore, the SMEs taxpayers may not have perceived that corruption possessed any 
significant effects on their compliance level because they are also part and parcel of the 
issue.  Furthermore, other reasons for the lack of moderating effect of perceived 
corruption might be due to the fact that Nigerian SMEs are relatively less exposed in the 
media. In short, they are less closely monitored and supervised by the stakeholders and 
thereby have less direct reputational risks at stake, and these factors might facilitate the 
perception that bribery is less risky. Such an environment can nurture a culture and 
tolerance for corruption as a natural way of doing business. As such, corruption might not 
have a direct bearing on their compliance behaviour because of their involvement in the 
act. 
 
Fourth, hypothesis (H6b) indicated that perceived corruption would moderate the 
relationship between incentives (positive inducement) and tax compliance behaviour. As 
expected, the finding provided support for the hypothesis. This is an indication that 
perceived corruption dampens the positive relationship between incentives (positive 
inducements) and tax compliance behaviour. As taxpayers perceive the system to be 
more corrupt and the amount they pay as taxes was not adequately used in providing 
services and other infrastructural facilities, these factors might, in turn, affect or influence 
their compliance behaviour negatively. The reciprocal behaviour of the taxpayers is 




people are always psychologically driven, and, as such, are forced to return benefits they 
have received in either material or non-material forms to the donor (Blau, 1964). 
 
However, the negative moderating effect of perceived corruption also corresponded with 
the earlier reports by Lewis (2006), Lewis and Alemika (2005), and Madueke, (2008) 
who said that Nigerians are broadly not satisfied with the performance of their 
government, particularly in the areas of corruption and accountability. This is because 
corruption in Nigeria has been significant for many years, and government has failed to 
provide basic infrastructure like good road networks, misuse of natural resources, 
inadequate power and water supplies, mediocrity in professional and leadership positions, 
defective leadership outputs, fuel scarcity in an oil producing nation, falling standards of 
education and work output, high unemployment rates, the ever-widening gap between the 
rich and poor to mention to name just a few. Therefore, with these widening effects of 
corruption, may overwhelm the provision of possible incentives to taxpayer‘s vis-á-vis 
SME owners/managers. 
 
Fifth, hypothesis (H7b) indicated that perceived corruption would moderate the 
relationship between tax knowledge and tax compliance behaviour. The findings also 
align with Blau's social exchange theory (1964), which states that a relationship is built 
on an atmosphere of trust. For a relationship to thrive, it must be capable of benefiting all 
the parties. In relationship to the moderating effect of perceived corruption on the 
relationship between tax knowledge and tax compliance behaviour, the presence of 




constructs. This is because, with a fair knowledge of tax as well as the prevailing 
corruption in the country, corruption will further reduce the level of tax compliance in the 
country. 
 
Furthermore, receiving contributions for social exchange generates a positive effect and a 
kind of moral duty to support the donor, which is socially and psychologically sanctioned 
by the norms of reciprocity (Gouldner, 1960). Eventually, however, the form and timing 
of reciprocation lies at the discretion of the receiver and cannot be enforced. As the 
deliberate acceptance of vulnerability associated with making contributions, the other 
party is only morally bound to reciprocate, and trust is vital to social exchange (Haas & 
Deseran, 1981). 
 
Sixth, hypothesis (H8b) states that perceived corruption would moderate the relationship 
between public governance quality and tax compliance behaviour. The results of this 
current study did not support the hypothesised moderating relationship. The results 
demonstrate that taxpayers concern for perceived corruption did not overwhelm their 
perceptions of the nature of public governance quality in the country. This finding could 
be aligned to social exchange theory (1964) as discussed earlier. Taxpayers are always 
concerned about the quality of public goods being supplied by the government in 
relationship to the amount of taxes paid by them. Exchanges can go a long way in 
motivating the taxpayers. This finding of the current study aligns with Alm et al. (1992) 
and Alm and Gomez (2008) who found that taxpayers generally seem to be more willing 




observe a direct relationship between their contributions and the quality of public service 
(governance) provided by the government. 
 
Additionally, the positive association between public governance quality and tax 
compliance behaviour generally reflects the norm of reciprocity, which suggests that both 
government and taxpayers are in a contract for exchange of value. That is, the taxpayers 
pay taxes in exchange for political goods, which in sum, represent public governance 
quality. By implication, as far as the public goods are being provided to the taxpayers, the 
effects of corruption might be perceived to be insignificant by SME owners/managers. 
Elaborating further, the results demonstrated that sampled respondents were indifferent to 
the role of corruption as a catalyst for influencing the relationship between public 
governance quality and tax compliance behaviour, which may be due to other plausible 
reasons as to why this finding occurred. 
 
This finding is not really surprising because an individual behaves in a positive way if 
and only if the person perceives a positive connection with their efforts (Vroom, 1964). 
Hence, in the context of this study, as already revealed by the findings, SME 
owners/managers do not really hold the prevalence of corruption in high esteem 
compared to the provision of public goods, in determining their compliance level. 
7.4 Implications of the Study 
This study has offered a new frontier of knowledge and understanding of other 




present study have significant theoretical, practical and methodological implications in 
the area of tax compliance as discussed below. 
7.4.1 Theoretical Implications 
Researchers have devoted much effort towards identifying other determinants of tax 
compliance capable of influencing the decisions of SME taxpayers. At the onset, most 
research traditionally viewed problems of tax compliance from the theoretical perspective 
of economic deterrence models (Allingham & Sandmo, 1972; Dubin & Wilde, 1988; 
Riahi-Belkaoui, 2004). However, the suggestion has been made that economic variables 
alone do not provide a complete explanation or understanding of the puzzle of tax 
compliance behaviour (Alm, 1999; Riahi-Belkaoui, 2004). Hence, researchers began to 
pay attention to the influences of sociological and psychological factors affecting tax 
compliance behaviour (Alabede et al., 2012; Mason & Calvin, 1984; Recker et al., 1994). 
 
Drawing from past and recent literature, much theoretical development for a tax 
compliance model has been developed (Alabede et al., 2012; Chau & Leung, 2009; 
Manaf, 2004; Mustafa, 1997). This study, unlike others, further expanded Fischer‘s 
model to include work family financial commitment, fuel subsidy removal as well as the 
moderating effects of perceived service orientation and perceived corruption as a single 






The present findings have contributed to literature and theory development in the 
following ways: 1) establishing the effects of work - family financial commitment and 
fuel subsidy removal on tax compliance behaviour; 2) establishing the moderating effect 
of perceived service orientation on the relationship between incentives (positive 
inducement), public governance quality and tax compliance behaviour; 3) establishing 
the moderating effects of perceived corruption on the relationship between tax rates, 
probability of detection, incentives (positive inducement), tax knowledge and tax 
compliance behaviour; 4) extending the tax compliance model with two exogenous 
constructs and two moderating constructs; 5) integrating the work family spillover theory 
into the area of tax compliance; and 6) extending the theories of social exchange (Blau, 
1964) and social learning (Bandura, 1977).  
 
The literature in the area of behavioural sciences has indicated significant direct effects 
between work - family financial commitment and other factors such as job performance, 
organisational commitment, and psychological strain (Ahmad, 2008; Akintayo, 2010; 
Kalliath et al., 2012).  However, not much has been documented on the direct effect of 
work - family financial commitment on tax compliance behaviour. The strong evidence 
of negative influence of work - family financial commitment on tax compliance 
behaviour in this current study has provided new theoretical knowledge about its effects 
by revealing that work - family financial commitments have negative significant effects 
on tax compliance behaviour. This indicates that work - family financial commitment 





Another contribution to the literature of this current study was the findings on the 
relationship between fuel subsidy removal and tax compliance behaviour. The study 
established that the perceptions of taxpayers in relationship to fuel subsidy removal had a 
strong negative impact on tax compliance behaviour.  
 
Third, the study further reaffirmed the finding of the previous studies concerning the 
impact of public governance quality on compliance behaviour; however, in this study 
governance quality was related to the SME sector. 
 
Other key contributions of the study concerned the presence of moderators in the 
relationship between economic factors, psychological factors and tax compliance 
behaviour. The findings in this direction were in accordance with the earlier suggestions 
of Alabede et al. (2011) and Kirchler et al. (2007) that the relationship between tax 
compliance behaviour and its determinants may be moderated by certain variables. 
Hence, evidence from the findings revealed that perceived service orientation, as well as 
perceived corruption possessed moderating impacts on tax compliance behaviour and 
some of its factors. In particular, the findings revealed that only perceived service 
orientation in the tax compliance model significantly moderated the influence of 
incentives (positive inducement) (5% significance level) and public governance quality 
(10% significance level) on tax compliance behaviour. 
 
In addition, the study also revealed that, when perceived corruption was added to the 




rates (5% significance level), probability of detection (5% significance level), incentives 
(positive inducements) (5% significance level), and tax knowledge (10% significance 
level) on tax compliance behaviour. One unique finding of the moderating effect of 
perceived corruption was its ability to alter the direction of the relationship between tax 
rates, probability of detection, incentives and tax knowledge from a positive to a negative 
relationship. 
 
The findings further indicated that perceived service orientation and perceived corruption 
in the model accounted for (71% R2) as moderators and further strengthened the ability of 
the model to predict SMEs owners/manager‘s compliance behaviour. When the 
interacting effect of PSO and perceived corruption was not applied, the model accounted 
for (68% R2). Thus, this study suggests that the inclusion of perceived service orientation 
and perceived corruption specifically to Fischer's model further strengthen the predictive 
relevance of the tax compliance model from 68% to 71%, showing an increment of 3%.  
The effect of the moderating variables was regarded as being strong bearing the 
recommendation of .02, .15 and .35 as having weak, moderate and strong effects 
respectively (Chin, 1998). In a nutshell, these variables further enhanced the predictive 
relevance of the tax compliance model. 
 
Fundamentally, this study has further enriched the tax compliance literature, especially in 
relationship to factors influencing the tax compliance behaviour of SME 




research gap to developing countries as recommended in Chau and Leung (2009), Stefura 
(2011, 2012), and Torgler (2003, 2007). 
 
This research has expanded the frontier of knowledge by providing empirical evidence 
about the influence of work family financial commitment on tax compliance behaviour. 
Therefore, in this study, more than an ordinary validation of the relationship was done, 
and this is the first of its kind in the literature. The study follows the suggestion of Stefura 
(2011, 2012) for empirical studies that will incorporate more psychological and other 
noneconomic variables capable of explaining tax compliance behaviour in a more 
elaborate manner. 
7.4.2 Practical / Policy Implications 
The present study contributed several practical implications in terms of the factors that 
influence taxpayers‘ compliance behaviour in the context of Nigerian SMEs. The results 
suggest that work family financial commitment and fuel subsidy removal are important 
factors influencing tax compliance among the Nigerian SME owners/managers. In 
particular, the study is crucial to the States Board of Internal Revenues Services on the 
probable factors that could be managed better to mitigate the extremely high number of 
cases related to tax compliance issues in the country. 
 
Second, the findings also suggest that work family financial commitment and fuel 
subsidy removal were related to tax compliance behaviour of the SME owners/managers. 




tax compliance behaviour in the study. Hence, States as well as the Federal government 
could minimise the likelihood of this type of financial commitment through poverty 
reduction and mitigation, because work - family financial commitment is highly 
connected to extended family burdens, financial obligations, and poverty. These 
problems could be properly addressed through adequate counselling units in the States 
tax offices that have been established purposely for tackling those related cases. Placing 
priority in such implications, there is likelihood of increasing tax compliance from these 
sets of taxpayers. 
 
Furthermore, fuel subsidy removal was also found to be related negatively to tax 
compliance. Thus, the Federal government should reconsider its earlier decisions with 
regards to fuel subsidy removal in the country because the resources or funds derived 
from the exercises should be ploughed back into developing the country‘s infrastructural 
deficits. By doing so, the government would go a long way to motivating taxpayers to 
abide by the reciprocity principles, which, in turn, would motivate the taxpayers 
positively towards tax payment. Other incentives should also be provided to the taxpayers 
by the government in order to cushion the effects of the fuel subsidy removal in the 
country. Similarly, the timing of the fuel subsidy removal in the country should also be 
looked at because the country and its populace are just recovering from the global 
financial crisis. 
 
Finally, as stated at the beginning of this research, a blend of both the economic and 




(Stefura, 2011, 2012). Consequently, the findings suggest that, beside other economic 
factors and psychological factors that were adequately explored in the literature, other 
psychological factors (work family financial condition, fuel subsidy removal) should be 
accorded serious consideration as factors likely to affect SME taxpayers in Nigeria. As 
such policy makers should look at the possibility of integrating these motivational 
intrinsic factors in their frameworks so as to improve the level of compliance vis a vis 
revenue generation in their respective states. In particular, the moderating role of 
perceived service orientation suggests that effective service provision in the form of tax 
services and assistance could minimise the tendency of taxpayers to engage in a low level 
of tax payments. 
 
To do so, the relevant tax authorities could consider the integration of service-oriented 
units in the States Internal Revenue Services, the Federal Inland Revenue Services, as 
well as sponsoring public service announcements on radio stations and television stations 
in order to orient the taxpayers on the importance of tax payment. In addition, the 
moderating role of perceived corruption also suggests that, corruption constitutes one of 
the factors causing the low level of tax compliance in the country. The results revealed 
that, aside other determinants, corruption are one of the most important factors affecting 
the social contract of taxpayers with the government. With a new government in place, 
for which fighting corruption is among its policy thrusts, this finding will assist the 




7.4.3 Methodological Implications 
The present study has several methodological implications. This study tried in testing the 
measures of Carlson et al.‘s (2000) work family financial commitment measures and 
Abdelrahim‘s (2014) fuel subsidy removal measures for the first time into the area of 
taxation in order to capture the extent to which financial commitment and fuel subsidy 
removal affect the taxpayers in the context of a developing economy. By doing that, this 
study clarified and tested the measures of both work family financial commitment and 
fuel subsidy removal in relationship to tax compliance in Nigeria, different from the 
settings in which the measures were formally developed. Therefore, the integration of 
work family financial condition and fuel subsidy removal scales into the area of tax 
compliance is another methodological contribution. Similarly, the validation of Alabede 
et al.‘s (2011) public governance quality measurement scale adopted in this study 
provided another methodological contribution. 
 
Another methodological contribution of this study is related to the application of smart 
PLS path modeling in assessing the properties of the latent constructs in the study. Past 
studies on tax compliance behaviour have employed analytical tool such as SPSS to 
produce results (Alabede et al., 2011; Manaf, 2004; Tayib, 1998; Palil & Mustapha, 
2011). In the context of Nigeria same SPSS software were employed in tax compliance 
studies by several authors (Atawodi & Ojeka, 2012; Aronmwan, Imobhio & Izedonmi, 
2015; Modugu & Anyaduba, 2014; Oladipupo & Obazee, 2016). Even though Chan et al. 
(2000) employed SEM in estimating the parameters of their constructs, but their model 




exogenous as well as two moderating constructs as a combined model which is one of the 
advantages of using PLS SEM. Therefore, this relatively new tool of analysis (i.e., PLS-
SEM) explained the structural relationship between the study's constructs. PLS-SEM is 
seen as a general model that comprises multivariate analysis of variance among other 
analyses. Thus, employing this tool of analysis has significant methodological 
connotations.  
 
In particular, this study succeeded in assessing the properties of each latent variable in 
terms of their convergent validity, as well as their discriminant validity. These properties 
included individual items reliability, average variance extracted (AVE), and composite 
reliability of each construct. Therefore, the present study has used one of the more robust 
methods (PLS-SEM) in assessing the psychometric features of each construct as shown in 
the study's research framework. 
7.5 Limitations and Future Research Directions   
This study has provided empirical support for some of the hypothesized relationships 
between the exogenous latent variables and endogenous latent constructs; hence, these 
findings have to be interpreted with caution. 
 
First, this study adopted a cross-sectional research design in which causal inferences 
pertaining the study's population may not be made with certainty. Hence, a longitudinal 




accurate estimate and measurement of the study‘s constructs at different time intervals in 
order to further confirm or validate this study. 
 
Second, all the study constructs were assessed using self-reported measures like other 
compliance research. Dodaj (2012) and Podsakoff et al. (2003) revealed that the use of 
self-reported measures is normally accompanied with common method variance as well 
as social desirability bias. Self-reported measures might not actually portray the real 
behaviours of SME taxpayers (Hessing, Elffers, & Weigel, 1988; van Djike & Verboon, 
2010). 
 
Notwithstanding its limitations, this study tried to reduce these issues through improving 
the scales as well as ensuring anonymity of the participants (Podsakoff et al., 2003; 
Podsakoff et al., 2012). It is of interest to note that the respondents might have under-
reported their survey responses in the questionnaires. Therefore, researchers might wish 
to employ other strategies to assess tax compliance behaviour of SME owners/managers 
in the future. 
 
Third, it is also important to note that the present study offers limited generalizability 
because it focused mainly on SMEs owners/managers in two states located in the North 
Western part of Nigeria. Additionally, the accuracy and the authenticity of the list of 
SMEs was not certain, even though that list was derived from SMEDAN. Further 




taxpayers in order to generalize the results. Therefore, SME taxpayers should be studied 
in comparison with other taxpayers. 
 
Fourth, this study research model was able to explain 71% of the total variance in tax 
compliance behaviour, which means that other latent variables could explain the variance 
in tax compliance. Because compliance behaviour could be explained by other factors 
that accounted for 29% of the variance, future study is needed to consider other possible 
factors that could affect the behaviours of the SME taxpayers. 
 
Finally, perceived service orientation was not found to moderate the relationship 
between: 1) tax rates; 2) probability of detection; 3) tax complexity, and 4) tax 
knowledge and tax compliance behaviour. This could possibly be the result of other 
mediating effects or other moderating variables. In particular, the relationship between 
these factors could be mediated by the influence of perceived service orientation. 
Similarly, perceived corruption was not found to moderate the relationship between: 1) 
tax complexity and 2) public governance quality, and tax compliance behaviour. 
Therefore, their relationship may also be mediated by perceived corruption. Thus, 
considering either perceived service orientation or perceived corruption as a mediator 
could be another good avenue for future studies. Furthermore, the relationship between 
tax rates and tax compliance behaviour, tax complexity and tax compliance behaviour, 
and tax knowledge and tax compliance behaviour was found to be insignificant; hence, it 
is necessary in the future to verify whether the presence of other moderating variables 





The present study has provided additional evidence to the growing body of knowledge 
about tax compliance. Theoretically, important gaps exist in the literature concerning the 
puzzle of tax compliance. Past research in this area (Alabede et al., 2011; Stefura, 2011, 
2012) have not addressed the following: 1) the influence of work - family financial 
commitment and tax compliance behaviour; 2) the influence of fuel subsidy removal and 
tax compliance behaviour; and 3) the moderating role of perceived service orientation 
and perceived corruption on the relationship between economic factors, psychological 
factors and tax compliance behaviour. 
 
The present study has contributed to the body of knowledge by providing empirical 
evidence about the effects of work family financial commitment, fuel subsidy removal 
and tax compliance behaviour. This study also lends theoretical and empirical support to 
the significant moderating effects of perceived service orientation, perceived corruption 
on the relationship between some of the economic factors, psychological factors and tax 
compliance behaviour. 
 
Aside from the study's major contributions, this research has also contributed to the body 
of literature by further validating past findings (Alabede et al., 2011, Manaf, 2004; 






Essentially, and bearing the new context of Nigeria, as well as the setting (SMEs) of this 
study, this research has shown that work family financial commitment and fuel subsidy 
removal negatively affects taxpayers‘ behaviour, which, in turn, affects their tax 
compliance behaviour negatively. Even though, Organ, Podsakoff, and Mackenzie (2006) 
argued that leaders who provide personal support (incentives, infrastructural facilities) to 
followers (taxpayers) and show absolute interest in them will motivated them to 
reciprocate the same gesture by means such as tax payments. 
 
Basically, the findings of this study have indicated a great association or linkage between 
work family financial commitment, fuel subsidy removal and tax compliance behaviour 
and the significant moderating effects of perceived service orientation, perceived 
corruption on the relationship between economic and psychological factors and tax 
compliance behaviour. Hence, the study will be relevant to the States Internal Revenue 
Services, Federal Inland Revenue Services, SMEDAN, as well as to SME owners in the 
country. The findings indicate that considering these newly introduced determinants will 
give the government new avenues for tackling the extremely high number of cases of a 
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Dear Respondent,  
 
A SURVEY ON DETERMINANTS OF TAX COMPLIANCE BEHAVIOUR OF 
SMALL AND MEDIUM ENTERPRISES IN NIGERIA: THE MODERATING 
ROLE OF PERCEIVED SERVICE ORIENTATION AND PERCEIVED 
CORRUPTION 
 
This questionnaire is designed purely for academic research purpose. It is meant to aid in 
data collection that can satisfy the requirement for the award of a Ph.D. degree in 
Accounting. The questionnaire is designed to source data on taxpayers‘ perceptions and 
opinions about the Nigerian SMEs income tax system. The main objective of the study is 
to determine factors influencing SMEs owners/managers‘ compliance behavior in 
Nigeria. As an owner/manager of the respective SMEs in the country, your participation 
in this survey is vital in order to obtain the necessary information needed for the success 
of this study. Your responses will be treated with ultimate confidence and used strictly 
for academic purposes. 
 
Thank you in anticipation of your cooperation and assistance. In case of any enquiry, 










Ayuba Augustine, Ph.D. Candidate (Accounting) 
School of Accountancy, 
College of Business, 
Universiti Utara Malaysia. 







1. Kindly complete the questionnaire attached herewith. 
2. Please circle the number you consider appropriate for each question  
3. Only one tick is to be made against each question.  
 
PART 1: Tax compliance behaviour 
Based on your own judgment, please state your agreement or disagreement for the following 









1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly Disagree Disagree  Indifferent Agree Strongly Agree 
TCB1    Trading goods or services from one SME to another without reporting it 
in a tax return is permissible. 1 2 3 4 5 
TCB2    Reporting income fully by SMEs, but not including a little extra amount 
of income is accepted. 1 2 3 4 5 
TCB3    Being paid cash to an SME for a job and then not reporting it in the tax 
returns is permissible. 1 2 3 4 5 
TCB4    Not reporting some earnings by the SME from interest earn or investment 
     which the government would not be able to find out is allowed. 1 2 3 4 5 
TCB5    Adding a little bit of what the SME actually spent when reporting in the 
     business is permissible 1 2 3 4 5 
TCB6    Since a lot of rich people pay no taxes at all, if SMEs underpay a little, its 
     not a big deal. 1 2 3 4 5 
TCB7    Tax rates are just too high, so it is not really cheating when SMEs find 
     ways to pay less tax than they are supposed to. 1 2 3 4 5 
TCB8    When SMEs are not really sure, whether or not they deserve a tax 
     deduction, it makes sense to take a chance and take a deduction anyway. 1 2 3 4 5 
TCB9    With the rising cost of living these days, it is okay for SMEs to cut a few 
     corners on its tax returns just to help pay the bills. 1 2 3 4 5 
TCB10   It is not wrong for SMEs to hold back a little bit on taxes since the 
     government spends too much anyway. 1 2 3 4 5 
TCB11  When the SME know, it deserves a deduction that the government will  
not let it take, it makes sense to take it some other place where they will 
not  know. 
1 2 3 4 5 
TCB12   It is not so wrong to under - report certain income since it does not really 
      hurt anyone. 1 2 3 4 5 
TCB13  The chances of getting caught are so low that, it is worthwhile trying to 
     cut corners by the SME, 1 2 3 4 5 
TCB14  It is all right to occasionally under-report certain income or claim an 
     undeserved deduction if the SMEs are generally law abiding. 1 2 3 4 5 
TCB15  Stretching self-relief deductions by the SME owner/manager to include 






PART 2: Work family financial commitment 
The following statements refer to some of the statement placed on work family financial 








1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly Disagree Disagree  Indifferent Agree Strongly Agree 
WFFC1    SME work keeps me from my family activities more than I would         
         like. 1 2 3 4 5 
WFFC2    The time I must devote to my business keeps me from participating        
                  equally in household responsibilities and activities. 1 2 3 4 5 
WFFC3     I have to miss family activities due to the amount of time I must        
         spend on work responsibilities. 1 2 3 4 5 
WFFC4    The time I spend on family responsibilities often interfere with my       
         business responsibilities. 1 2 3 4 5 
WFFC5    The time I spend with my family often causes me not to spend time       
        in activities at work that could be helpful to the SME. 1 2 3 4 5 
WFFC6    I have to miss business activities due to the amount of time I must        
        spend on family responsibilities. 1 2 3 4 5 
WFFC7    When I get home from work I am often too exhausted to participate       
        in family activities/ responsibilities. 1 2 3 4 5 
WFFC8    I am often so emotionally drained when I get home from work that it 
        prevents me from contributing to my family. 1 2 3 4 5 
WFFC9    Due to all the pressures at work, sometimes when I come home I am  
        too stressed to do the things I enjoy. 1 2 3 4 5 
WFFC10  Due to stress at home, I am often preoccupied with family matters at    
        work. 1 2 3 4 5 
WFFC11  Because I am  often stressed from family responsibilities, I have a        
        hard time concentrating on my business. 1 2 3 4 5 
WFFC12  Tension and anxiety from my family life often weakens my ability       
         to fulfill my business obligations. 1 2 3 4 5 
WFFC13  The problem-solving behaviors I use in my business are not effective      
         in resolving problems at home. 1 2 3 4 5 
WFFC14  Behavior that is effective and necessary for me at home would be     
        counterproductive at my business domain. 1 2 3 4 5 
WFFC15  The behaviors I perform that makes me effective at work do not help 
         me to be a better parent and spouse. 1 2 3 4 5 
WFFC16 The behaviors that work for me at home do not seem to be effective at   
        work. 1 2 3 4 5 
WFFC17 Behavior that is effective and necessary for me at home would be        
        counterproductive at work. 1 2 3 4 5 
WFFC18 The problem-solving behavior that work for me at home does not       





PART 3: Fuel subsidy removal 
 
The following statements refer to some of the statement placed fuel subsidy removal. Using the 







1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly Disagree Disagree  Indifferent Agree Strongly Agree 
FSR1      Fuel subsidy removal increases the cost of energy consumption to SMEs. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
FSR2      Fuel subsidy removal increases the cost of electricity consumption to SMEs. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
FSR3      Fuel subsidy removal has a positive impact on SMEs production. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
FSR4      Fuel subsidy removal has a negative impact on the cost of raw materials used 
      by the SMEs 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
FSR5      Fuel subsidy removal has a positive impact on SMEs disposable income. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
FSR6     Fuel subsidy withdrawal has stimulated a general increase in the prices of 
      goods and services. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
FSR7      Fuel subsidy removal has improved comparative advantage of exports. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
FSR8     Fuel subsidy removal has improved the comparative advantage of trading by a 
     local SME and other SMEs outside the country. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
FSR9    Fuel subsidy removal has negative impact on the SMEs internal cost of 
     transportation. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
FSR10   Fuel subsidy withdrawal has a negative impact on public budget in Nigeria. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
FSR FSR11   Fuel subsidy removal has a negative impact on national investment in renewable 
             energy. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
FSR12   Fuel subsidy removal has brought untold hardship to the masses and the SMEs. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
FSR13  Fuel subsidy removal poses an obstacle to SMEs in obtaining credit facilities 
    from the commercial banks. 
 




PART4: Tax rates 
The following statements refer to some of the statement placed on tax rates. Using the scale 




PART 5: Probability of detection  




(A). Imagine AYUBCO ENTERPRISES has been paid some amounts in cash for services offered to other enterprises. 
AYUBCO ENTERPRISES did not declare it on its income tax return. Indicate the extent of your agreement or 
disagreement with the statements below: 
       
PD1 There is low chance that AYUBCO ENTERPRISES will be caught by the tax authority, if the amount paid is just N10,000. 1 2 3 4 5 




(B). Imagine AYUBCO ENTERPRISES claimed some amounts as deductions when the expenses are not actually 
deductible. Indicate the extent of your agreement or disagreement with the statements below: 
 
       
PD3 There is high chance that AYUBCO ENTERPRISES will be caught by the tax authority, if the amount it claimed as deduction is N50,000. 1 2 3 4 5 
PD4 There is low chance that AYUBCO ENTERPRISES will be caught by the tax authority, if the amount it claimed as deduction is N5,000. 1 2 3 4 5 
 
(C). Assuming AYUBCO ENTERPRISES is caught for not declaring and deducting the amount stated in (PD1) and 
(PD2) above respectively, indicate how much a problem do you think the following legal consequences would be to 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly Disagree Disagree  Indifferent Agree Strongly Agree 
TR1 It is absolutely okay that, the higher the profit declared by the SMEs the 
higher the rate of income tax. 1 2 3 4 5 
TR2 It is not okay that, SMEs who earned higher returns on its investment 
proportionately pay higher taxes compared to those who earned less. 1 2 3 4 5 
TR3 An appropriate tax rate should be the same for every SME regardless of 
their income. 1 2 3 4 5 
TR4 The share of the total income taxes paid by SMEs who declared higher 
profit is not too much high. 1 2 3 4 5 
 TR5 SMEs who declared moderate profits typically pay more than fair share of 
the income tax burden. 1 2 3 4 5 
TR6 The share of total income taxes paid by the SMEs who declared lower profit 





       
PD5 Pay the tax they owe with interest. 1 2 3 4 5 
PD6 Pay substantial fine and pay the tax they owe with interest. 1 2 3 4 5 
PD7 Taken to court and pay the tax they owe with interest. 1 2 3 4 5 




PART 6: Tax complexity 
Please indicate the extent of your agreement with each statement based on the following scale: 
 
 
PART 7: Incentives (Positive inducement) 
The following are statements placed on incentives (positive inducement). Using the scale below 










1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly Disagree Disagree  Indifferent Agree Strongly Agree 
TC1 I think the term used in tax publications (e.g., SBIRS guide books) and in tax 
return forms are difficult. 1 2 3 4 5 
TC2 The sentences and wording in the SMEs Income Tax Return Guide are lengthy 
and not user-friendly. 1 2 3 4 5 
TC3 The rules related to SMEs income tax are clear. 1 2 3 4 5 
TC4 Most at times our SME do refer to others for assistance in dealing with tax 
matters. 1 2 3 4 5 
TC5 Our SME do not always have a problem with completing and filing the tax return 
form(s). 1 2 3 4 5 
TC6 As an SME, we find it tedious to maintain all our relevant records for the whole 
year for tax purposes. 1 2 3 4 5 
TC7 As an SME we do not have to make a lot of effort to understand the explanations 
given in the State Internal Revenue Service (SIRS) guide books and other similar 
explanatory material. 
1 2 3 4 5 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly Disagree Disagree  Indifferent Agree Strongly Agree 
IPI1 Tax collection on SMEs would increase, if incentives were given to the 
SMEs taxpayers' who are honest. 1 2 3 4 5 
IPI2 If government plans to give positive inducement to compliant SMEs, the 




PART 8: Tax knowledge 




PART 9: Public governance quality 







1 2 3 
I don't know No Yes 
TK1 Is interest on savings account taxable under the SMEs income tax law? 
 1 2 3 
TK2 Rent received from sub-letting part of the SME building is taxable under the Nigerian 
income tax law 1 2 3 
TK3 Dividend received by the SME from another investment is taxable under the Nigerian 
income tax law. 1 2 3 
TK4 Are provision for doubtful debt and other business/personal expenses allowed for 
deduction under the Nigerian SMEs income tax law? 1 2 3 
TK5 Medical expenses and other business expenses allow for deduction under the Nigerian 
SMEs income tax law? 1 2 3 
TK6 Loss on sale of assets and other business/personal expenses allowed for deduction under 
the Nigerian SMEs income tax law? 1 2 3 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly Disagree Disagree  Indifferent Agree Strongly Agree 
PGQ1      I trust the National Assembly in making good laws for Nigeria. 1 2 3 4 5 
PGQ2      There is no free and fair election in Nigeria. 1 2 3 4 5 
PGQ3      I have access to the published accounts and the annual report of the Federal    
                Government. 1 2 3 4 5 
PGQ4      I am not satisfied with the quality of general infrastructure in Nigeria. 1 2 3 4 5 
PGQ5      I am satisfied with the manner the government is handling the health services 1 2 3 4 5 
PGQ6     I am not satisfied with the manner the government is handing the education 
                system. 
 
1 2 3 4 5 
PGQ7      I trust the financial honesty of Nigerian politicians. 
 1 2 3 4 5 
PGQ8     The diversion of public funds due to corruption is common in Nigeria 
 1 2 3 4 5 
PGQ9     Political stability is not declining in Nigeria. 1 2 3 4 5 
PGQ10   Ethnic and religious conflict is not a threat to stability in Nigeria. 1 2 3 4 5 
PGQ11   Nigeria‘s Judiciary is free of interference of other arms of government.  1  2  3  4   5 
PGQ12   Justice is not fairly administered in Nigeria. 1 2 3 4 5 




PART 10: Perceived Service Orientation 






The tax authority: 
     
PSO1 Does everything possible to serve SMEs and other people in general 1 2 3 4 5 
PSO2 Treats SMEs and its businesses with respect 1 2 3 4 5 
PSO3 Keeps its promises in relation to SMEs business 1 2 3 4 5 
PSO4 Treats every SMEs fairly, and 1 2 3 4 5 
PSO5 Makes SMEs circumstances sufficiently into account 1 2 3 4 5 
 
PART 11: Perceived Corruption  




PART 12: Relate to the personal profile of the respondent and some general 
information about the SMEs.  
 






2) Age (years): 
 Less than 30 
  31-40 
  41-50 




1 2 3 4 5 
Completely 
disagree Disagree  Indifferent Agree 
Completely 
Agree 
1 2 3 4 5 
Strongly Disagree Disagree  Indifferent Agree Strongly Agree 
PC1        Individuals pay bribes and tips to get things done. 1 2 3 4 5 
PC2        Organizations pay bribes and tips to get things done. 1 2 3 4 5 
PC3        If public officials act against rules, help can be obtained elsewhere. 1 2 3 4 5 




3)  What is your highest educational qualification: 
 Doctorate degree 
 Master degree 
 Bachelor degree or equivalent 
 Diploma or A - level equivalent 
 GCE or O - level equivalent 
 
4) How many years of experience do you have in SMEs related business: 
  1 -  5 
  6 - 10 
 Above 10  
 
5) How long has your SME being in existence (in years): 
 Less than 5years 
 6 - 10 
 11 – 15 
 16 - 20 
 More than 20years 
 
End of questions 
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Appendix G: Common Method Bias (Total Variance Explained) 
Table 6.4 
Summary of Factor Analysis for Common Method Bias (Total Variance Explained) 
Component Initial Eigenvalues Extraction Sums of Squared 
Loadings 




1 11.39 11.74 11.74 11.39 11.74 11.74 
2 7.21 7.44 19.18 7.21 7.44 19.18 
3 6.37 6.57 25.76 6.37 6.57 25.76 
4 5.53 5.70 31.47 5.53 5.70 31.47 
5 4.65 4.80 36.27 4.65 4.80 36.27 
6 3.85 3.97 40.24 3.85 3.97 40.24 
7 3.42 3.53 43.78 3.42 3.53 43.78 
8 3.03 3.13 46.91 3.03 3.13 46.91 
9 2.83 2.91 49.83 2.83 2.91 49.83 
10 2.34 2.41 52.24 2.34 2.41 52.24 
11 2.22 2.29 54.54 2.22 2.29 54.54 
12 2.11 2.18 56.72 2.12 2.18 56.72 
13 1.94 2.01 58.73 1.95 2.01 58.73 
14 1.89 1.95 60.68 1.89 1.95 60.68 
15 1.76 1.82 62.50 1.76 1.82 62.50 
16 1.74 1.80 64.29 1.74 1.80 64.29 
17 1.61 1.66 65.95 1.61 1.66 65.95 
18 1.47 1.52 67.47 1.47 1.52 67.47 
19 1.40 1.44 68.91 1.40 1.44 68.91 
20 1.35 1.40 70.31 1.36 1.40 70.31 
21 1.25 1.30 71.61 1.26 1.30 71.61 
22 1.20 1.24 72.85 1.21 1.24 72.85 
23 1.15 1.19 74.04 1.16 1.19 74.04 
24 1.14 1.19 75.22 1.15 1.19 75.22 
25 1.09 1.12 76.35 1.09 1.12 76.35 
26 1.04 1.07 77.42 1.04 1.07 77.42 
27 1.02 1.06 78.48 1.03 1.06 78.48 
28 0.99 1.02 79.50 
   29 0.95 0.98 80.48 
   30 0.92 0.95 81.43 
   31 0.88 0.91 82.34 
   32 0.83 0.86 83.20 
   33 0.81 0.84 84.04 
   34 0.76 0.78 84.82 
   35 0.75 0.78 85.60 
   36 0.73 0.76 86.37 
   37 0.71 0.74 87.11 




38 0.69 0.72 87.82 
   39 0.65 0.67 88.49 
   40 0.63 0.65 89.15 
   41 0.61 0.63 89.78 
   42 0.58 0.60 90.38 
   43 0.56 0.59 90.97 
   44 0.55 0.57 91.53 
   45 0.53 0.55 92.08 
   46 0.51 0.54 92.62 
   47 0.48 0.50 93.11 
   48 0.45 0.46 93.58 
   49 0.43 0.45 94.03 
   50 0.42 0.44 94.47 
   51 0.40 0.42 94.89 
   52 0.38 0.40 95.28 
   53 0.35 0.37 95.65 
   54 0.35 0.36 96.01 
   55 0.33 0.34 96.36 
   56 0.31 0.32 96.68 
   57 0.30 0.31 96.99 
   58 0.29 0.30 97.29 
   59 0.27 0.28 97.57 
   60 0.25 0.26 97.83 
   61 0.24 0.26 98.09 
   62 0.20 0.21 98.30 
   63 0.19 0.20 98.50 
   64 0.18 0.19 98.69 
   65 0.16 0.17 98.86 
   66 0.16 0.17 99.03 
   67 0.14 0.15 99.18 
   68 0.12 0.13 99.31 
   69 0.11 0.12 99.43 
   70 0.11 0.12 99.55 
   71 0.09 0.10 99.64 
   72 0.07 0.08 99.72 
   73 0.06 0.07 99.79 
   74 0.05 0.06 99.85 
   75 0.04 0.04 99.89 
   76 0.03 0.04 99.93 
   77 0.03 0.03 99.96 
   78 0.01 0.02 99.98 
   79 0.01 0.02 99.99 












80 0.00 0.01 100.00 
   81 0.00 0.00 100.00 
   82 0.00 0.00 100.00 
   83 0.00 0.00 100.00 
   84 0.00 0.00 100.00 
   85 0.00 0.00 100.00 
   86 0.00 0.00 100.00 
   87 0.00 0.00 100.00 
   88 0.00 0.00 100.00 
   89 0.00 0.00 100.00 
   90 0.00 0.00 100.00 
   91 0.00 0.00 100.00 
   92 0.00 0.00 100.00 
   93 0.00 0.00 100.00 
   94 0.00 0.00 100.00 
   95 0.00 0.00 100.00 
   96 0.00 0.00 100.00 




Appendix H: PLS Output 
PLS Quality Criteria Overview 
Constructs 
Composite 
Reliability AVE R Square 
Cronbach‘s 
Alpha Communality Redundancy 
FSR 0.921082 0.594019 
 
0.907729 0.594019 
 IPI 0.831635 0.712757 
 
0.607082 0.712756 
 PC 0.743382 0.591737 
 
0.310575 0.591737 
 PD 0.862117 0.677019 
 
0.775894 0.677019 
 PGQ 0.829682 0.619305 
 
0.697705 0.619305 
 PSO 0.752558 0.504107 
 
0.510263 0.504107 
 TC 0.826293 0.704881 
 
0.589856 0.704881 
 TCB 0.948005 0.64646 0.682888 0.939444 0.64646 0.019171 
TK 0.859754 0.681523 
 
0.733782 0.681523 
 TR 0.899984 0.693959 
 
0.857411 0.693959 




Latent Variable Correlations 
  FSR IPI PC PD PGQ PSO TC TCB TK TR WFFC 
FSR 1.0000 
          IPI -0.12218 1.0000 
         PC 0.00904 -0.04927 1.0000 
        PD 0.00676 0.109054 -0.012486 1.0000 
       PGQ -0.00435 0.119141 -0.006975 0.160276 1.0000 
      PSO -0.03786 0.043099 0.088243 0.117307 0.027516 1.0000 
     TC 0.06672 -0.12556 -0.046207 -0.01862 -0.04486 -0.01324 1.0000 
    TCB -0.19676 0.791446 -0.134622 0.197982 0.207207 0.11173 -0.14521 1.0000 
   TK 0.04249 -0.10648 -0.070234 -0.01445 0.047187 -0.31039 -0.00434 -0.10275 1.0000 
  TR 0.06780 -0.00031 0.016314 0.075529 0.029088 -0.04791 -0.02841 0.021389 0.012553 1.0000 




  FSR IPI PC PD PGQ PSO TC TCB TK TR WFFC 
FSR1 0.777164 -0.008552 -0.034236 -0.016511 -0.101465 -0.059457 0.09028 -0.087903 -0.033796 0.074398 0.051692 
FSR2 0.738822 -0.143922 0.026046 0.043599 -0.118404 0.032081 0.020355 -0.154096 -0.007997 0.01659 0.116151 
FSR3 0.827717 -0.131257 -0.02262 -0.013028 0.075918 -0.071844 0.070479 -0.200088 0.100395 0.073673 0.073724 
FSR4 0.775077 -0.020954 -0.030134 0.001737 -0.113128 -0.000789 0.126341 -0.079901 -0.011774 0.085222 0.04236 
FSR5 0.719736 -0.103421 0.050563 -0.001698 -0.105116 -0.027733 0.012133 -0.119227 -0.00474 0.019767 0.1038 
FSR6 0.788491 -0.11109 -0.015563 0.014886 0.105229 -0.036604 0.057279 -0.210493 0.021223 0.046576 0.079982 
FSR7 0.822021 -0.082983 0.058108 -0.026744 0.04322 -0.046985 0.02307 -0.147961 0.094693 0.064023 0.083339 
FSR8 0.707811 -0.015199 0.043692 0.08377 0.03268 0.041326 0.048717 -0.044566 0.039402 0.066243 0.17397 
IPI1 -0.083961 0.900064 -0.039923 0.134109 0.03865 0.057093 -0.121194 0.768958 -0.093239 -0.03405 -0.150317 
IPI2 -0.132864 0.784473 -0.044948 0.034381 0.19107 0.007764 -0.086846 0.540307 -0.087224 0.047817 -0.228107 
PC1 0.001724 -0.044636 0.748976 -0.001662 0.011094 0.084742 -0.023888 -0.099571 -0.025887 -0.044824 -0.005117 
PC2 0.011818 -0.031704 0.788992 -0.016981 -0.020634 0.05233 -0.046398 -0.107381 -0.080187 0.065766 0.017864 
PD1 -0.011326 0.131615 -0.033166 0.814271 0.121025 0.087367 -0.088391 0.192321 -0.008527 0.053905 0.014691 
PD2 0.002663 0.076652 0.023553 0.899556 0.134585 0.111638 0.056379 0.174701 -0.023391 0.093499 -0.015776 
PD3 0.051088 0.027638 -0.029192 0.747541 0.161836 0.093696 0.001786 0.083273 0.003506 0.02039 -0.07414 
PGQ12 -0.048893 0.129941 0.019357 0.109531 0.783269 -0.031382 -0.039336 0.153659 -0.025495 0.044307 -0.015593 
PGQ3 0.006135 0.084205 -0.028306 0.183736 0.828911 0.059255 -0.082373 0.19403 0.040543 -0.013418 0.016967 
PGQ7 0.035379 0.067702 -0.000991 0.063495 0.746533 0.028589 0.037808 0.132003 0.105827 0.051826 -0.00649 
PSO1 -0.084324 0.045503 0.0714 0.083548 0.009322 0.751747 0.042737 0.087294 -0.168568 -0.10017 -0.127099 
PSO3 -0.020504 0.048627 0.069697 0.03234 0.000001 0.714106 -0.051927 0.08097 -0.283323 -0.026187 -0.044656 
PSO4 0.03865 -0.009428 0.043949 0.144498 0.05603 0.661249 0.025745 0.068267 -0.214904 0.040823 0.039602 
TC1 0.054286 -0.131926 -0.01482 -0.008282 -0.00577 0.008959 0.783336 -0.100892 0.043255 0.022485 0.010322 




TCB1 -0.180065 0.447801 -0.132578 0.174241 0.271603 0.132963 -0.12163 0.785258 -0.087735 0.040459 -0.306553 
TCB11 -0.106082 0.843332 -0.066813 0.135524 0.02648 0.061949 -0.109778 0.788124 -0.068556 -0.01105 -0.165635 
TCB13 -0.061374 0.653863 -0.158112 0.102775 0.142574 0.062923 -0.078731 0.821043 -0.07432 0.048529 -0.31565 
TCB14 -0.284154 0.504591 -0.064675 0.224573 0.20173 0.07828 -0.093248 0.754773 -0.039168 -0.00062 -0.077688 
TCB2 -0.232111 0.564819 -0.130911 0.203168 0.261667 0.137813 -0.158463 0.868272 -0.11778 0.06938 -0.186734 
TCB4 -0.096135 0.859691 -0.064736 0.127521 0.023141 0.062804 -0.119711 0.789551 -0.078139 -0.018352 -0.173085 
TCB6 -0.053303 0.681061 -0.155673 0.094171 0.13803 0.059936 -0.093884 0.827297 -0.084899 0.036621 -0.326625 
TCB7 -0.27502 0.529268 -0.063522 0.215998 0.197248 0.075572 -0.106032 0.760727 -0.048548 -0.010293 -0.08943 
TCB8 -0.155284 0.472884 -0.130979 0.165045 0.270182 0.112503 -0.110027 0.752666 -0.089907 -0.036583 -0.23729 
TCB9 -0.216379 0.606146 -0.12784 0.191617 0.254067 0.139205 -0.175296 0.880977 -0.133459 0.056689 -0.200734 
TK1 0.014461 -0.071641 -0.134187 -0.056857 -0.035396 -0.326476 -0.101178 -0.074824 0.558799 -0.021476 -0.015298 
TK2 0.033687 -0.102424 -0.032034 0.011855 0.087816 -0.226838 0.034492 -0.089897 0.929681 0.028723 -0.009965 
TK5 0.05365 -0.085133 -0.01789 0.002442 0.051714 -0.220963 0.041331 -0.086523 0.931669 0.018617 -0.017106 
TR1 0.043744 -0.007142 -0.003939 0.071248 0.047521 -0.03566 -0.019112 0.025139 0.036463 0.921568 -0.022734 
TR2 0.058587 0.016068 0.032349 0.026946 0.06212 -0.078803 0.030748 0.011361 0.042613 0.882977 0.015643 
TR5 0.072384 -0.003977 0.004919 0.085204 -0.002194 -0.014847 -0.079037 0.016889 -0.049705 0.74761 0.059409 
TR6 0.068665 0.006758 0.067992 0.04739 -0.051998 -0.058205 0.001195 0.007137 0.011588 0.766798 0.092835 
WFFC1 0.050769 -0.134462 0.030215 -0.019601 -0.093554 -0.044332 -0.01781 -0.198738 -0.017975 0.032075 0.835866 
WFFC10 0.192914 -0.137135 -0.000207 0.003617 -0.004974 -0.124084 0.023581 -0.257351 -0.015363 -0.01063 0.82359 
WFFC11 0.050279 -0.130074 0.024762 -0.017937 -0.094366 -0.04958 -0.018741 -0.198445 -0.017738 0.024643 0.839088 
WFFC12 0.006847 -0.262925 -0.011654 -0.025797 0.125244 0.011171 -0.014424 -0.157579 -0.006316 0.044377 0.732061 
WFFC14 0.050279 -0.130074 0.024762 -0.017937 -0.094366 -0.04958 -0.018741 -0.198445 -0.017738 0.024643 0.839088 
WFFC15 0.006847 -0.262925 -0.011654 -0.025797 0.125244 0.011171 -0.014424 -0.157579 -0.006316 0.044377 0.732061 
WFFC18 0.19431 -0.143488 0.006437 0.001538 -0.004565 -0.118449 0.024646 -0.259544 -0.01579 -0.001656 0.826828 
WFFC2 0.007765 -0.267541 -0.004195 -0.027915 0.124749 0.017706 -0.013202 -0.158029 -0.006695 0.054022 0.727559 




WFFC6 0.049459 -0.124824 0.01913 -0.01615 -0.094564 -0.054521 -0.019552 -0.196855 -0.017384 0.017026 0.836842 











































Structural model (Bootstrap with 281 cases) 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
